This “uncommonly astute study” examines the early development of the US-UK military alliance that would eventually lead to victory in WWII (Paul Miles, author of FDR’s Admiral). On December 12, 1937, Japanese aircraft sank the American gunboat Panay outside Nanjing, China. Although the Japanese apologized, President Roosevelt set Captain Royal Ingersoll to London to begin conversations with the British admiralty about Japanese aggression in the Far East. While few Americans remember the Panay Incident, it was the start of what would become the “Special Relationship” between the United States and Great Britain. In The Origins of the Grand Alliance, William T. Johnsen provides the first comprehensive analysis of Anglo-American military collaboration before the Second World War. He sets the stage by examining Anglo-French and Anglo-American coalition military planning from 1900 through World War I and the interwar years. Johnsen also considers the formulation of policy and grand strategy, operational planning, and the creation of the command structure and channels of communication. He addresses vitally important logistical and materiel issues, particularly the difficulties of war production. Drawn from extensive sources and private papers held in the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States, Johnsen’s exhaustively researched study casts new light on the twentieth century’s most significant alliance.

A broad-ranging study of the relationship between alliances and the conduct of grand strategy, examined through historical case studies.

The joint British and US campaigns in the European theater of operations during World War II rank among the most impressive examples of coalition warfare in history. In just eighteen months, the US and British armies integrated their planning, intelligence, and command structures more thoroughly than any previous alliance. Millions of British and American soldiers fighting alongside one another liberated North Africa, France, Italy, and western Germany. How did these two armies come together so quickly? How did they combine their forces to a degree never before seen among the services of sovereign nations? And how did they sustain their alliance in the face of severe disagreements and battlefield setbacks? In Forging the Anglo-American Alliance, Tyler Bamford answers these questions by presenting the first history of the two armies’ relations from 1917 to 1941. Great Britain and the United States emerged from World War I as the strongest military powers in the world. Forging the Anglo-American Alliance examines why the armies of these two nations chose to view each other as their closest strategic partner instead of their greatest potential threat and illustrates the legacy that World War I had on the attitudes of the US and British armies toward one another and alliance warfare. Through personal interactions and military education in the years leading up to World War II, army officers shared large amounts of military intelligence and formed positive opinions of one another. As the threat of Germany and Japan grew, army officers were the first to anticipate the need for an alliance between their nations and to begin thinking about ways to structure their combined forces. Using untapped archival sources, official reports, and officers’ personal papers, Bamford presents an important and engaging new analysis of how this partnership grew out of the experiences and initiative of British and US Army officers and attachés during World War I and the two decades that followed.

Of all the British amateur ambassadors, none was more distinguished than Philip Kerr, 11th Marquis of Lothian (1882-1940). His tenure of office was brief -- Aug. 1939 to Dec. 1940 -- but it coincided with a crucial period in British & U.S. history. Recently-opened archives enable one to fill in some important gaps in the history of his life & achievements & to set Lothian's work in the context of British & U.S. policy-making. This book will shows the strengths & weaknesses of a non-career diplomat. In the end, the successes outweighed the failures, as is shown by examining Lothian's role as intermediary between Churchill & Roosevelt in the two episodes in Anglo-American diplomacy during 1940, the Destroyers-for-Bases Deal & the origins of Lend-Lease.

This volume charts how the national strategic needs of the United States of America and Great Britain created a "parallel but not joint" relationship towards the Far East as the crisis in that region evolved from 1933-39. In short, it is a look at the relationship shared between the two nations with respect to accommodating one another on certain strategic and diplomatic issues so that they could become more confident of one another in any potential showdowns with Japan.