This dissertation examines quantity surcharges and heterogeneity in consumer attention. Quantity surcharges exist for packaged goods when a smaller package size is cheaper than its larger size counterpart per unit. Even though consumers face quantity surcharges in their daily lives, minimal research has been done on this topic. Chapter 1 documents the relevance of quantity surcharges for households who shop at grocery stores. I use rich scanner data in the peanut butter category for this analysis and throughout the other chapters. The data show that quantity surcharges are highly frequent: they exist in 62\% of weeks. Quantity surcharges also exist consistently over time, rather than being a side effect of occasional sales on small size items. Households have heterogeneous purchasing behavior during quantity surcharge periods: some households take advantage of the surcharge and purchase multiple small size jars, but others pay extra and buy large jars ("miss" purchases). I analyze the characteristics of those households who make miss purchases using negative binomial regressions, and find that they have large expenditures per shopping trip and small variety of peanut butter purchases.

Contains abstracts of papers presented at the ORSA/TIMS Joint National Meetings.

It is well understood that decisions made under uncertainty differ from those made without risk in important and significant ways. Yet, there is very little research into how uncertainty manifests itself in the most ubiquitous of decision-making environments: Consumers' day-to-day decisions over where to shop, and what to buy for their daily grocery needs. Facing a choice between stores that either offer relatively stable "everyday low prices" (EDLP) or variable prices that reflect aggressive promotion strategies (HILO), consumers have to choose stores under price-uncertainty. I find that consumers' attitudes toward risk are critically important in determining store-choice, and that heterogeneity in risk attitudes explains the co-existence of EDLP and HILO stores - an equilibrium that was previously explained in somewhat unsatisfying ways. After choosing a store, consumers face another source of risk. While knowing the quality or taste of established brands, consumers have very little information about new products. Consequently, consumers tend to choose smaller package sizes for new products, which limits their exposure to the risk that the product does not meet their prior expectations. While the observation that consumers purchase small amounts of new products is not new, I show how this practice is fully consistent with optimal purchase decision-making by utility-maximizing consumers. I then use this insight to explain how manufacturers of consumer packaged goods (CPGs) respond to higher production costs. Because consumers base their purchase decisions in part on package size, manufacturers can use package size as a competitive tool in order to raise margins in the face of higher production costs. While others have argued that manufacturers reduce package sizes as a means of raising unit-prices (prices per unit of volume) in a hidden way, I show that the more important effect is a competitive one: Changes in package size can soften price competition, so manufacturers need not rely on fooling consumers in order to pass-through cost increases through changes in package size. The broader implications of consumer behavior under risk are dramatic. First, risk perceptions affect consumers' store choice and product choice patterns in ways that can be exploited by both retailers and manufacturers. Second, strategic considerations prevent manufacturers from manipulating package size in ways that seem designed to trick consumers. Third, many services are also offered as packages, and also involve uncertainty, so the effects identified here are likely to be pervasive throughout the consumer economy.

In this dissertation, we show how the firm can improve its revenue and competitiveness through segmenting the market by exploring consumer heterogeneity. In the first essay, we show that asymmetric assortment breadth among two competing retailers can emerge as an equilibrium when consumers differ in their prior knowledge about their product preferences and their shopping costs. Under this equilibrium, the full line retailer expands the market demand by attracting the uninformed consumers with large shopping costs and the single product retailer passes on the savings from a streamlined assortment to the informed consumers by setting a lower price. Therefore, the two retailers soften the competition between them and both achieve higher profits. In the second essay, we consider a setting in which consumers experience distinct instances of need for a durable product at random intervals and derive random amount of utility from each instance. Consumers are differentiated according to the frequency with which they experience instances of need. For a firm that provides a durable product to such a market, we consider the implications of selling versus renting on a per-usage basis. Selling minimizes transaction costs, but may result in inefficient utilization of units that are produced. Alternatively, per-usage rentals allow more utility to be generated per unit of product that is produced. Focusing on these trade-offs, we identify conditions under which the firm should sell, offer per-usage rentals, or offer a combination of the two. In the third essay, we continue to use the durable good framework to study how various forms of government subsidy programs shift consumer's demand patterns and thus generate different magnitude of additional savings in resource consumption. We give the conditions under which each type of cash rebate programs does the best in generating resource savings per dollar spent.