During the past four years, the countries of the European periphery – the so-called PIIGS (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain) – have been experiencing an economic-financial crisis that can only be compared to the Great Depression. To solve the crisis, the EU and the IMF instituted bailout programs for the debit countries on conditions of austerity and structural reforms. In this volume 20 social scientists, using both theoretical and empirical tools, delve into the causes and the social impacts of this crisis. The volume also provides an excellent background for a better comprehension of the dynamics of structural and political changes now taking place within the European Union. The social impacts cover a range of consequences, including poverty, unemployment, anti-migrant attitudes, a decline of welfare and health indicators, post-traumatic stress disorders, national humiliation, political alienation and social protest. The authors analyse the “international” and the “domestic” causes of the crisis, while some of them underline the importance of both factors. In the concluding chapter, the editors undertake a synthesis of the previous chapters, and extract a number of policy recommendations that – if adopted – could transform the current financial crisis into a growth-opportunity for the European Union and its member states.

Athens, Greece—May Day 2010. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU) were putting together the final details of a $100 billion euro rescue package for the country. The Greek Prime Minister, George Papandreou, had agreed to a savage package of “austerity measures” involving cuts in public spending and lower salaries and pensions. Outside, riot police were deployed as protestors gathered to fight the austerity program. A country with a history of revolution and dictatorship hovered on the brink of collapse—with the world’s financial markets watching to see if the deal cobbled together would be enough to both calm the markets and rescue the Greek economy, and with it the euro, from oblivion. In Bust: Greece, the Euro, and the Sovereign Debt Crisis, leading market commentator Matthew Lynn blends financial history, politics, and current affairs to tell the story of how one nation rode the wave of economic prosperity and brought a continent, a currency, and, potentially, the global financial system to its knees. Bust is a story of government deceit, unfettered spending, and cheap borrowing: a tale of financial folly to rank alongside the greatest in history. It charts Greece’s rise, and spectacular fall from grace, but it also explores the global repercussions of a financial disaster that has only just begun. It explains how the Greek debt crisis spread like wildfire through the rest of Europe, hitting Ireland, Portugal, Italy, and Spain, and ultimately provoking a crisis that brought the euro to the edge of collapse. And it argues that the Greek crisis is just the start of a decade of financial turmoil that will eventually force the break up of the euro, and a massive retrenchment in the living standards of all the developed economies. Written in a lively and entertaining style, Bust: Greece, the Euro, and the Sovereign Debt Crisis is an engaging and informative account of a country gone wrong and a must-read for anyone interested in world events and global economics.

First, there was the credit crunch, and governments around the world stepped in to bail out the banks. The sequel to that debacle is the sovereign debt crisis, which has hit the eurozone hard. The hour has come to pay the piper, and ordinary citizens across Europe are growing to realize that socialism for the wealthy means punching a few new holes in their already-tightened belts. Building on his work as a leading member of the renowned Research on Money and Finance group, Costas Lapavitsas argues that European austerity is counterproductive. Cutbacks in public spending will mean a longer, deeper recession, worsen the burden of debt, further imperil banks, and may soon spell the end of monetary union itself. Crisis in the Eurozone charts a cautious path between political economy and radical economics to envisage a restructuring reliant on the forces of organized labour and civil society. The clear-headed rationalism at the heart of this book conveys a controversial message, unwelcome in many quarters but soon to be echoed across the continent: impoverished states have to quit the euro and cut their losses or worse hardship will ensue.

The book analyses the emerging centre-periphery divisions within the European Union which result from the unprecedented conditions created by the 2008-09 global financial crisis and the subsequent Eurozone sovereign debt crisis. The multiple layers of policy coordination which emerged in response to the crisis have initiated a process by which the EU is increasingly divided in terms of the level of vertical integration between the Eurozone core group and differentiated peripheries amongst the outsiders. At the same time the sovereign debt crisis has created a periphery of predominantly Southern European countries within the Eurozone that became dependent on external financial support from the other member states. The contributions in this book critically examine various aspects of the emerging internal post-crisis constellation of the EU. The main focus lies on national and supranational governance issues, national dynamics and dynamics in the Eurozone core as well as in the periphery. This book was originally published as a special issue of Perspectives on European Politics and Society.

What began as a relatively localized crisis in Greece in early 2010 soon escalated to envelop Ireland and Portugal. By the second half of 2011, the contagion had spread to the far larger economies of Italy and Spain. In mid-September the Peterson Institute and Bruegel hosted a conference designed to contribute to the formulation of policies that could help resolve the euro area debt crisis. This volume presents the conference papers; several are updated through end-2011. European experts examine the political context in Greece (Loukas Tsoukalis), Ireland (Alan Ahearne), Portugal (Pedro Lourtie), Spain (Guillermo de la Dehesa), Italy (Riccardo Perissich), Germany (Daniela Schwarzer), and France (Zaki La�di). Lessons from past debt restructurings are then examined by Jeromin Zettelmeyer (economic) and Lee Buchheit (legal). The two editors separately consider the main current policy issues: debt sustainability by country, private sector involvement and contagion, alternative restructuring approaches, how to assemble a large emergency financing capacity, whether the European Central Bank (ECB) should be a lender of last resort, whether joint-liability "eurobonds" would be feasible and desirable, and the implications of a possible break-up of the euro area. The luncheon address by George Soros and a description (by Steven R. Weisman with Silvia B. Merler) of the policy simulation game played on the second day of the conference complete the volume. Involving market participants and experts representing the roles of euro area governments, the ECB, IMF, G-7, and credit rating agencies, the game led to a proposal for leveraging the capacity of the European Financial Stability Facility through arrangements with the ECB.

This book explores Portugal’s response to the 2008 economic crisis and how the country regained the trust of the global capital markets through investor support. The experiences and successes of Portugal are compared with the other Eurozone countries, in particular Greece which had to negotiate a series of assistance programs, to highlight the strategies which helped lessen the impact of the debt crisis. This book aims to provide insight into the global investor ecosystem and to how financial globalization works in practice, illustrating how the multinational investor universe, the financial media, rating agencies, and how investment banks interact. It will be relevant to students and researchers interested in financial markets and political economy, and also financial market practicioners and policy makers.