This book is a collection of essays on Husserl's Crisis of European Sciences by leading philosophers of science and scholars of Husserl. Published and ignored under the Nazi dictatorship, Husserl's last work has never received the attention its author's prominence demands. In the Crisis, Husserl considers the gap that has grown between the "life-world" of everyday human experience and the world of mathematical science. He argues that the two have become disconnected because we misunderstand our own scientific past—we confuse mathematical idealities with concrete reality and thereby undermine the validity of our immediate experience. The philosopher's foundational work in the theory of intentionality is relevant to contemporary discussions of qualia, naive science, and the fact-value distinction. The scholars included in this volume consider Husserl's diagnosis of this "crisis" and his proposed solution. Topics addressed include Husserl's late philosophy, the relation between scientific and everyday objects and "worlds," the history of Greek and Galilean science, the philosophy of history, and Husserl's influence on Foucault.

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The Crisis of the European Sciences is Husserl's last and most influential book, written in Nazi Germany where he was discriminated against as a Jew. It incisively identifies the urgent moral and existential crises of the age and defends the relevance of philosophy at a time of both scientific progress and political barbarism. It is also a response to Heidegger, offering Husserl's own approach to the problems of human finitude, history and culture. The Crisis introduces Husserl's influential notion of the 'life-world' – the pre-given, familiar environment that includes both 'nature' and 'culture' – and offers the best introduction to his phenomenology as both method and philosophy. Dermot Moran's rich and accessible introduction to the Crisis explains its intellectual and political context, its philosophical motivations and the themes that characterize it. His book will be invaluable for students and scholars of Husserl's work and of phenomenology in general.

The purpose of the text is threefold: 1] to contribute to the renaissance of Husserl interpretation around a) the continuing publication of Husserl's manuscripts and b) his unpublished manuscripts; 2] to account for the historical origins and influence of the phenomenological project by articulating Husserl's relationship to authors before and after him; 3] to argue for the viability of the phenomenological project as conceived by Husserl in his later years. In regard to the last purpose, Luft's main argument shows that Husserlian phenomenology is not exhausted in the Cartesian (early) perspective, which is indeed its weakest and most vulnerable perspective. Husserlian phenomenology is a robust and philosophically necessary perspective when taken from its hermeneutic (late) perspective. And the ultimate point Luft makes in the text is that Husserl's hermeneutic phenomenology is distinct from other hermeneutic philosophers, namely, Cassirer, Heidegger and Gadamer. Unlike them, Husserl's focus centers on the work the subject must do in order to uncover the prejudices that guide his/her unreflective relationship to the world. In making his argument, Luft also demonstrates that there is a deep consistency within Husserl's own writings-from early to late-around the guiding themes of: 1] the natural attitude; 2] the need and function of the epoché; and 3] the split between egos, where the transcendental self (distinct from the natural self) is seen as the fundamental ability we all have to inquire into the genesis of our tradition-laden attitudes toward the world.

This book offers an in-depth exploration of the burgeoning field of meaning in life in the psychological sciences, covering conceptual and methodological issues, core psychological mechanisms, environmental, cognitive and personality variables and more.

This volume sheds light upon the omnipresent discussion of crisis' in our times by returning to the thought of the two philosophers upon which much of this talk is consciously (or unconsciously) based, namely, Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. By tracing the narrative of the crisis' from Husserl's early treatment of arithmetic and logic through to Heidegger's meditations on the essence of technology, the author not only proposes a unified reading of both Husserl's and Heidegger's work, but points to important elements of the often underplayed continuity between these phenomenologists. At the same time, the concept of crisis' also illustrates the difference between Husserl and Heidegger. Though both define the crisis as one of forgetting', and both view this forgetting' as a matter of philosophical responsibility, essential divergence emerges in their interpretation of this phenomenon. Three questions uncover these points of convergence and divergence. First, does not the forgetfulness' reveal itself as a type of felix culpa, a necessary decay that now reveals itself in a positive light, indeed, as the precondition of history itself

The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Husserl's last great work, is important both for its content and for the influence it has had on other philosophers. In this book, which remained unfinished at his death, Husserl attempts to forge a union between phenomenology and existentialism. Husserl provides not only a history of philosophy but a philosophy of history. As he says in Part I, "The genuine spiritual struggles of European humanity as such take the form of struggles between the philosophies, that is, between the skeptical philosophies--or nonphilosophies, which retain the word but not the task--and the actual and still vital philosophies. But the vitality of the latter consists in the fact that they are struggling for their true and genuine meaning and thus for the meaning of a genuine humanity."