The UK spends approximately £20bn annually on military goods and services, around two-thirds of the total Defence Budge The challenges are constantly evolving, and there has been a succession of reforms to the acquisition process, each building on the last, and between them delivering significant improvement: more recent equipment projects show less tendency towards cost growth and time slippage; there is a more holistic, 'throughlife' approach to providing capability (Chapter 5); and a stronger and more mutually beneficial relationship with industry (Chapter 6). Around 98 per cent of major projects deliver the operational performance needed at the front line. But they also tend to increase in cost - by an average of 2.8 per cent each year - and to suffer delay averaging 5.9 months. More projects must be delivered to cost and time. An independent report into defence acquisition by Bernard Gray (available at: http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/78821960-14A0-429E-A90A-FA2A8C292C84/0/ReviewAcquisitionGrayreport.pdf) concluded that overall plans for new equipment were too ambitious, and needed to be scaled down to match the funding likely to be available; and management of equipment portfolios must be improved. This strategy is built around those conclusions. The framework is designed so that the Ministry of Defence will make better decisions about what equipment (and wider services) to buy, how to ensure they are delivered on time, to cost and provide the desired performance; and in doing so, recognise and properly manage all the other strands (training, personnel, information, doctrine, organisation, infrastructure and logistics) needed to deliver and sustain effect on the ground.

Military and defense organizations are a vital component to any nation. In order to maintain the standards of these sectors, new procedures and practices must be implemented. Emerging Strategies in Defense Acquisitions and Military Procurement is a pivotal reference source for the latest scholarly research on the present state of defense organizations, examining reforms and solutions necessary to overcome current limitations and make vast improvements to their infrastructure. Highlighting methodologies and theoretical foundations that promote more effective practices in defense acquisition, this book is ideally designed for academicians, practitioners, researchers, upper-level students, and professionals engaged in defense industries.

The authors analyze various approaches to speed acquisition of military capabilities and keep pace with evolving threats, assess these approaches' suitability for different conditions and acquisition types, and identify implementation issues.

In light of Section 881 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017, which expanded the legal definition of the National Technology and Industrial Base (NTIB) to include the United Kingdom and Australia, this report informs NTIB partners on barriers and opportunities for effective integration. The expansion of the NTIB is based on the principle that defense trade between the United States and its closest allies enables a host of benefits, including increased access to innovation, economies of scale, and interoperability. In order to reap the greatest benefits of a new era of NTIB, this report uses the lessons learned from study of the present state of integration to identify areas of opportunity for policy reforms and greater cooperation.

The Defence Reform was launched in August 2010 as a fundamental review of how Defence is structured and managed. Many of the issues are not new and have been noted by similar reviews. The Steering Group believes an effective MOD is one which builds on the strengths of the individual Services and the Civil Service and does so within a single Defence framework that ensures the whole is more than the sum of its parts. A key driver for this review has been the Department's over-extended programme, to which the existing departmental management structure and management structure and behaviours contributed. Many of the Steering Group's proposals are designed to help prevent the Department from getting into such a poor financial position in the future and to put it in the position to make real savings. There are 53 recommendations the key ones of which are: to create a new and smaller Defence Board chaired by the Defence Secretary to strengthen top level decision making; to clarify the responsibilities of senior leaders, including the Permanent Secretary and the Chief of the Defence Staff; make the Head Office smaller and more strategic, to make high level balance of investment decisions, set strategic direction and a strong corporate framework; focus the Service Chiefs on running their Services and empower them to perform their role effectively with greater freedom to manage; strengthen financial and performance management throughout the Department to ensure future plans are affordable; create a 4 star led Joint Forces Command; create single, coherent Defence Infrastructure and Defence Business Services organisations; manage and use less senior military and civil personnel more effectively, people staying in post longer, more transparent and joint career management.

This book demonstrates that under the leadership of President Ronald Reagan and through the mechanism of his National Security Council staff, the United States developed and executed a comprehensive grand strategy, involving the coordinated use of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power, and that grand strategy led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. In doing so, it refutes three orthodoxies: that Reagan and his administration deserve little credit for the end of the Cold War, with most of credit going to Mikhail Gorbachev; that Reagan’s management of the National Security Council staff was singularly inept; and that the United States is incapable of generating and implementing a grand strategy that employs all the instruments of national power and coordinates the work of all executive agencies. The Reagan years were hardly a time of interagency concord, but the National Security Council staff managed the successful implementation of its program nonetheless.