This volume argues that the crisis of the European Union is not merely a fiscal crisis but reveals and amplifies deeper flaws in the structure of the EU itself. It is a multidimensional crisis of the economic, legal and political cornerstones of European integration and marks the end of the technocratic mode of integration which has been dominant since the 1950s. The EU has a weak political and administrative centre, relies excessively on governance by law, is challenged by increasing heterogeneity and displays increasingly interlocked levels of government. During the crisis, it has become more and more asymmetrical and has intervened massively in domestic economic and legal systems. A team of economists, lawyers, philosophers and political scientists analyze these deeper dimensions of the European crisis from a broader theoretical perspective with a view towards contributing to a better understanding and shaping the trajectory of the EU.

This volume argues that the crisis of the European Union is not merely a fiscal crisis but reveals and amplifies deeper flaws in the structure of the EU itself. It is a multidimensional crisis of the economic, legal and political cornerstones of European integration and marks the end of the technocratic mode of integration which has been dominant since the 1950s. The EU has a weak political and administrative centre, relies excessively on governance by law, is challenged by increasing heterogeneity and displays increasingly interlocked levels of government. During the crisis, it has become more and more asymmetrical and has intervened massively in domestic economic and legal systems. A team of economists, lawyers, philosophers and political scientists analyse these deeper dimensions of the European crisis from a broader theoretical perspective with a view towards contributing to a better understanding and shaping the trajectory of the EU.

This book takes a wide-ranging approach to tackle the complex question of the current state of constitutional democracy in the EU. It brings together a broad set of academics and practitioners with legal and political perspectives to focus on both topical and perennial issues concerning constitutional democracy (including safeguarding the rule of law and respect for fundamental rights) in theory and practice, primarily at EU level but also with due regard to national and global developments. This approach underlines that rather than a single problématique to be analysed and resolved, we are presently facing a kaleidoscopic spectrum of related challenges that influence each other in elusive, multifaceted ways. Critical Reflections on Constitutional Democracy in the European Union offers a rich analysis of the issues as well as concrete policy recommendations, which will appeal to scholars and practitioners, students and interested citizens alike. It provides a meaningful contribution to the array of existing scholarship and debate by proposing original elements of analysis, challenging often-made assumptions, destabilising settled understandings and proposing fundamental reforms. Overall, the collection injects a set of fresh critical perspectives on this fundamental issue that is as contemporary as it is eternal.

Creating the European monetary union between diverse and unequal nation states is arguably one of the biggest social experiments in history. This book offers an explanation of how the euro experiment came about and was sustained despite a severe crisis, and provides a comparison with the monetary-financial history of the US. The euro experiment can be understood as risk-sharing through a currency that is issued by a supranational central bank. A single currency shares liquidity risks by creating larger markets for all financial assets. A single monetary policy responds to business cycles in the currency area as a whole rather than managing the path of one dominant economy. Mechanisms of risk-sharing become institutions of monetary solidarity if they are consciously maintained, but they will periodically face opposition in member states. This book argues that diversity of membership is not an economic obstacle to the success of the euro, as diversity increases the potential gains from risk sharing. But political cooperation is needed to realize this potential, and such cooperation is up against collective action problems which become more intractable as the parties become more diverse. Hence, risk-sharing usually comes about as a collective by-product of national incentives. This political-economic tension can explain why the gains from risk-sharing are not more fully exploited, both in the euro area and in the US dollar area. This approach to monetary integration is based on the theory of collective action when hierarchy is not available as a solution to inter-state cooperation. The theory originates with Keohane and Ostrom (1995) and it is applied in this book, taking into account the latest research on the inherent instability of financial market integration.

Following the financial and public debt crisis, the EU's Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has been under intense political scrutiny. The measures adopted in response to the crisis have granted additional powers to the EU (and national) authorities, the exercise of which can have massive implications for the economies of the Member States, financial institutions and, of course, citizens. The following questions arise: how can we hold accountable those institutions that are exercising power at the national and EU level? What is the appropriate level, type and degree of accountability and transparency that should be involved in the development of the EU's governance structures in the areas of fiscal and economic governance and the Banking Union? What is the role of parliaments and courts in holding those institutions accountable for the exercise of their duties? Is the revised EMU framework democratically legitimate? How can we bridge the gap between the citizens - and the institutions that represent them - and those institutions that are making these important decisions in the field of economic and monetary policy? This book principally examines the mechanisms for political and legal accountability in the EMU and the Banking Union. It examines the implications that the reforms of EU economic governance have had for the locus and strength of executive power in the Union, as well as the role of parliaments (and other political fora) and courts in holding the institutions acting in this area accountable for the exercise of their tasks. It further sets out several proposals regarding transparency, accountability, and legitimacy in the EMU.

With coverage of both traditional and critical theories and approaches to European integration and their application, this is the most comprehensive textbook on European integration theory and an essential guide for all students and scholars interested in the subject. Throughout the text, a team of leading international scholars demonstrate the current relevance of integration theory as they apply these approaches to real-world developments and crises in the contemporary European Union.