and should therefore constitute a part of every area of economic 3 theory. The spectrum covered by information economics today ranges from Stigler's search theory4 to industrial economics, including oligopoly theory, innovation, as well as research and develop 5 ment. However, the area information economics is most closely connected with is the theory of optimal contracts, mainly ana 6 lyzed in principal-agent models. Contract theory deals primar ily with the question of how optimal arrangements (contracts) for the purchase and sale of commodities and services between two or more agents should be structured. In these models, it is often assumed that the parties to the contract are informed differently or asymmetrically about relevant variables (e. g. the health of one party in the case of insurance contracts, or the effort in relation to employment contracts). As a result of this asymmetric in formation, phenomena such as moral hazard, adverse selection, signaling, and screening may arise. Frequently, results from con tract theory are referred to when making statements about the effects of asymmetric information on an economy. Models of this kind are often used to explain phenomena such as fixed wages or unemployment, among others. 7 However, such conclusions must be treated with caution for two reasons. In the first place, in these models, a contract (explicit or implicit) is determined by the solution of an optimization prob lem.

One of the main problems in current economic theory is to write contracts which are Pareto optimal, incentive compatible, and also implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of a dynamic, noncooperative game. The question arises whether it is possible to provide Walrasian type or cooperative equilibrium concepts which have these properties. This volume contains original contributions on noncooperative and cooperative equilibrium notions in economies with differential information and provides answers to the above questions. Moreover, issues of stability, learning and continuity of alternative equilibria are also examined.

The paper analyzes the effects of informational asymmetries on the market structure of the banking industry in a multi-period model of spatial competition. All lenders face uncertainty with regard to borrowers’ creditworthiness, but, in the process of lending, incumbent banks gather proprietary information about their clients, acquiring an advantage over potential entrants. These informational asymmetries are an important determinant of the industry structure and may represent a barrier to entry for new banks. The paper shows that, in contrast with traditional models of horizontal differentiation, the steady-state equilibrium is characterized by a finite number of banks even in the absence of fixed costs.

In this volume, specialists from traditionally separate areas in economics and finance investigate issues at the conjunction of their fields. They argue that financial decisions of the firm can affect real economic activity—and this is true for enough firms and consumers to have significant aggregate economic effects. They demonstrate that important differences—asymmetries—in access to information between "borrowers" and "lenders" ("insiders" and "outsiders") in financial transactions affect investment decisions of firms and the organization of financial markets. The original research emphasizes the role of information problems in explaining empirically important links between internal finance and investment, as well as their role in accounting for observed variations in mechanisms for corporate control.

A new edition of a comprehensive text, updated throughout, with new material on behavioral economics, international taxation, cost-benefit analysis, and the economics of climate policy. Public economics studies how government taxing and spending activities affect the economy—economic efficiency and the distribution of income and wealth. This comprehensive text on public economics covers the core topics of market failure and taxation as well as recent developments in both policy and the academic literature. It is unique not only in its broad scope but in its balance between public finance and public choice and its combination of theory and relevant empirical evidence. The book covers the theory and methodology of public economics; presents a historical and theoretical overview of the public sector; and discusses such topics as departures from efficiency (including imperfect competition and asymmetric information), issues in political economy, equity, taxation, fiscal federalism, and tax competition among independent jurisdictions. Suggestions for further reading, from classic papers to recent research, appear in each chapter, as do exercises. The mathematics has been kept to a minimum without sacrificing intellectual rigor; the book remains analytical rather than discursive. This second edition has been thoroughly updated throughout. It offers new chapters on behavioral economics, limits to redistribution, international taxation, cost-benefit analysis, and the economics of climate policy. Additional exercises have been added and many sections revised in response to advice from readers of the first edition.

A complete introduction to economics and the economy taught in undergraduate economics and masters courses in public policy. CORE's approach to teaching economics is student-centred and motivated by real-world problems and real-world data. The only introductory economics text to equip students to address today's pressing problems by mastering the conceptual and quantitative tools of contemporary economics. THE ECONOMY: is a new approach that integrates recent developments in economics including contract theory, strategic interaction, behavioural economics, and financial instability; challenges students to address inequality, climate change, economic instability, wealth creation and innovation, and other problems; provides a unified treatment of micro- and macroeconomics; motivates all models and concepts by evidence and real-world applications.

In credit markets, asymmetric information problems arise when borrowers have private information about their creditworthiness that is not observable by lenders. If these informational asymmetries do not negatively affect lenders' profitability, then they are irrelevant to lenders.