Developmental state, n.: the government, motivated by desire for economic advancement, intervenes in industrial affairs. The notion of the developmental state has come under attack in recent years. Critics charge that Japan's success in putting this notion into practice has not been replicated elsewhere, that the concept threatens the purity of freemarket economics, and that its shortcomings have led to financial turmoil in Asia. In this informative and thought-provoking book, a team of distinguished scholars revisits this notion to assess its continuing utility and establish a common vocabulary for debates on these issues. Drawing on new political and economic theories and emphasizing recent events, the authors examine the East Asian experience to show how the developmental state involves a combination of political, bureaucratic, and moneyed influences that shape economic life in the region. Taking as its point of departure Chalmers Johnson's account of the Japanese developmental state, the book explores the interplay of forces that have determined the structure of opportunity in the region. The authors critically address the argument for centralized political involvement in industrial development (with a new contribution by Johnson), describe the historical impact of colonialism and the Cold War, consider new ideas in economics, and compare the experiences of East Asian countries with those of France, Brazil, Mexico, and India.

This open access book modifies and revitalizes the concept of the ‘developmental state’ to understand the politics of emerging economy through nuanced analysis on the roles of human agency in the context of structural transformation. In other words, there is a revived interest in the ‘developmental state’ concept. The nature of the ‘emerging state’ is characterized by its attitude toward economic development and industrialization. Emerging states have engaged in the promotion of agriculture, trade, and industry and played a transformative role to pursue a certain path of economic development. Their success has cast doubt about the principle of laissez faire among the people in the developing world. This doubt, together with the progress of democratization, has prompted policymakers to discover when and how economic policies should deviate from laissez faire, what prevents political leaders and state institutions from being captured by vested interests, and what induce them to drive economic development. This book offers both historical and contemporary case studies from Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Rwanda. They illustrate how institutions are designed to be developmental, how political coalitions are formed to be growth-oriented, and how technocratic agencies are embedded in a network of business organizations as a part of their efforts for state building.

The concept of the developmental state emerged to explain the rapid growth of a number of countries in East Asia in the postwar period. Yet the developmental state literature also offered a theoretical approach to growth that was heterodox with respect to prevailing approaches in both economics and political science. Arguing for the distinctive features of developmental states, its proponents emphasized the role of government intervention and industrial policy as well as the significance of strong states and particular social coalitions. This literature blossomed into a wider approach, firmly planted in a much longer heterodox tradition, that explored comparisons with states that were decidedly not developmentalist, thus contributing to our historical understanding of long-run growth. This Element provides a critical but sympathetic overview of this literature and ends with its revival and a look forward at the possibility for developmentalist approaches, both in the advanced and developing world.

The concept of a democratic developmental state is part of the current development discourse advocated by international aid agencies, deliberated on by academics, and embraced by policymakers in many emerging economies in the global South. This volume investigates these attempts to establish a new and more inclusive conceptualization of the state.

The focus of this volume is on the role of the developmental state in a situation in which a series of major crises affects the (semi-) periphery of the global economy. The authors go beyond the established debate on developmental states in East Asia by highlighting a much broader understanding of development and a very different global economic context. They also further the existing debate by covering new country cases. At the same time, they deepen our perspective on developmental states by looking at unusual sectors such as green industrial policy, education and farming.

The End of the Developmental State? brings together leading scholars of development to assess the current status of the "developmental state" in several developing and transitional economies of South Korea, Taiwan, Ireland, the United Kingdom, China, South Africa, Brazil and India. Has the concept of the developmental state become outmoded? These authors would suggest not. However, they do argue that the historical trajectories of developmental states in Asia, Latin America, Africa and Europe suggest all too clearly that the concept must be re-examined critically and creatively. The range and diversity of their positions and their rejection of stale programmatic positions from the past will revitalize the debate on the role of the state in social and economic transformation in the twenty-first century. By bringing together careful comparative analyses of national cases, in both the Global North and South, the volume highlights pivotal conditions – economic restructuring, domestic politics, epistemic shifts and ecological limits – that are forcing revision of the goals and strategies of developmental states and suggests that states that ignore these new conditions will indeed see the "end of the developmental state".

The rapid growth of Taiwan's postwar miracle economy is most frequently credited to the leading role of the state in promoting economic development. Megan Greene challenges this standard interpretation in the first in-depth examination of the origins of Taiwan's developmental state. Greene examines the ways in which the Guomindang state planned and promoted scientific and technical development both in mainland China between 1927 and 1949 and on Taiwan after 1949. Using industrial science policy as a lens, she shows that the state, even during its most authoritarian periods, did not function as a monolithic entity. State planners were concerned with maximizing the use of Taiwan's limited resources for industrial development. Political leaders, on the other hand, were most concerned with the state's political survival. The developmental state emerged gradually as a result of the combined efforts of technocrats and outsiders, including academicians and foreign advisors. Only when the political leadership put its authority and weight behind the vision of these early planners did Taiwan's developmental state fully come into being. In Taiwan's combination of technocratic expertise and political authoritarianism lie implications for our understanding of changes taking place in mainland China today.