Innovation underpins competitiveness, is crucial to addressing societal challenges, and its support has become a major public policy goal. But what really works in innovation policy, and why? This Handbook, compiled by leading experts in the field, is the first comprehensive guide to understanding the logic and effects of innovation polices. The Handbook develops a conceptualisation and typology of innovation policies, presents meta-evaluations for 16 key innovation policy instruments and analyses evidence on policy-mix. For each policy instrument, underlying rationales and examples are presented, along with a critical analysis of the available impact evidence. Providing access to primary sources of impact analysis, the book offers an insightful assessment of innovation policy practice and its evaluation.

Clear rules of the game (e.g., established property rights and institutions of exchange) are important for innovation and entrepreneurship to flourish, but how those rules are defined is important. The scope and reach of federal regulation in the United States has been increasing over the last 30 years, and while federal agencies often try to quantify the benefits and costs of their regulations before they are issued, those measures are necessarily static, and bounded by data available to, and assumptions made by, the analyst. These analyses cannot capture the organic, dynamic nature of innovation nor anticipate how participants in a market might respond to incentives created by the regulation. Arguments that support “technology forcing” regulations often neglect the opportunities foregone when resources are devoted in a particular direction. Further, because regulations can confer competitive advantage on certain market participants at the expense of others, they provide incentives to focus innovative energy on influencing the rules, rather than innovating along more productive dimensions. Scholarship of the 1960s and 1970s showed that price and entry regulation tended to benefit organized interests at the expense of the broader public interest, and led to the economic deregulation movement that served to increase competition in several previously-regulated industries, with resulting improvements in innovation and consumer welfare. I hope to generate discussion of the effects of regulatory practices on innovation using current examples.

Americans praise medical technology for saving lives and improving health. Yet, new technology is often cited as a key factor in skyrocketing medical costs. This volume, second in the Medical Innovation at the Crossroads series, examines how economic incentives for innovation are changing and what that means for the future of health care. Up-to-date with a wide variety of examples and case studies, this book explores how payment, patent, and regulatory policiesâ€"as well as the involvement of numerous government agenciesâ€"affect the introduction and use of new pharmaceuticals, medical devices, and surgical procedures. The volume also includes detailed comparisons of policies and patterns of technological innovation in Western Europe and Japan. This fact-filled and practical book will be of interest to economists, policymakers, health administrators, health care practitioners, and the concerned public.

Does regulation affect the pace and nature of innovation and if so, by how much? We build a tractable and quantifiable endogenous growth model with size-contingent regulations. We apply this to population administrative firm panel data from France, where many labor regulations apply to firms with 50 or more employees. Nonparametrically, we find that there is a sharp fall in the fraction of innovating firms just to the left of the regulatory threshold. Further, a dynamic analysis shows a sharp reduction in the firm's innovation response to exogenous demand shocks for firms just below the regulatory threshold. We then quantitatively fit the parameters of the model to the data, finding that innovation at the macro level is about 5.4% lower due to the regulation, a 2.2% consumption equivalent welfare loss. Four-fifths of this loss is due to lower innovation intensity per firm rather than just a misallocation towards smaller firms and lower entry. We generalize the theory to allow for changes in the direction of R&D, and find that regulation's negative effects only matter for incremental innovation (as measured by citations and text-based measures of novelty). A more regulated economy may have less innovation, but when firms do innovate they tend to "swing for the fence" with more radical (and labor saving) breakthroughs.

This book contends that various forms of regulation have costs as well as benefits and it examines the impact of government regulation on the innovativeness of ’monopolies’ - in this book meaning firms with the power to affect market price. The government regulation analyzed in this case is limited to rate-of-return regulation. Using theoretical models such as the Averch-Johnson model and a two-stage Nash equilibrium model, this volume examines whether regulated monopolies engage in more or less technological innovation than unregulated monopolies. Furthermore, if the unregulated (or less regulated) monopolies do engage in more research and development than regulated ones, it questions whether social welfare would be greater with the former. Using a case study of ten privately-owned electric utilities in the State of Texas, USA, it then tests out the general propositions brought forward by the theoretical modelling and finally makes its conclusions taking into consideration both theoretical and empirical findings.

The past thirty years have witnessed a transformation of government economic intervention in broad segments of industry throughout the world. Many industries historically subject to economic price and entry controls have been largely deregulated, including natural gas, trucking, airlines, and commercial banking. However, recent concerns about market power in restructured electricity markets, airline industry instability amid chronic financial stress, and the challenges created by the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, which allowed commercial banks to participate in investment banking, have led to calls for renewed market intervention. Economic Regulation and Its Reform collects research by a group of distinguished scholars who explore these and other issues surrounding government economic intervention. Determining the consequences of such intervention requires a careful assessment of the costs and benefits of imperfect regulation. Moreover, government interventions may take a variety of forms, from relatively nonintrusive performance-based regulations to more aggressive antitrust and competition policies and barriers to entry. This volume introduces the key issues surrounding economic regulation, provides an assessment of the economic effects of regulatory reforms over the past three decades, and examines how these insights bear on some of today’s most significant concerns in regulatory policy.