This paper has two related objectives. First, it seeks to identify the key determinants of some policies that have been at the heart of the reforms of the telecommunications industry in developing countries, namely, liberalization, privatization, and the (re)structuring of regulation. Second, it attempts to estimate the extent to which these policies have translated into actual deployment of telecommunications infrastructure. This simultaneous investigation is conducted by means of an econometric analysis of a 1985-1999 time-series-cross-sectional database on 86 developing countries. Sectoral as well as institutional and financial factors are found to be important determinants of the actual reforms implemented. We uncover a positive relationship between the decision to introduce competition in the digital cellular segment and the growth of the fixed-line segment, suggesting that these two segments have benefited from each other. We also find that countries facing increasing institutional risk and financial constraints are more likely to introduce competition in the digital cellular segment and to privatize the fixed-line incumbent, these policies being economically attractive to both investors and governments. In turn, these policies are those that enhance the deployment of fixed-line infrastructure. In contrast, competition in the analogue cellular segment and the creation of a separate regulator seem to be relatively less attractive policies as they are found to be less likely to be introduced in countries facing increasing institutional risk and budget constraints. Their impact on fixed network deployment is found to be negative or non significant.

This paper has two related objectives. First, it seeks to identify the key determinants of some policies that have been at the heart of the reforms of the telecommunications industry in developing countries, namely, liberalization, privatization, and the (re)structuring of regulation. Second, it attempts to estimate the extent to which these policies have translated into actual deployment of telecommunications infrastructure. This simultaneous investigation is conducted by means of an econometric analysis of a 1985-1999 time-series cross- sectional database on 86 developing countries. Sectoral as well as institutional and financial factors are found to be important determinants of the actual reforms implemented. We uncover a positive relationship between the decision to introduce competition in the digital cellular segment and the growth of the fixed-line segment, suggesting that these two segments have benefited from each other. We also find that countries facing increasing institutional risk and financial constraints are more likely to introduce competition in the digital cellular segment and to privatize the fixed-line incumbent, these policies being economically attractive to both investors and governments. In turn, these policies are those that enhance the deployment of fixed-line infrastructure. In contrast, competition in the analogue cellular segment and the creation of a separate regulator seem to be relatively less attractive policies as they are found to be less likely to be introduced in countries facing increasing institutional risk and budget constraints. Their impact on fixed network deployment is found to be negative or non significant.

Based on a policy-making theoretical framework and on the recent experiences of 10 developing countries, this study explores the factors that lead to the success or failure of telecommunications reform. It provides universal conclusions that might help predict the success or failure of telecommunications policies, such as, privatization and liberalization, in other nations that are moving towards reform. This book is an original contribution to our understanding of the rapid and often complex transformations in telecommunications policies. It defies previous assumptions about conditions for success and failure of policy implementation. Although numerous publications deal with telecommunications policy reform in Europe or the United States, little has been written about it in the developing world. This book fills the gap and will be invaluable for academics, policy makers, and others concerned with communications, economic development, and international business.

This book attempts to draw lessons from the experiences of developed as well as developing countries in carrying out telecommunications reform. Contributors come from academia, as well as from stakeholders in telecommunications policy in a dozen countries, mostly in the Asia-Pacific region. Globally, the telecommunications industry is undergoing major changes: technological advances in the form of a vast number of new digitised services, ownership shifts as state-owned carriers in many countries become fully or partly privatized, and a general transition from monopolistic to more competitive market environments. The economic and regulatory experiences derived from these changes are explored and analyzed using the USA, the UK, Australia and Singapore to represent developed and newly industrialized countries, and China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Vietnam as examples of developing countries. The conclusions outlined in this timely volume hold important lessons for these as well as for other countries.

We investigate the determinants of regulatory reforms between 1990 and 1998 in 50 developing countries. We find that the reforms are attributable to differences in the configurations of interest groups and in the political structure - in particular, the decision-making mechanisms and the ideology of the legislature. Regulatory reforms are more likely in countries with strong pro-reform interest groups (a larger financial sector and a greater proportion of urban consumers) and less likely in countries where incumbent operators have already made large investments and hence have strong incentives to oppose the reforms. Democracy facilitates the actions of interest groups.