The monumental events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union must be understood, Jan Van Oudenaren argues, in the context of a process of East-West détente begun in 1953 in the aftermath of Stalin's death. Van Oudenaren's comprehensive and timely study examines the development of Soviet-Western détente from the death of Stalin to the unification of Germany. In redefining détente as a process, rather than a code of conduct, Van Oudenaren looks to its origins in Soviet policy earlier than previously identified and analyzes both its history and character. His study explores the restoration of four-power negotiations in Germany and Austria in the mid-1950s, their subsequent breakdown in the Berlin crisis, their unexpected revival in 1990 in the form of "two plus four" talks on German unity, and the future of the Soviet Union as a European power. Among the key elements of détente discussed are diplomacy, particularly the role of summit conferences; cooperation among parliaments, political parties, and trade unions; arms control; economic relations; and links among cultural institutions, churches, and peace movements.

Containing essays by leading Cold War scholars, such as Wilfried Loth, Geir Lundestad and Seppo Hentilä, this volume offers a broad-ranging examination of the history of détente in the Cold War. The ten years from 1965 to 1975 marked a deep transformation of the bipolar international system of the Cold War. The Vietnam War and the Prague Spring showed the limits of the two superpowers, who were constrained to embark on a wide-ranging détente policy, which culminated with the SALT agreements of 1972. At the same time this very détente opened new venues for the European countries: French policy towards the USSR and the German Ostpolitik being the most evident cases in point. For the first time since the 1950s, Western Europe began to participate in the shaping of the Cold War. The same could not be said of Eastern Europe, but ferments began to establish themselves there which would ultimately lead to the astounding changes of 1989-90: the Prague Spring, the uprisings in Gdansk in 1970 and generally the rise of the dissident movement. That last process being directly linked to the far-reaching event which marked the end of that momentous decade: the Helsinki conference. The Making of Détente will appeal to students of the Cold War, international history and European contemporary history.

This book examines the key relationship between Willy Brandt (the former Mayor of West Berlin and future West German Chancellor) and the administration of President John F. Kennedy. Arne Hofmann focuses on the administration’s influence on the development of Brandt’s ‘policy of small steps’ and the formation of his later Ostpolitik, the centrepiece of European détente. Brandt’s interaction with the Kennedy administration is traced through the Berlin Wall crisis of 1961, together with Kennedy’s search for a modus vivendi based on the status quo, the 1962 crisis in German-American relations, Brandt’s disillusionment campaign, the development of his programmatic statements, Brandt’s three meetings with the President including Kennedy’s famous visit to Berlin, the limited nuclear test ban treaty and Brandt’s Berlin pass agreement of Christmas 1963. While the narrative focuses on the gradual change in Brandt’s position, systematic parts concentrate on Brandt’s and Kennedy’s détente concepts, the triangular relationship between West Berlin, Washington and Bonn with its implication for domestic politics, and the role of images, campaigning and public opinion. The Emergence of Détente in Europe will appeal to students of Cold War history, foreign policy, international relations and international history in general.

Very Short Introductions: Brilliant, Sharp, Inspiring The Cold War dominated international life from the end of World War II to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. But how did the conflict begin? Why did it move from its initial origins in Postwar Europe to encompass virtually every corner of the globe? And why, after lasting so long, did the war end so suddenly and unexpectedly? Robert McMahon considers these questions and more, as well as looking at the legacy of the Cold War and its impact on international relations today. The Cold War: A Very Short Introduction is a truly international history, not just of the Soviet-American struggle at its heart, but also of the waves of decolonization, revolutionary nationalism, and state formation that swept the non-Western world in the wake of World War II. McMahon places the 'Hot Wars' that cost millions of lives in Korea, Vietnam, and elsewhere within the larger framework of global superpower competition. He shows how the United States and the Soviet Union both became empires over the course of the Cold War, and argues that perceived security needs and fears shaped U.S. and Soviet decisions from the beginning—far more, in fact, than did their economic and territorial ambitions. He unpacks how these needs and fears were conditioned by the divergent cultures, ideologies, and historical experiences of the two principal contestants and their allies. Covering the years 1945-1990, this second edition uses recent scholarship and newly available documents to offer a fuller analysis of the Vietnam War, the changing global politics of the 1970s, and the end of the Cold War. ABOUT THE SERIES: The Very Short Introductions series from Oxford University Press contains hundreds of titles in almost every subject area. These pocket-sized books are the perfect way to get ahead in a new subject quickly. Our expert authors combine facts, analysis, perspective, new ideas, and enthusiasm to make interesting and challenging topics highly readable.

This book examines the dynamic evolution of Western détente policies which sought to transform Europe and overcome its Cold War division through more communication and engagement. Kieninger challenges the traditional Cold War narrative that détente prolonged the division of Europe and precipitated America’s decline in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. Rather, he argues that policymakers in the U.S. Department of State and in Western Europe envisaged the stability enabled by détente as a precondition for change, as Communist regimes saw a sense of security as a prerequisite for opening up their societies to Western influence over time. Kieninger identifies the Helsinki Accords, Lyndon Johnson’s bridge building, and Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik as efforts aimed at constructive changes in Eastern Europe through a multiplication of contacts, communication, and cooperation on all societal levels. This study also illuminates the longevity of America’s policy of peaceful change against the background of the nuclear stalemate and the military status quo.

This edited volume is the first detailed exploration of the last phase of the Cold War, taking a critical look at the crisis of détente in Europe in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The transition from détente to a new phase of harsh confrontation and severe crises is an interesting, indeed crucial, phase of the evolution of the international system. This book makes use of previously unreleased archival materials, moving beyond existing interpretations of this period by challenging the traditional bipolar paradigm that focuses mostly on the role of the superpowers in the transformation of the international system. The essays here emphasize the combination and the interplay of a large number of variables- political, ideological, economic and military - and explore the topic from a truly international perspective. Issues covered include human rights, the Euromissiles, the CSCE (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe), the Revolution in Military Affairs, economic growth and its consequences.

This edited collection offers a new approach to the study of Italy’s foreign policy from the 1960s to the end of the Cold War, highlighting its complex and sometimes ambiguous goals, due to the intricacies of its internal system and delicate position in the fault line of the East-West and North-South divides. According to received opinion, during the Cold War era Italy was more an object rather than a factor in active foreign policy, limiting itself to paying lip service to the Western alliance and the European integration process, without any pretension to exerting a substantial international influence. Eleven contributions by leading Italian historians reappraise Italy’s international role, addressing three complex and intertwined issues, namely, the country’s political-diplomatic dimension; the economic factors affecting Rome’s international stance; and Italy’s role in new approaches to the international system and the influence of political parties’ cultures in the nation’s foreign policy.