There is ongoing debate as to what competition law and policy is most suitable for developing jurisdictions. This book argues that the unique characteristics of developing jurisdictions matter when crafting and enforcing competition law and these shoul

This book brings together perspectives of development economics and law to tackle the relationship between competition law enforcement and economic development. It addresses the question of whether, and how, competition law enforcement helps to promote economic growth and development. This question is highly pertinent for developing countries largely because many developing countries have only adopted competition law in recent years: about thirty jurisdictions had in place a competition law in the early 1980s, and there are now more than 130 competition law regimes across the world, of which many are developing countries. The book proposes a customized approach to competition law enforcement for developing countries, set against the background of the academic and policy debate concerning convergence of competition law. The implicit premise of convergence is that there may exist one, or a few, correct approaches to competition law enforcement, which in most cases emanate from developed jurisdictions, that are applicable to all. This book rejects this assumption and argues that developing countries ought to tailor competition law enforcement to their own economic and political circumstances. In particular, it suggests how competition law enforcement can better incorporate development concerns without causing undue dilution of its traditional focus on protecting consumer welfare. It proposes ways in which approaches to competition law enforcement need to be adjusted to reflect the special economic characteristics of developing country economies and the more limited enforcement capacity of developing country competition authorities. Finally, it also addresses the long-running debate concerning the desirability and viability of industrial policy for developing countries. The author would like to acknowledge the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong for its generous support. The work in this book was fully supported by a grant from the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong (Project No. HKU 742412H).

The gap between the rich and poor is widening across the globe. This book explores whether this major societal challenge of our time can be addressed by the means of competition law. The primary goal of today's competition law is to ensure that market power does not lead to an inefficient production of goods and services. Nevertheless, even such efficiency-oriented curbing of market power may arguably contribute to the reduction of differences in how much people own and earn. Furthermore, many competition law regimes do take into account distributive considerations too. The chapters investigate the relationship between competition law and economic (in)equality from philosophical, historical, and economic perspectives. Their inquiries concern the conceptual foundations of competition law and doctrinal frameworks of individual jurisdictions, as well as specific problems and markets. As such, the book provides a novel and comprehensive overview of whether and how competition law can contribute to more equality in both developed and developing countries. The book is a must-read for researchers, public officials, judges, and practitioners within the competition law community. It will also appeal to anyone more broadly interested in issues of inequality and economic policy.

This open access book provides answers to key open questions concerning competition policy in emerging economies, with a focus on South Eastern Europe. The contributions address two major issues. One is the design of competition policy and the national competition authorities that enforce it, including the topics of competition advocacy and state aid control; the other is the use of economic methods in competition law enforcement, especially in the cases of relevant market definition and merger control. Many lessons learned in the countries of South Eastern Europe can be applied to the emerging markets of other regions. As such, the findings presented here will be highly relevant for officials and staff at national competition authorities, advisers to legislators shaping national competition policy, competition law professionals, and university students alike.

This book explores the relationship between market entry analysis in competition law and the study of the determinants of aggregate investment. Macroeconomic and social characteristics, such as widespread corruption, political instability, and low levels of education are associated with lower investment rates. Progress on these indicators on the other hand is also strongly associated with sustained growth and higher investment rates. This book analyzes the interaction between these macro variables and the market-specific analysis typical in antitrust cases. Against this background, representative decisions of four Latin American competition authorities – México, El Salvador, Colombia, and Chile – on unilateral conduct are analyzed, focusing on market power assessment. The analysis shows that there is little to no explicit or implicit consideration of the impact of the macroeconomic environment on market dynamism and therefore on market power. This book also explores the influence that EU and US competition law have in the standards to prove ease of market entry developed by the Latin American authorities. Although most of the Latin American authorities share a lack of reliance on market forces, which is characteristic of EU competition law, this book argues that market entry analysis still needs to be adjusted to fit the socio-economic context that affects investment within the country and the degree to which each particular market is affected. Finally, the book proposes a framework on how the macro characteristics covered can be incorporated into competition law enforcement.

Abusive Practices in Competition Law tackles the difficult questions presented to competition lawyers and economists regarding abusive practices: where and when is the red line crossed in competitive advances? When is a company explicitly dominant? How do you handle those who hold superior bargaining power over others but are not classed as dominant?