In The Constitutional Balance Sir John Laws has left a vivid and timely commentary on one of the most pressing issues in the legal world today. The debate continues whether or not judges venture too far into issues of Government policy, and whether or not there are any limits on the power of the executive and the legislature to propose and enact legislation that unduly restricts fundamental freedoms in a democratic society subject to the rule of law. Sir John Laws examines the relationship between constitutional fundamentals and values. He finds basic ideals of reason, fairness and the presumption of liberty in the common law, and recognises that a democratically accountable executive and legislature must be able to make policy and enact and implement legislation to pursue social goals. The courts then interpret the laws. As Sir John puts it – “The meeting of Parliament and the common law, in the crucible of statutory interpretation, is close to the core of [the constitutional balance]”. These fundamental values can compete with each other, giving rise to tensions within and between key state institutions, in particular the executive and the judiciary. A 'constitutional balance' between them must be found if the constitution is to function properly, each institution is to understand the proper extent and limits of its authority, and the rule of law is to be maintained. Sir John draws on his life-long experience as a barrister, judge and academic, and on case-law and learning, to explain in vibrant and engaging terms how such a 'constitutional balance' might be achieved.

Extension of presidential leadership in foreign affairs to war powers has destabilized our constitutional order and deranged our foreign policy. Stephen M. Griffin shows unexpected connections between the imperial presidency and constitutional crises, and argues for accountability by restoring Congress to a meaningful role in decisions for war.

Classic Books Library presents this brand new edition of “The Federalist Papers”, a collection of separate essays and articles compiled in 1788 by Alexander Hamilton. Following the United States Declaration of Independence in 1776, the governing doctrines and policies of the States lacked cohesion. “The Federalist”, as it was previously known, was constructed by American statesman Alexander Hamilton, and was intended to catalyse the ratification of the United States Constitution. Hamilton recruited fellow statesmen James Madison Jr., and John Jay to write papers for the compendium, and the three are known as some of the Founding Fathers of the United States. Alexander Hamilton (c. 1755–1804) was an American lawyer, journalist and highly influential government official. He also served as a Senior Officer in the Army between 1799-1800 and founded the Federalist Party, the system that governed the nation’s finances. His contributions to the Constitution and leadership made a significant and lasting impact on the early development of the nation of the United States.

An eminent constitutional scholar reveals how our approach to rights is dividing America, and shows how we can build a better system of justice.

This book examines how the judicialization of politics, and the politicization of courts, affect representative democracy, rule of law, and separation of powers. This volume critically assesses the phenomena of judicialization of politics and politicization of the judiciary. It explores the rising impact of courts on key constitutional principles, such as democracy and separation of powers, which is paralleled by increasing criticism of this influence from both liberal and illiberal perspectives. The book also addresses the challenges to rule of law as a principle, preconditioned on independent and powerful courts, which are triggered by both democratic backsliding and the mushrooming of populist constitutionalism and illiberal constitutional regimes. Presenting a wide range of case studies, the book will be a valuable resource for students and academics in constitutional law and political science seeking to understand the increasingly complex relationships between the judiciary, executive and legislature.

Why are republics nowadays the most common form of political organization, and the one most readily associated with modern democracy? In The Invention of the Modern Republic, a team of highly distinguished historians of ideas answers this question, and examines the origins of republican governments in America and Europe. Given the renewed interest at present in the functioning and evolution of democratic institutions--especially in their relation with market economies--the issues discussed here have a powerful contemporary resonance.