The Consumer Welfare Hypothesis in Law and Economics is a compelling account of market relations with firm roots in economic theory and legal practice. This incisive book challenges the mainstream view that allocative efficiency is about total welfare maximisation. Instead, it argues for the consumer welfare hypothesis, in which allocating resources efficiently means maximising consumer welfare, and demonstrates that legal structures such as antitrust and consumer law are in reality designed and practised with this goal in mind.

This book offers an edited volume for all readers who wish to gain an in-depth grasp of the economic analysis of recent developments in energy law and policy in Europe and the United States. In response to waning resources and heightened environmental awareness, many countries are now seeking to redefine their energy mix. Several energy sources are available: coal and oil, natural gas, and a variety of renewables. Yet which of them are capable of addressing core energy-related concerns? Reliability, security, affordability, fairness, and sustainability all have to be taken into account. Further, once a target mix has been identified, two challenges remain for legal scholars: what role does the law play in achieving a specified energy mix, and, how can the law best fulfill that role? The essential energy concerns are just as important in defining the way we shape our energy mix as they are in defining the mix itself. An example of current challenges in energy law and policy can be seen in the pursuit by the German and Swiss governments of the so-called “Energiewende” (energy transition). These policies are intended to enable the transition from a non-sustainable use of fossil and nuclear energy to a more sustainable approach based on renewable energies. On the one hand, the goal is to achieve a decarbonization of the energy economy by reducing the use of fossil energy sources such as petroleum, carbon and natural gas. On the other, and in response to the Fukushima nuclear accident, a phase out is intended to eliminate the dangers of nuclear technologies. Achieving these goals poses tremendous challenges for the two countries’ energy policies – partly because the energy transition will not only affect energy production, but also energy consumption. From a Law and Economics perspective, a number of questions arise: to what extent is it justifiable to rely on markets and continued technological innovation, especially with regard to the present exploitation of scarce resources? To what extent is it necessary for states to intervene in energy markets? Regulatory instruments are available to create and maintain more sustainable societies: command and control regulations, restraints, Pigovian taxes, emission certificates, nudging policies, and more. If regulation in a certain legal field is necessary, which policies and methods will most effectively spur the sustainable consumption and production of energy in order to protect the environment while mitigating any potential negative impacts on economic development? Do neoclassical and behavioural economics provide us with a suitable framework for predicting the market’s complex reactions to a changing energy policy? This book provides theoretical insights as well as empirical findings in order to answer these vital questions.

The most important book on antitrust ever written. It shows how antitrust suits adversely affect the consumer by encouraging a costly form of protection for inefficient and uncompetitive small businesses.

In the past few decades, economic analysis of law has been challenged by a growing body of experimental and empirical studies that attest to prevalent and systematic deviations from the assumptions of economic rationality. While the findings on bounded rationality and heuristics and biases were initially perceived as antithetical to standard economic and legal-economic analysis, over time they have been largely integrated into mainstream economic analysis, including economic analysis of law. Moreover, the impact of behavioral insights has long since transcended purely economic analysis of law: in recent years, the behavioral movement has become one of the most influential developments in legal scholarship in general. Behavioral Law and Economics offers a state-of-the-art overview of the field. Eyal Zamir and Doron Teichman survey the entire body of psychological research that lies at the basis of behavioral analysis of law, and critically evaluate the core methodological questions of this area of research. Following this, the book discusses the fundamental normative questions stemming from the psychological findings on bounded rationality, and explores their implications for setting the law's goals and designing the means to attain them. The book then provides a systematic and critical examination of the contributions of behavioral studies to all major fields of law including: property, contracts, consumer protection, torts, corporate, securities regulation, antitrust, administrative, constitutional, international, criminal, and evidence law, as well as to the behavior of key players in the legal arena: litigants and judicial decision-makers.

Does competitive process constitute an autonomous societal value or is it a means for achieving more meritorious goals: welfare, growth, integration, and innovation? The hypothesis of The Normative Foundations of European Competition Law is that the former is the case. This insightful book analyses the phenomenon of competition from philosophical, legal and economic perspectives demonstrating exactly why competitive process should not be viewed only as an instrument. It consolidates various normative theories of freedom, market and competition, and explains how exactly they can be operationalized effectively in the matrix of the EU competition policy.

After thirty years, the debate over antitrust's ideology has quieted. Most now agree that the protection of consumer welfare should be the only goal of antitrust laws. Execution, however, is another matter. The rules of antitrust remain unfocused, insufficiently precise, and excessively complex. The problem of poorly designed rules is severe, because in the short run rules weigh much more heavily than principles. At bottom, antitrust is a defensible enterprise only if it can make the microeconomy work better, after accounting for the considerable costs of operating the system. The Antitrust Enterprise is the first authoritative and compact exposition of antitrust law since Robert Bork's classic The Antitrust Paradox was published more than thirty years ago. It confronts not only the problems of poorly designed, overly complex, and inconsistent antitrust rules but also the current disarray of antitrust's rule of reason, offering a coherent and workable set of solutions. The result is an antitrust policy that is faithful to the consumer welfare principle but that is also more readily manageable by the federal courts and other antitrust tribunals.