This book investigates the dynamic intertwinement of law and morality, with a focus on new and developing fields of law. Taking as its starting point the debates and mutual misunderstandings between proponents of different philosophical traditions, it argues that this theoretical pluralism is better explained once law is accepted as an essentially ambiguous concept. Continuing on, the book develops a robust theory of law that increases our grasp on global legal pluralism and the dynamics of law. This theory of legal interactionism, inspired by the work of Lon Fuller and Philip Selznick, also helps us to understand apparent anomalies of modern law, such as international law, the law of the European Convention on Human Rights and horizontal interactive legislation. In an ecumenical approach, legal interactionism does justice to the valuable core of truth in natural law and legal positivism. Shedding new light on familiar debates between authors such as Fuller, Hart and Dworkin, this book is of value to academics and students interested in legal theory, jurisprudence, legal sociology and moral philosophy.

This book investigates the dynamic intertwinement of law and morality, with a focus on new and developing fields of law. Taking as its starting point the debates and mutual misunderstandings between proponents of different philosophical traditions, it argues that this theoretical pluralism is better explained once law is accepted as an essentially ambiguous concept. Continuing on, the book develops a robust theory of law that increases our grasp on global legal pluralism and the dynamics of law. This theory of legal interactionism, inspired by the work of Lon Fuller and Philip Selznick, also helps us to understand apparent anomalies of modern law, such as international law, the law of the European Convention on Human Rights and horizontal interactive legislation. In an ecumenical approach, legal interactionism does justice to the valuable core of truth in natural law and legal positivism. Shedding new light on familiar debates between authors such as Fuller, Hart and Dworkin, this book is of value to academics and students interested in legal theory, jurisprudence, legal sociology and moral philosophy.

This book argues that overcoming people's inability to recognize their own wrongdoing is the most important but regrettably neglected area of the behavioral approach to law.

This investigation of the dynamic intertwinement of law and morality argues that theoretical pluralism is better explained once law is accepted as an essentially ambiguous concept. The book develops a robust theory of law that increases our grasp on global legal pluralism and the dynamics of law and also emphasises the theory of legal interactionism. This helps us to understand apparent anomalies of modern law and does justice to the valuable core of truth in natural law and legal positivism.

This book explores illegal forms of corruption and, more widely, moral and legal forms of corruption. The authors draw on detailed ethnographic accounts of corrupt practice at local, national and international levels. Coverage includes both Western and non-Western societies, from Italy to Latin America, to Albania, Africa and post-Soviet bureaucracy in Russia, Mongolia and Kazakhstan. There is also a chapter on corruption in the context of globalization. Key issues discussed include the problems caused by the inflated rhetoric of corruption and by the inadequacy of official definitions. The authors look at measures designed to bring corruption under some degree of control, discussing the level of legal intervention compatible with public expectations and with the dynamics of trust and responsibility. This fascinating book makes a significant contribution to our understanding of conflicting public and private moralities.