Written by an international team of authors, this book provides the first systematic account of the control of corporate Europe based on voting block data disclosed in accordance with the European Union's Large Holdings Directive (88/627/EEC). The study provides detailed information on the voting control of companies listed on the official markets in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and, as a benchmark comparison, the United States. The authors record a high concentration of control of corporations in many European countries with single blockholders frequently controlling more than fifty per cent of corporate votes. In contrast, a majority of UK listed companies have no blockholder owning more than ten per cent of shares, and a majority of US listed companies have no blockholder with more than six per cent of shares. Those chapters devoted to individual countries illustrate how blockholders can use legal devices to leverage their voting power over their cash-flow rights, or how incumbents prevent outsiders from gaining voting control. It is shown that the cultural and linguistic diversity of Europe is (almost) matched by its variety of corporate control arrangements.

European Company Law Series, Volume 19 Compelling new perspectives on corporate governance – including attention to increased shareholder engagement, long-term value creation, and sustainability – have given rise to major changes in the management of companies. Yet, until this book, there has been no systematic account of the legislative and soft law instruments designed to promote good corporate governance practices across the range of sizes and types of companies. The book analyses the various instruments that legislators and others have used to promote good corporate governance in European companies and assesses their value in practice. Nineteen well-known scholars of business and corporate law delve into how such issues and topics as the following are approached across the spectrum of corporate governance instruments available in Europe: corporate codes of conduct; procedural rules regulating how directors make decisions; rules on board composition and remuneration; regulating boards in small- and medium-sized enterprises; public enforcement of directors’ duties; how digitalisation may affect implementation of corporate governance instruments; reporting rules; rules on the empowerment of minority shareholders; the role of the general meeting; regulation of the market for corporate control; certifications; rules on liability of directors; and role of auditors and accountants. In its in-depth analysis of the benefits and potential disadvantages of each instrument and what may be achieved both at company level and generally, this book will prove of value to all concerned with promoting responsible corporate governance, whether in business, government, or academia.

In light of the most severe financial crisis since the 1930s, this intelligent look at European corporate governance brings out the richness of European corporate governance systems and highlights historical weaknesses that will require further work for a sustainable corporate governance environment in the future.

Introduction - The Law and Economics of EU State Aid Control /Vincent Verouden and Philipp Werner --Advantage /Giuseppe Conte and James Kavanagh --State Measure /Rein Wesseling and Marieke Bredenoord-Spoek --Selectivity /Michael Honoré --Distortion of Competition and Effect on Trade /Jacques Derenne and Vincent Verouden --Compatibility of Aid - General Introduction /Leigh Hancher and Phedon Nicolaides --General Block Exemption Regulation /Koert van Buiren and Alexander Rose --Ex Post Evaluation of Aid /Xavier Boutin and Inkalotta Nuotio-Osazee --Research, Development and Innovation Aid /Pascal Belmin and Hans Zenger --Regional Aid /Hans W. Friederiszick and Massimo Merola --Risk Finance Aid /Isabel Taylor and Albert Bravo-Biosca --Rescue and Restructuring Aid /Ulrich Soltész and Bruce Lyons --Services of General Economic Interest /Philipp Werner and Vincent Verouden --Infrastructure Aid /Penelope Papandropoulos and Elisabetta Righini --State Aid in the Broadband Sector /Hein Hobbelen and Oliver Stehmann --State Aid in the Postal Services Sector /Alessandra Fratini and Khaled Diaw --Transport Aid /Udo Woll and Andrew Meaney --Energy and Environmental Aid /Kai Struckmann and Geza Sapi --Aid to Broadcasting, Culture and Sport /Christine Gerlach and Dimitrios Pikios --Aid in the Banking Sector /Stan Maes and Stephen Mavroghenis --State Aid and Privatisation /Andreas von Bonin and Elisabeth Häringer.

Many citizens, politicians, and political activists voice concern about the political influence of business in the European Union. But do business interests really pull the strings in Brussels? Contrary to expectations, this book shows that business interests are no more influential than other interests in shaping contemporary EU policies. Andreas Dür, David Marshall, and Patrick Bernhagen present an original argument that stresses the role of public actors in facilitating or impeding interest groups’ lobbying success. Novel data on a large number of legislative proposals on the EU’s agenda and three case studies present strong support for this argument. The Political Influence of Business in the European Union offers new insights into how lobbying success depends on the demand and supply of information, as well as new ideas on how to measure lobbying success. The book advances a fresh perspective on the question of business power and shows why business interests often lose in the policy struggle.

Why does corporate governance--front page news with the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat--vary so dramatically around the world? This book explains how politics shapes corporate governance--how managers, shareholders, and workers jockey for advantage in setting the rules by which companies are run, and for whom they are run. It combines a clear theoretical model on this political interaction, with statistical evidence from thirty-nine countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America and detailed narratives of country cases. This book differs sharply from most treatments by explaining differences in minority shareholder protections and ownership concentration among countries in terms of the interaction of economic preferences and political institutions. It explores in particular the crucial role of pension plans and financial intermediaries in shaping political preferences for different rules of corporate governance. The countries examined sort into two distinct groups: diffuse shareholding by external investors who pick a board that monitors the managers, and concentrated blockholding by insiders who monitor managers directly. Examining the political coalitions that form among or across management, owners, and workers, the authors find that certain coalitions encourage policies that promote diffuse shareholding, while other coalitions yield blockholding-oriented policies. Political institutions influence the probability of one coalition defeating another.