Provides comprehensive, up-to-date coverage of the key themes and principles of conflict economics.

The Handbook on the Economics of Conflict conveys how economics can contribute to the understanding of conflict in its various dimensions embracing world wars, regional conflicts, terrorism and the role of peacekeeping in conflict prevention. The economics of conflict is a relatively new branch of the discipline of economics. Conflict provides opportunities for applying game theory involving strategic behaviour, interactions and interdependence betweenadversaries. The Handbook demonstrates that conflict and its prevention is costly; it considers new dimensions such as ethnic cleansing, destructive power, terrorism, corruption, the impact of new technology, peacekeeping, the role of economists in defence ministries and the use of privatecontractors in conflict.

This Handbook brings together contributions from leading scholars who take an economic perspective to study peace and conflict. Some chapters are largely empirical, exploring the correlates and quantifying the costs of conflict. Others are more theoretical, examining the mechanisms that lead to war or are more conducive to peace.

In Law, Economics, and Conflict, Kaushik Basu and Robert C. Hockett bring together international experts to offer new perspectives on how to take analytic tools from the realm of academic research out into the real world to address pressing policy questions. As the essays discuss, political polarization, regional conflicts, climate change, and the dramatic technological breakthroughs of the digital age have all left the standard tools of regulation floundering in the twenty-first century. These failures have, in turn, precipitated significant questions about the fundamentals of law and economics. The contributors address law and economics in diverse settings and situations, including central banking and the use of capital controls, fighting corruption in China, rural credit markets in India, pawnshops in the United States, the limitations of antitrust law, and the role of international monetary regimes. Collectively, the essays in Law, Economics, and Conflict rethink how the insights of law and economics can inform policies that provide individuals with the space and means to work, innovate, and prosper—while guiding states and international organization to regulate in ways that limit conflict, reduce national and global inequality, and ensure fairness. Contributors: Kaushik Basu; Kimberly Bolch; University of Oxford; Marieke Bos, Stockholm School of Economics; Susan Payne Carter, US Military Academy at West Point; Peter Cornelisse, Erasmus University Rotterdam; Gaël Giraud, Georgetown University; Nicole Hassoun, Binghamton University; Robert C. Hockett; Karla Hoff, Columbia University and World Bank; Yair Listokin, Yale Law School; Cheryl Long, Xiamen University and Wang Yanan Institute for Study of Economics (WISE); Luis Felipe López-Calva, UN Development Programme; Célestin Monga, Harvard University; Paige Marta Skiba, Vanderbilt Law School; Anand V. Swamy, Williams College; Erik Thorbecke, Cornell University; James Walsh, University of Oxford. Contributors: Kimberly B. Bolch, Marieke Bos, Susan Payne Carter, Peter A. Cornelisse, Gaël Giraud, Nicole Hassoun, Karla Hoff, Yair Listokin, Cheryl Long, Luis F. López-Calva, Célestin Monga, Paige Marta Skiba, Anand V. Swamy, Erik Thorbecke, James Walsh

This collection of essays questions the adequacy of explaining today's internal armed conflicts purely in terms of economic factors and re-establishes the importance of identity and grievances in creating and sustaining such wars. Countries studied include Lebanon, Angola, Colombia and Afghanistan.

Modern economics has largely ignored the issue of outright conflict as an alternative way of allocating goods, assuming instead the existence of well-defined property rights enforced by an undefined third party. And yet even in ostensibly peaceful market transactions, conflict exists as an outside option, sometimes constraining the outcomes reached through voluntary agreement. In this volume, economists offer a crucial rational-choice perspective on conflict, using methodological approaches that range from the game theoretic to the experimental. This text uses the recently developed contest success function to model conflict, examining such topics as alliance formation, regional conflicts under fiscal federalism, coups d'etat in developing countries, and the correlation between conflict and economic growth in Bolivia. This text also considers subjects that include the link between occupational choices and antigovernment activity in Afghanistan, social unrest and the IMF's Structural Adjustment Program, and the effect of Tajikistan's civil war on ex-combatants' capacity for trust and cooperation. This text shows that economics needs a theory of conflict to understand both outright conflict and transactions in the shadow of conflict. It also shows that the study of conflict also needs the rigorous, methodology-based perspectives of economics.

This work addresses new directions in research on the economic theory of conflict, the cost of war, and the benefits of peace. A collection of 17 papers drawing on contributors from all continents, the volume is divided into four sections. The first discusses novel ways to think about the economics of conflict and peace from theory perspectives. These include discussions of conflict from the perspectives of standard neoclassical analysis and economic geography. An especially interesting paper in this section addresses conflict in the context of the emerging theory of international public finance. A second section deals with military expenditures, economic/human development and economic growth in the US and developing nations of Asia and Africa. The volume enters new territory in sections three and four. Section three contains a set of papers on the economic cost of war and war’s aftermath, significantly expanding economists’ rather modest efforts to date. Section four is concerned with how the concepts of economics might be operationalized and institutionalized to foster security.