"On June 28th 2012, the small island of Cyprus became the fifth government to request an economic bail-out from the Eurozone after losing access to international capital markets. Less than a year later, a €10 billion second rescue deal was agreed upon -- an unprecedented agreement that bailed in creditors of Cyprus' two largest banks, and triggered an economic crisis that the nation still struggles to recover from today. This resourceful collection of essays provides a thorough and in depth analysis of how Cyprus reached the point of failure and what lessons this experience holds for future economic crises. The various perspectives collectively address unanswered questions, including whether the bail-in can be considered successful, why the recession was less severe than expected, and what conclusions can be drawn about stress-testing exercises across borders. Focusing on one of the (proportionately) largest crises in financial history, the case study will prove essential to policy-makers and politicians, especially in the euro area."--Provided by publisher

On June 28th 2012, the small island of Cyprus became the fifth government to request an economic bail-out from the Eurozone after losing access to international capital markets. Less than a year later, a €10 billion second rescue deal was agreed upon — an unprecedented agreement that bailed in creditors of Cyprus' two largest banks, and triggered an economic crisis that the nation still struggles to recover from today.This resourceful collection of essays provides a thorough and in depth analysis of how Cyprus reached the point of failure and what lessons this experience holds for future economic crises. The various perspectives collectively address unanswered questions, including whether the bail-in can be considered successful, why the recession was less severe than expected, and what conclusions can be drawn about stress-testing exercises across borders.Focusing on one of the (proportionately) largest crises in financial history, the case study will prove essential to policy-makers and politicians, especially in the euro area.

The 2012-2013 economic crisis in the Republic of Cyprus is commonly attributed to a number of factors, including the exposure of Cypriot banks to over leveraged local property companies; the knock-on effect of the Greek government debt crisis; and international credit rating agencies downgrading the Cypriot government's bond credit status. What followed was unexpected and controversial: a bailout on condition of a one-time bank deposit levy on all uninsured deposits in the country's second-largest bank, the Cyprus Popular Bank; and on the uninsured deposits of large proportion of the island's largest commercial bank, the Bank of Cyprus. Many have questioned the implications of Cyprus' ties with the Russian financial system, as well as the draconian and unprecedented bailout terms imposed on the Cypriot population by the Eurozone. There has been little written from the Cypriot perspective on these events. This book presents a study of the events surrounding the recent Cypriot Financial Crisis and its impact on the Eurozone. It incorporates insights from leading protagonists in the Cypriot government and banking sectors and focuses on qualitative research to assess the events that formed the backdrop of the crisis. The book analyzes the policies of many public and private institutions and presents the crisis alongside other Eurozone bailouts to compare and contextualize the ongoing issues. Cyprus and the Financial Crisis also explains the political and historical backdrop of the events, including the wider Cypriot experience since the 1974 invasion, and the unravelling financial relationship between Cyprus, Greece and Russia. It incorporates the views of Cypriots from a wide and diverse spectrum, and presents the resilience of the island in fighting back to beat forecasts for recovery, helped by the Eldorado of gas finds off its southern shores.

This book tells the story of the euro crisis in Cyprus from the inside. Written by the former Governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus, Panicos Demetriades, who was in office during this turbulent period, this book shows how the crisis unravelled through a series of key events that occurred during his tenure. Written in chronological order, and broadly based on the author’s personal diary, starting from his first day in office, this volume brings together economics, banking, regulation, governance, history, politics and international relations. Presenting personal witness statements, including records of noteworthy telephone conversations, informal meetings and other milestones, it examines crucial questions like: How did Cyprus become so systemically important to the rest of the euro area? Why was Cyprus treated so differently in comparison to other peripheral countries in Europe? Why were bank depositors targeted? What role did Cyprus’ links with Russia play in the design of the programme? What has been the toxic fallout from the bail-in? Are there any longer-term implications for the euro? What are the lessons for regulators around the world? The book will appeal to readers interested in financial crises, the euro’s architecture, the evolution of the European Monetary Union, and those with an interest in how Europe and the IMF dealt with crises in peripheral European countries.

The Cyprus debt crisis provides some unique lessons. By the time an assistance program was agreed with the Troika of international lenders, the problem had become so complex that a depositor bail-in was implemented to safeguard financial stability. The bail-in was an ad hoc solution applied for the first time in the eurozone but is now the blueprint for dealing with future banking crises. This paper examines the events for the eighteen-month period before the two eurogroup meetings on Cyprus in March 2013, and the resolution and restructuring of the two systemic banks of the country with depositor bail-in. We show how delays in dealing with the crisis exacerbated the problem but also how the tools brought in to solve the problem had significant unintended consequences that fit the reflexivity principle. Available evidence questions the validity of confidential studies guiding the policy decisions on depositor haircut and supports the argument that the bail-in, as implemented in Cyprus, violated international principles of fairness. We use the analysis to draw some lessons on the use of bail-in for future crises.

This book tells the inside story of those who played key roles in setting up the organisations and combatting the crisis. In exclusive interviews, global financial leaders and ESM insiders provide a rich stock of perspectives and anecdotes that bring to life the urgency of the crisis as well as the innovative solutions found to resolve it. The European Stability Mechanism and its temporary predecessor the EFSF provided billions of euros in loans to five hard-hit euro area countries during the European financial and sovereign debt crisis of the early 2000s, helping to safeguard the stability of those countries and the euro area as a whole. Initially, the crisis-torn euro area was ill-equipped institutionally, but the rapid establishment of the firewalls, the assistance programmes, deep‐seated country reforms, the strengthening of European institutions, and extraordinary European Central Bank measures shielded Europe from a euro area break-up. With the EFSF/ESM set-up, its managers aspired to create a new, more entrepreneurial international financial institution, one that is agile enough to respond quickly to new challenges, while still ensuring the strict governance befitting an organisation pursuing a public mission. The euro area has emerged from near disaster in more robust shape. As Europe strives to further strengthen its architecture in preparation for any possible future crises, it is important to reflect upon how the euro area reinvigorated its fortunes and draw the relevant lessons for future crisis management in Europe and beyond.

This paper analyzes the impact of strained government finances on macroeconomic stability and the transmission of fiscal policy. Using a variant of the model by Curdia and Woodford (2009), we study a "sovereign risk channel" through which sovereign default risk raises funding costs in the private sector. If monetary policy is constrained, the sovereign risk channel exacerbates indeterminacy problems: private-sector beliefs of a weakening economy may become self-fulfilling. In addition, sovereign risk amplifies the effects of negative cyclical shocks. Under those conditions, fiscal retrenchment can help curtail the risk of macroeconomic instability and, in extreme cases, even stimulate economic activity.