The Competitive Effects of Vertical Integration in Platform Markets
Title | The Competitive Effects of Vertical Integration in Platform Markets PDF eBook |
Author | Jérôme Pouyet |
Publisher | |
Pages | 0 |
Release | 2022 |
Genre | Industrial organization (Economic theory) |
ISBN |
We analyze vertical integration between platforms providing operating systems to manufacturers of devices when there are indirect network effects between buyers of devices and developers of applications. Vertical integration creates market power over developers, and over non-integrated manufacturers but only under certain circumstances. That market power enables to coordinate pricing decisions across both sides of the market, which leads to a better internalization of network effects. Vertical integration does not systematically lead to foreclosure and can benefit all parties, even in the absence of efficiency gains. Its competitive impact depends on the strength and the structure of indirect network effects.
Vertical Mergers in Platform Markets
Title | Vertical Mergers in Platform Markets PDF eBook |
Author | Jérôme Pouyet |
Publisher | |
Pages | 47 |
Release | 2016 |
Genre | Industrial organization (Economic theory) |
ISBN |
We analyze the competitive impact of vertical integration between a platform and a manufacturer when platforms provide operating systems for devices sold by manufacturers to customers, and, customers care about the applications developed for the operating systems. Two-sided network effects between customers and developers create strategic substitutability between manufacturers' prices. When it brings efficiency gains, vertical integration increases consumer surplus, is not profitable when network effects are strong, and, benefits the non-integrated manufacturer. When developers bear a cost to make their applications available on a platform, manufacturers boost the participation of developers by affiliating with the same platform. This creates some market power for the integrated firm and vertical integration then harms consumers, is always profitable, and, leads to foreclosure. Introducing developer fees highlights that not only the level, but also the structure of indirect network effects matter for the competitive analysis.
The Antitrust Paradox
Title | The Antitrust Paradox PDF eBook |
Author | Robert Bork |
Publisher | |
Pages | 536 |
Release | 2021-02-22 |
Genre | |
ISBN | 9781736089712 |
The most important book on antitrust ever written. It shows how antitrust suits adversely affect the consumer by encouraging a costly form of protection for inefficient and uncompetitive small businesses.
Competitive Effects of Vertical Integration
Title | Competitive Effects of Vertical Integration PDF eBook |
Author | |
Publisher | |
Pages | |
Release | 2005 |
Genre | |
ISBN |
Vertical Integration and Regulation
Title | Vertical Integration and Regulation PDF eBook |
Author | Christoph Kleineberg |
Publisher | Springer |
Pages | 62 |
Release | 2019-01-17 |
Genre | Law |
ISBN | 3030113582 |
This book investigates under which circumstances vertical unbundling can lead to a more efficient market result. The assessment is based on an interdisciplinary approach combining law and economics. Drawing on the assessment, circumstances are subsequently presented under which unbundling might become necessary. Additionally, less severe means of regulatory intervention are suggested in order to protect competition. Given its scope, the book is chiefly intended for scholars and practitioners in the field of economic policy and regulation law; in addition, it will give interested members of the public a unique opportunity to learn about the underlying rationales of regulation law and regulation economics.
Vertical Integration in Two-Sided Markets
Title | Vertical Integration in Two-Sided Markets PDF eBook |
Author | Anna D'Annunzio |
Publisher | |
Pages | 44 |
Release | 2015 |
Genre | |
ISBN |
We study how vertical integration in a two-sided media market affects investments in premium content. We show that a content provider provides the premium content exclusively to a platform, regardless of what the vertical structure of the industry is. However, a vertically integrated content provider has lower incentives to invest in quality than an independent one. With asymmetric platforms, the platform with a competitive advantage in the advertising market obtains the exclusive content, and the content provider invests even less when it is integrated with it. We determine that the content provider prefers to acquire the platform with a competitive advantage in the advertising market. Vertical integration reduces both consumer and total surplus. Our results suggest that authorities should carefully assess the effects of a merger on the incentives to invest in content quality, incorporating non-price measures in merger analysis. An intervention at the distribution stage that enforces non-exclusive provision reduces quality and may have adverse effects on consumer and total surplus. Advertising caps might also have the effect of reducing quality.
On the Competitive Effects of Vertical Integration Under Product Differentiation
Title | On the Competitive Effects of Vertical Integration Under Product Differentiation PDF eBook |
Author | Joel Sandonís |
Publisher | |
Pages | 24 |
Release | 2003 |
Genre | |
ISBN |