Novelist and Time correspondent Nick McDonell brings this stunning account back from the latest iteration of the War in Iraq--an engrossing, ground-level report on the conflict still unfolding under its second commander-in-chief. Traveling to Baghdad and then to Mosul with the 1st Cavalry Division, McDonell offers an unforgettable look at the way things stand now--at the translators stranded in a country that doesn't look kindly on their cooperation, at the infantrymen struggling to make something out of the soft counterinsurgency missions they call chai-ops, at the commanders inured to American journalists and Iraqi officials both--and what the so-called "end of major combat operations" means for where they're going.

Volume 5, Deep Maneuver: Historical Case Studies of Maneuver in Large-Scale Combat Operations, presents eleven case studies from World War II through Operation Iraqi Freedom focusing on deep maneuver in terms of time, space and purpose. Deep operations require boldness and audacity, and yet carry an element of risk of overextension - especially in light of the independent factors of geography and weather that are ever-present. As a result, the case studies address not only successes, but also failure and shortfalls that result when conducting deep operations. The final two chapters address these considerations for future Deep Maneuver.

Iraq in 2009 was a strange netherworld, not quite war but not yet peace. The country teetered on the threshold of great change with the impending national elections and the promised withdrawal of all US combat forces. These changes would usher in either an era of irreversible stability or a return to the sectarian carnage that nearly destroyed Iraq in 2006. It was during this period of uncertainty that Task Force Patriot arrived to take over as the last US combat force to occupy Saddam Hussein’s hometown of Tikrit. In this gripping first-hand account of the final months of combat operations, author Pat Proctor brings his unique, insider perspective to reveal the circumstances that put this battalion in a position to turn the tide of the Iraq war. Despite resistance from insurgents, intransigent Iraqi politicians, and, occasionally, the US interagency team, this artillery-turned-infantry battalion found itself in a position to not only improve conditions in its area, but solve the last unsettled problem of the Iraq war, the sectarian divide. Task Force Patriot, through the confluence of lucky circumstances and innovative thinking, had stumbled upon a unique approach—a combination of hardball politics, economic investment, and a nuanced application of force—that could potentially end Sunni separatism in Iraq. This book tells the untold story of this critical period during the second national elections, which, eight months later, was only beginning to yield a government. More importantly, however, this book tells the story of the last crucial days of the Iraq War.

On May 1, 2003, before a live television audience onboard the USS Abraham Lincoln, President George W. Bush declared victory for the United States and the end of major combat operations in Iraq. Preceding the president's speech was perhaps the most stunning display of technological superiority and joint conventional fire power in military history. In just 26 days, the United States and coalition forces had invaded Iraq, defeated Iraqi conventional forces, ousted President Saddam Hussein from power, and terminated the Ba'ath party's 35-year hold on Iraq. Even the harshest critics of the war were claiming that there had never been a combat operation as successful as Operation Iraqi Freedom. Omitted from the President's jubilant speech, however, was that the United States' campaign in Iraq was far from over. The defeat of Iraqi conventional forces and subsequent regime change were trigger points for the coalition's transition to the final phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom -- post-conflict operations. Post-conflict or post-hostility operations are activities taken to stabilize, secure, and reconstruct an area of operations (AO) to transition the AO back to peace and civilian government control. Almost 3 years after President Bush's declaration of the end of major combat operations, the United States is still heavily engaged in stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations in Iraq. This thesis states that U.S. Combatant Commanders struggled to transition to and execute post-conflict operations in Iraq for three main reasons. To support his thesis, the author examines shortfalls in the formulation of the plan for post-conflict operations; analyzes the lack of interagency coordination and communication and how it affected the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and its subsequent successor, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA); and examines how lack of operational intelligence and cultural awareness contributed to the problem.

This Leavenworth Paper is a critical reconstruction of World War II Ranger operations conducted at or near Djebel el Ank, Tunisia; Porto Empedocle, Sicily; Cisterna, Italy; Zerf, Germany; and Cabanatuan in the Philippines. It is not intended to be a comprehensive account of World War II Ranger operations, for such a study would have to include numerous minor actions that are too poorly documented to be studied to advantage. It is, however, representative for it examines several types of operations conducted against the troops of three enemy nations in a variety of physical and tactical environments. As such, it draws a wide range of lessons useful to combat leaders who may have to conduct such operations or be on guard against them in the future. Many factors determined the outcomes of the operations featured in this Leavenworth Paper, and of these there are four that are important enough to merit special emphasis. These are surprise, the quality of opposing forces, the success of friendly forces with which the Rangers were cooperating, and popular support.

Volume 2, Bringing Order to Chaos: Combined Arms Maneuver in Large Scale Combat Operations, opens a dialogue with the Army. Are we ready for the significantly increased casualties inherent to intensive combat between large formations, the constant paralyzing stress of continual contact with a peer enemy, and the difficult nature of command and control while attempting division and corps combined arms maneuver to destroy that enemy? The chapters in this volume answer these questions for combat operations while spanning military history from 1917 through 2003. These accounts tell the challenges of intense combat, the drain of heavy casualties, the difficulty of commanding and controlling huge formations in contact, the effective use of direct and indirect fires, the need for high quality leadership, thoughtful application of sound doctrine, and logistical sustainment up to the task. No large scale combat engagement, battle, or campaign of the last one hundred years has been successful without being better than the enemy in these critical capabilities. What can we learn from the past to help us make the transition to ready to fight tonight?