Many books have covered the technological revolution that saw wooden hulls replaced by iron and steel, sail superseded by steam, and smooth-bore muzzle-loading gun giving way to rifled breech-loaders and entirely new weapons like torpedoes. But previous works have tended to concentrate on the technology itself, largely to the exclusion of external but crucial factors, like politics, finance, administrative problems, foreign threats and strategic situations. The years 1870-1885 have also been neglected because they were seen as the 'dark ages of the Admiralty', but this book argues strongly that, although the problems faced were greater than in previous decades, it is actually a pivotal period in the emergence of the modern warship. In so doing, it counters the general perception that that those responsible for British design policy at the time were retrogressive, incompetent, or both. What emerges is a more complete picture of the problems - often insoluble - faced by the Admiralty during the era, and the sensible steps it took to meet them.

Since the beginning of the 20th century, the United States has sought to achieve Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan's vision of "command of the sea" using large battle fleets of capital ships. This strategy has been generally successful: no force can oppose the U.S. Navy on the open seas. Yet capital ship theory has become increasingly irrelevant. Globally, irregular warfare dominates the spectrum of conflict, especially in the aftermath of 9/11. Fleet engagements are a thing of the past and even small scale missions that rely on capital ships are challenged by irregular warfare. In a pattern evident since World War II, the U.S. Navy has attempted to adapt its capital ship theory to irregular conflicts--with mixed results--before returning to traditional operations with little or no strategic debate. This book discusses the challenges of irregular warfare in the 21st century, and the need for U.S. naval power to develop a new strategic paradigm.

Joseph Moretz's innovative work focuses on what battleships actually did in the inter-war years and what its designed war role in fact was. In doing so, the book tells us much about British naval policy and planning of the time. Drawing heavily on official Admiralty records and private papers of leading officers, the author examines the navy's operational experience and the evolution of its tactical doctrine during the interwar period. He argues that operational experience, combined with assumptions about the nature of a future naval war, were more important in keeping the battleship afloat than conservatism in Navy.

The launch in 1606 of HMS Dreadnought, the worlds's first all-big-gun battleship, rendered all existing battle fleets obsolete, but at the same time it wiped out the Royal Navy's numerical advantage, so expensively maintained for decades. Already locked in the same arms race with Germany, Britain urgently needed to build an entirely new battle fleet of these larger, more complex and more costly vessels In this she succeeded spectacularly; in little over a decade fifty such ships were completed, almost exactly double that of what Germany achieved It was only made possible by the companyÍs vast industrial nexus of shipbuilders, engine manufacturers, armament fleets and specialist armour producers, whose contribution to the Grand Feet is too often ignored. This heroic achievement, and how it was done, is the subject of this book. It charts the rise of the large industrial conglomerates that were key to this success, looks at the reaction to fast-moving technical changes, and analyses the politics of funding this vast national effort, both before and beyond the Great War. It also attempts to assess the true cost- and value- of the Grand Fleet in terms of the resources consumed. And finally, by way of contrast, it describes the effects of the post-war recession, industrial contraction, and the very different responses to rearmament in the run up to the Second World War.

“Outstanding . . . covers the major units starting with the Deutschland Class, through the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, to the Bismarck and Tirpitz.” —WW2 Cruisers The Kriegsmarine’s capital ships—Deutschland, Admiral Scheer, Graf Spee, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Bismarck, and Tirpitz—continue to generate intense interest among warship enthusiasts, despite the fact that no new source of information has been unearthed in decades. What has come to light, however, is a growing number of photographs, many from private albums and some that lay forgotten in obscure archives. These include many close-ups and onboard shots of great value to modelmakers, as well as rare action photos taken during wartime operations. This book is a careful selection of the best of these, but on a grand scale, with around one hundred images devoted to each ship, allowing in-depth coverage of its whole career, from launching and fitting out to whatever fate the war had waiting for it. For sake of completeness, there are even sections reproducing the various design studies that led to each class, while an appendix covers the uncompleted Graf Zeppelin, Germany’s only attempt to build an aircraft carrier, the vessel which clearly displaced the battleship as the capital ship of the world’s navies during the war. Essays on technical backgrounds and design origins by the well-known expert Siegfried Breyer and explanatory captions by Miroslaw Skwiot draw out the full significance of this magnificent collection of photos. “Highly recommended for those who wish to admire seven of the most magnificent warships built anywhere in the twentieth century. We will certainly never see their like again.” —Journal of the Australian Naval Institute

This book looks at the transition of wooden sailing fleets to the modern steel navy. It details the technological breakthroughs that brought about this change - steampower, armour, artillery and torpedoes, and looks at their affect on naval strategy and tactics. Part of the ever-growing and prestigious Warfare and History series, this book is a must for enthusiasts of military history.