This book delivers a thorough and essential analysis of current economic policy, transformation and legislative changes in Libya. The authors answer many questions about Libya’s distinctive society and economic system and explain the necessity for the major restructuring of the Libyan economy which is currently in process. The book makes extensive use of previously unavailable economic and social data and thus allows a unique insight into a fascinating country.

Although Libya and its current leader have been the subject of numerous accounts, few have considered how the country's tumultuous history, its institutional development, and its emergence as an oil economy combined to create a state whose rulers ignored the notion of modern statehood. International isolation and a legacy of internal turmoil have destroyed or left undocumented much of what researchers might seek to examine. Dirk Vandewalle supplies a detailed analysis of Libya's political and economic development since the country's independence in 1951, basing his account on fieldwork in Libya, archival research in Tripoli, and personal interviews with some of the country's top policymakers. Vandewalle argues that Libya represents an extreme example of what he calls a "distributive state," an oil-exporting country where an attempt at state-building coincided with large inflows of capital while political and economic institutions were in their infancy. Libya's rulers eventually pursued policies that were politically expedient but proved economically ruinous, and disenfranchised local citizens. Distributive states, according to Vandewalle, may appear capable of resisting economic and political challenges, but they are ill prepared to implement policies that make the state and its institutions relevant to their citizens. Similar developments can be expected whenever local rulers do not have to extract resources from their citizens to fund the building of a modern state.

Since the 2011 uprising that toppled the former regime, Libya has been mired in deep political strife. An economy in which agriculture once flourished was converted wholesale to an oil-based rentier state of the most extreme kind. Following the immediate post-revolution oil-consumption boom, in 2014 Libya's economy is in recession. Security is the greatest challenge to stability (World Bank 2014). Today, limited opportunities exist for reintegrating youth and ex-combatants into the labor market. This policy note provides an initial assessment of Libya's labor market and discusses policy options for promoting employability as part of a broader jobs strategy. It is intended as a contribution to evidence on Libya's labor market for the benefit of policy makers, civil society and the broader international community. The report finds that the overall unemployment rate in Libya increased from 13.5 percent in 2010 prior to the uprising to 19 percent as of 2012, having changed little since then. Youth unemployment stands at approximately 48 percent and female unemployment 25 percent. The vast majority (85 percent) of Libya's active labor force is employed in the public sector, a high rate even by regional standards. The rate for women is even higher (93 percent). Employment in industry (largely the oil sector) and agriculture accounts for only 10 percent of the labor force. While nearly all public sector workers are covered by some form of social insurance, only 46 percent of private sector workers are enrolled - a striking difference. The report further discusses the implications of Libyan jobseeker profiles. Thirty percent of firms have reported difficulty in recruiting qualified Libyan nationals. Only 15-30 percent of Libya’s labor force is relatively skilled and likely could be hired readily if given access to basic job training and job search assistance. For the remainder of the unemployed work force, targeted interventions would need to be designed for advanced skills development, vocational training, reconversion, and apprenticeship and entrepreneurship programs. The report discusses options for shifting Libya from a rentier state to a diversified, productive economy through economic and technical partnerships to help accelerate creating economic opportunities and jobs.

In the wake of the civil war and Qadhafi's demise, the time is ripe for a new edition of Dirk Vandewalle's classic history of Libya. The book, which was originally published in 2006, traces the country's history back to the 1900s, through the Italian occupation in the early twentieth century, the Sanusi monarchy and, thereafter, to the revolution of 1969 and the accession of Qadhafi. The following chapters analyse the economics and politics of Qadhafi's revolution, offering insights into the man and his ideology as reflected in his Green Book. The new edition covers the intervening years, since 2005, when, courted by the West, Qadhafi came in from the cold. At home, though, his people were disillusioned, and economic liberalization came too late to forestall revolution. In an epilogue, the author reflects upon Qadhafi's premiership and the legacy he leaves behind.

Libya has been one of the most remarkable of the Arab oil producers. It has combined an aggressive foreign policy, a domestic political revolution and extraordinary economic growth over the last decade. This book focuses on the development of the Libyan economy over this period. In the boom years of the oil market Libya’s revenues exploded. With the current decline of Arab oil revenues many of the projects undertaken then now look less realistic. The book surveys both the structural developments in the Libyan economy and the experience of individual sectors. It considers the potential for industrial development and the prospects for agriculture both in terms of natural resources and political commitments. The book also examines developments in the service sector, especially banking. Although it recognises the acute problems of the Libyan economy, the book is broadly optimistic for prospects through to the year 2000. First published in 1987.

Why has Libya fallen apart since 2011? The world has largely given up trying to understand how the revolution that toppled Muammar Gaddafi has left the country a failed state and a major security headache for Europe. Gaddafi's police state has been replaced by yet another dictatorship, amidst a complex conflict of myriad armed groups, Islamists, tribes, towns and secularists. What happened? One of few foreign journalists to have lived in post-revolution Tripoli, Ulf Laessing has unique insight into the violent nature of post-Gaddafi politics. Confronting threats from media-hostile militias and jihadi kidnappings, in a world where diplomats retreat to their compounds and guns are drawn at government press conferences, Laessing has kept his ear to the ground and won the trust of many key players. Understanding Libya Since Gaddafi is an original blend of personal anecdote and nuanced Libyan history. It offers a much-needed diagnosis of why war has erupted over a desert nation of just 6 million, and of how the country blessed with Africa's greatest energy reserves has been reduced to state collapse.

The war in Syria, now in its eighth year, continues to take its toll on the Syrian people. More than half of the population of Syria remains displaced; 5.6 million persons are registered as refugees outside of the country and another 6.2 million are displaced within Syria's borders. The internally displaced persons include 2 million school-age children; of these, less than half attend school. Another 739,000 Syrian children are out of school in the five neighborhood countries that host Syria's refugees. The loss of human capital is staggering, and it will create permanent hardships for generations of Syrians going forward. Despite the tragic prospects for renewed fighting in certain parts of the country, an overall reduction in armed conflict is possible going forward. However, international experience shows that the absence of fighting is rarely a singular trigger for the return of displaced people. Numerous other factors—including improved security and socioeconomic conditions in origin states, access to property and assets, the availability of key services, and restitution in home areas—play important roles in shaping the scale and composition of the returns. Overall, refugees have their own calculus of return that considers all of these factors and assesses available options. The Mobility of Displaced Syrians: An Economic and Social Analysis sheds light on the 'mobility calculus' of Syrian refugees. While dismissing any policies that imply wrongful practices involving forced repatriation, the study analyzes factors that may be considered by refugees in their own decisions to relocate. It provides a conceptual framework, supported by data and analysis, to facilitate an impartial conversation about refugees and their mobility choices. It also explores the diversified policy toolkit that the international community has available—and the most effective ways in which the toolkit can be adapted—to maximize the well-being of refugees, host countries, and the people in Syria.