The original impetus for this research was provided several years ago by a request to assist Counsel for Fidelity Management and Research Corporation in analyzing the mutual fund industry, with particular emphasis on money market mutual funds. We were asked to focus our efforts on the mechanism by which the advisory fees of mutual funds are determined. This request arose out of litigation that challenged the level of advisory fees charged to the shareholders of the Fidelity Cash Reserve Fund. Subsequently, we were asked to provide similar assistance to Counsel for T. Rowe Price Associates regarding the fees charged to shareholders of their Prime Reserve Fund. 1940, advisers of Under the Investment Company Act of mutual funds have a fiduciary duty with respect to the level of fees they may charge a fund's shareholders. Since the passage of the Investment Company Act, there have been numerous lawsuits brought by shareholders alleging that advisory fees were excessive. In these lawsuits, the courts have failed to provide a set of standards for determining when such fees are excessive. Instead, they have relied on arbitrary and frequently ill-defined criteria for jUdging the reasonableness of fees. This failure to apply economic-based tests for evaluating the fee structure of mutual funds provided the motivation for the present book, which undertakes a comprehensive analysis of the economics of the mutual fund industry.

The original impetus for this research was provided several years ago by a request to assist Counsel for Fidelity Management and Research Corporation in analyzing the mutual fund industry, with particular emphasis on money market mutual funds. We were asked to focus our efforts on the mechanism by which the advisory fees of mutual funds are determined. This request arose out of litigation that challenged the level of advisory fees charged to the shareholders of the Fidelity Cash Reserve Fund. Subsequently, we were asked to provide similar assistance to Counsel for T. Rowe Price Associates regarding the fees charged to shareholders of their Prime Reserve Fund. 1940, advisers of Under the Investment Company Act of mutual funds have a fiduciary duty with respect to the level of fees they may charge a fund's shareholders. Since the passage of the Investment Company Act, there have been numerous lawsuits brought by shareholders alleging that advisory fees were excessive. In these lawsuits, the courts have failed to provide a set of standards for determining when such fees are excessive. Instead, they have relied on arbitrary and frequently ill-defined criteria for jUdging the reasonableness of fees. This failure to apply economic-based tests for evaluating the fee structure of mutual funds provided the motivation for the present book, which undertakes a comprehensive analysis of the economics of the mutual fund industry.

Mutual funds form the bedrock of retirement savings in the United States, and, considering their rapid growth, are sure to be more critical in the future. Because the size of fees paid by investors to mutual fund advisers can strongly affect the return on investment, these fees have become a contentious issue in Congress and the courts, with many arguing that investment advisers grow rich at the expense of investors. This ground-breaking book not only conceptualizes a new economic model of the mutual fund industry, but also uses this model to test for price competition between investment advisers, evaluating the assertion that market forces fail to protect investors' returns from excessive fees. Highly experienced authors track the growth of the industry over the past twenty-five years and present arguments and evidence both for and against theories of adviser malfeasance. The authors review the regulatory history of mutual fund fees and summarize leading case decisions addressing excessive fees. Revealing the extent to which the governance structure of mutual funds truly impacts fund performance, this book provides the best understanding of today's mutual fund industry and is a vital tool for investors, money managers, fund directors, securities lawyers, economists, and anyone concerned with the regulation of mutual funds.

How to prevent runs on open-end mutual funds? In recent years, markets have observed an innovation that changed the way open-end funds are priced. Alternative pricing rules (known as swing pricing) adjust funds’ net asset values to pass on funds’ trading costs to transacting shareholders. Using unique data on investor transactions in U.K. corporate bond funds, we show that swing pricing eliminates the first-mover advantage arising from the traditional pricing rule and significantly reduces redemptions during stress periods. The positive impact of alternative pricing rules on fund flows reverses in calm periods when costs associated with higher tracking error dominate the pricing effect.

"Since 1960 the mutual fund industry has grown from 160 funds and $18 billion in assets under management to over 8,000 funds with $10.4 trillion in assets. Yet critics, including Yale Chief Investment Officer David Swensen, Vanguard founder Jack Bogle, and New York Governor Eliot Spitzer, call for more fund regulation, claiming that competition has not protected investors from excessive fees. Starting in 2003, the number of class action suits against fund advisors increased sharply, and, consistent with critics' views, some courts have excluded or treated skeptically evidence of competition and comparable fees of other funds. Skepticism about fund competition dates to the 1960s, when the SEC accepted the view that market forces fail to constrain advisory fees, in part because fund boards rarely fire advisors. In this article, we show that economic theory, empirical evidence, and careful analysis of the laws and institutions that shape mutual funds refute this view. Fund critics overlook the most salient characteristic of a mutual fund, redeemable shares. While boards rarely fire advisors, fund investors may fire advisors at any time by redeeming shares and switching into other investments. Industry concentration is low, new entry is common, barriers to entry are low, and empirical studies -- including new evidence presented in this article -- show higher advisory fees significantly reduce fund market shares, and so constrain fees. Fund performance is consistent with competition exerting a strong disciplinary force on funds and fees. Our findings lead us to reject the critics' views in favor of the legal framework established by ʹ36(b) of the Investment Company Act and the lead case interpreting that law (the Gartenberg decision), while suggesting Gartenberg is best interpreted to allow the introduction of evidence regarding competition between funds"--Preface.

With fifty trillion in worldwide assets, the growth of mutual funds is a truly global phenomenon and deserves a broad international analysis. Local political economies and legal regimes create different regulatory preferences for the oversight of these funds, and academics, public officials and legal practitioners wishing to understand the global investing environment will require a keen awareness of these international differences. The contributors, leading scholars in the field of investment law from around the world, provide a current legal analysis of funds from a variety of perspectives and using an array of methodologies that consider the large fundamental questions governing the role and regulation of investment funds. This volume also explores the identity and behavior of investors as well as issues surrounding less orthodox funds, such as money market funds, ETFs, and private funds. This Handbook will provide legal and financial scholars, academics, lawyers and regulators with a vital tool for working with mutual funds. Contributors include: W.A. Birdthistle, M. Bullard, I.H-Y Chiu, B. Clarke, Q. Curtis, D.A. DeMott, J. Fanto, J.E. Fisch, P. Hanrahan, L.P.Q. Johnson, W.A. Kaal, A.K. Krug, A.B. Laby, J.D. Morley, A. Palmiter, I. Ramsay, E.D. Roiter, M. White, D.A. Zetzsche