The Economic Effects of Constitutions
Title | The Economic Effects of Constitutions PDF eBook |
Author | Torsten Persson |
Publisher | MIT Press |
Pages | 324 |
Release | 2005-01-14 |
Genre | Business & Economics |
ISBN | 9780262661928 |
The authors of The Economic Effects of Constitutions use econometric tools to study what they call the "missing link" between constitutional systems and economic policy; the book is an uncompromisingly empirical sequel to their previous theoretical analysis of economic policy. Taking recent theoretical work as a point of departure, they ask which theoretical findings are supported and which are contradicted by the facts. The results are based on comparisons of political institutions across countries or time, in a large sample of contemporary democracies. They find that presidential/parliamentary and majoritarian/proportional dichotomies influence several economic variables: presidential regimes induce smaller public sectors, and proportional elections lead to greater and less targeted government spending and larger budget deficits. Moreover, the details of the electoral system (such as district magnitude and ballot structure) influence corruption and structural policies toward economic growth.Persson and Tabellini's goal is to draw conclusions about the causal effects of constitutions on policy outcomes. But since constitutions are not randomly assigned to countries, how the constitutional system was selected in the first place must be taken into account. This raises challenging methodological problems, which are addressed in the book. The study is therefore important not only in its findings but also in establishing a methodology for empirical analysis in the field of comparative politics.
Constitutions, Politics and Economics
Title | Constitutions, Politics and Economics PDF eBook |
Author | Daron Acemoglu |
Publisher | |
Pages | 34 |
Release | 2005 |
Genre | Constitutions |
ISBN |
In this essay I review the new book by Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, The Economic Effects of Constitutions, which investigates the policy and economic consequences of different forms of government and electoral rules. I also take advantage of this opportunity to discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a number of popular empirical strategies in the newly emerging field of comparative political economy.
The Economic Effects of Constitutions
Title | The Economic Effects of Constitutions PDF eBook |
Author | Lorenz Blume |
Publisher | |
Pages | 42 |
Release | 2007 |
Genre | |
ISBN |
Constitutional Economics
Title | Constitutional Economics PDF eBook |
Author | Stefan Voigt |
Publisher | Cambridge University Press |
Pages | 153 |
Release | 2020-06-18 |
Genre | Business & Economics |
ISBN | 1108808123 |
Constitutional political economy has emerged as an indispensable part of political economy. This book offers a concise survey of the questions, methods, and empirical findings central to this topic. What effects – if any – do constitutions have within autocracies? Can small electoral districts help reduce corruption? Does a country's leadership affect the size of its government? Can direct democratic institutions increase politicians' accountability to citizens? Stefan Voigt, a pioneer in the field, explores these questions and more throughout the course of this cutting-edge primer. As the number of courses in constitutional economics continues to grow, this book fills an important gap in the literature. This highly original project maintains curiosity about the questions it generates, identifying potential new areas of research whilst successfully demonstrating the impact constitutional rules have on political economy.
Constitutions in Times of Financial Crisis
Title | Constitutions in Times of Financial Crisis PDF eBook |
Author | Tom Ginsburg |
Publisher | Cambridge University Press |
Pages | 342 |
Release | 2022-06-30 |
Genre | Law |
ISBN | 9781108729208 |
Many constitutions include provisions intended to limit the discretion of governments in economic policy. In times of financial crises, such provisions often come under pressure as a result of calls for exceptional responses to crisis situations. This volume assesses the ability of constitutional orders all over the world to cope with financial crises, and the demands for emergency powers that typically accompany them. Bringing together a variety of perspectives from legal scholars, economists, and political scientists, this volume traces the long-run implications of financial crises for constitutional order. In exploring the theoretical and practical problems raised by the constitutionalization of economic policy during times of severe crisis, this volume showcases an array of constitutional design options and the ways they channel governmental responses to emergency.
An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States
Title | An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States PDF eBook |
Author | Charles A. Beard |
Publisher | Courier Corporation |
Pages | 338 |
Release | 2012-03-08 |
Genre | History |
ISBN | 0486140458 |
This classic study — one of the most influential in the area of American economic history — questioned the founding fathers' motivations and prompted new perceptions of the supreme law of the land.
The Economic Effects of Constitutions
Title | The Economic Effects of Constitutions PDF eBook |
Author | Martin Ardanaz |
Publisher | |
Pages | 23 |
Release | 2013 |
Genre | |
ISBN |
According to an influential theoretical argument, presidential systems tend to present smaller governments because the separation between those who decide the size of the fiscal purse and those who allocate it creates incentives for lower public expenditures. In practice, forms of government vary greatly, and budget institutions -the rules according to which budgets are drafted, approved, and implemented- are one (of many) drivers of such variation. This paper argues that under more hierarchical budget rules, presidential and parliamentary systems generate a similar incentive structure for the executive branch in shaping the size of government. This hypothesis is tested on a broad cross-section of countries, presidentialism is found to have a negative impact on government size only when executive discretion in the budget process is low (that is, in a context of separation of powers). However, the negative effect of presidentialism on expenditures vanishes or is even reversed when the executive`s discretion over the budget process is higher. Hence, budget institutions that impose restrictions on the legislature`s ability to amend budget proposals can make political regimes look more alike in terms of fiscal outcomes.