In recent years, analysts and policy makers alike have been evaluating the nexus between exchange rates and macroeconomic stability. Among the most important questions is why have some countries adopted rigid, including fixed, exchange-rate paper addresses this question from a political economy perspective both theoretically and empirically. The model assumes that the monetary authority minimizes a quadratic loss function that captures the trade-off between infla- tion and unemployment. This framework is initially applied to the case where monetary authorities must choose between a (permanently) fixed and a flexible exchange-rate regime. In choosing the regime it is assumed authorities compare the expected losses under each scenario. The model is subsequently extended extended to cover the somewhat more complicated case where the authoriities must choose between fixed-but-adjustable and flexible exchange-rate regimes. In this latter case, potential political costs of abandoningithe pegged rate are taken into account. In the empirical section, an unbalanced panel data set of 63 countries from 1980-1992 is used to estimate a series of probit models, with a binary exchange-rate regime index as the dependent variable. Among the most important explanatory variables were measures of countries' historical degree of political instability, measures of the probability of abandoning pegged rates, and variables related to the relative importance of real (unemployment) targets in the preferences of monetary authorities. The regression results support the political economy approach developed in the theoretical discussion.

This paper examines whether decisions about the appropriate exchange rate regime in six Central American countries were based on longer-run economic fundamentals or on the confluence of historical and political circumstances. To uncover any actual relationship both across countries and across time, we estimate several probit and multinomial logit models of exchange rate regime choice with data spanning the period 1974-2001. We find that theoretical long-run determinants, such as trade openness, export share with the major trading partner, economic size, and per capita income, are adequate, but not robust, predictors of exchange rate regime choice. However, we were not able to establish a statistically significant association between the terms of trade fluctuations or capital account openness and a particular regime in any specification using our sample.

This book explores the exchange rate regime choice and the role played by the exchange rate in the economy. Approaching the classification of exchange rate regimes from theoretical, practical and historical perspectives, the book discusses pertinent case studies, including the choice of exchange rate regime in the post-conflict case of Iraq.

Using recent advances in the classification of exchange rate regimes, this paper finds no support for the popular bipolar view that countries will tend over time to move to the polar extremes of free float or rigid peg. Rather, intermediate regimes have shown remarkable durability. The analysis suggests that as economies mature, the value of exchange rate flexibility rises. For countries at a relatively early stage of financial development and integration, fixed or relatively rigid regimes appear to offer some anti-inflation credibility gain without compromising growth objectives. As countries develop economically and institutionally, there appear to be considerable benefits to more flexible regimes. For developed countries that are not in a currency union, relatively flexible exchange rate regimes appear to offer higher growth without any cost in credibility.

An empirical study of exchange rate regimes based on data compiled from 150 member countries of the International Monetary Fund over the past thirty years. Few topics in international economics are as controversial as the choice of an exchange rate regime. Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s, countries have adopted a wide variety of regimes, ranging from pure floats at one extreme to currency boards and dollarization at the other. While a vast theoretical literature explores the choice and consequences of exchange rate regimes, the abundance of possible effects makes it difficult to establish clear relationships between regimes and common macroeconomic policy targets such as inflation and growth. This book takes a systematic look at the evidence on macroeconomic performance under alternative exchange rate regimes, drawing on the experience of some 150 member countries of the International Monetary Fund over the past thirty years. Among other questions, it asks whether pegging the exchange rate leads to lower inflation, whether floating exchange rates are associated with faster output growth, and whether pegged regimes are particularly prone to currency and other crises. The book draws on history and theory to delineate the debate and on standard statistical methods to assess the empirical evidence, and includes a CD-ROM containing the data set used.

In this paper we first explain why most microstates (countries with less than 2 million inhabitants) have gained independence only in the last 30 years. Despite the higher costs and risks microstates face, their ability to better accommodate local preferences combined with a more integrated world economy probably explains why the benefits of independence have risen. We explain why microstates at independence have chosen either dollarization, currency board arrangements, or fixed exchange rates rather than more flexible forms of exchange rate systems. We then, using the Geweke-Hajvassiliou-Keane multivariate normal simulator, model empirically the determinants of each of the different fixed exchange rate regimes in microstates and analyze the policy implications.

Traditionally the choice of exchange rate regime has been seen as a second-best policy choice, which can be directed toward mitigating the distortionary effects of price or information rigidities. In this paradigm the optimal degree of exchange rate flexibility is found to depend of the source and nature of shocks hitting an economy. More recent literature views the exchange rate as a widely and frequently seen manifestation of government policy with careful exchange-rate management emerging as a tool that can enhance shaky policy credibility.