This illustrated book that includes tables, charts, and maps primarily discusses the role of USAREUR (US Army Europe) in rearming and training the new German Army which was perhaps the Army's single greatest contribution toward maintaining security in Western Europe. Likewise, the relationship between American soldiers and their French and West German hosts evolved over time and is a critical element in telling the story of the US Army in Europe.

Forging the Shield tells the story of the U.S. Army in Europe during the critical 1950s and early 1960s. It spans the period between the return of major U.S. combat forces to Germany in 1951 and the aftermath of the Berlin crisis of 1961-1962. During that time, the troops in Europe became the public face of the Army to Europeans and Americans as well as to the rest of the world. The service directed almost all of its training, equipment, and force development toward that potential day when its troops would face Soviet divisions streaming through the Fulda Gap and into Germany. The establishment of a credible conventional deterrent in Germany, backed up with our nuclear forces, was one of the central linchpins of the U.S. strategy of containment of Soviet power. It was a visible symbol to the world that America had placed its flag and its soldiers--its citizens-in-arms--in harm's way to reinforce its commitment to peace and freedom in Europe. This important volume tells the story of the U.S. Army in the early days of the Cold War as our commitment evolved into the multigenerational defense of Europe and the values of freedom. The Army in Europe has remained a central pillar of U.S. defense and foreign policy throughout the Cold War and into the new reality of post-Cold War Europe.Most of the major military conflicts between the end of World War II in 1945 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 were fought in Asia and the Middle East. Ironically, Europe, where no war was fought, was the epicenter of the Cold War. The stakes were highest there for both sides as two fundamentally opposed ideologies and political systems confronted each other across the so-called Iron Curtain. The forces of Western Europe and the United States formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Soviet Union and its European satellites created a rival Warsaw Pact. Both sides saw war in Europe as a potential Armageddon that could bring total victory or catastrophic defeat. As a result, both sides shaped their political and military strategies and arranged their military forces to fight that war. By the time the Cold War ended in 1989 with the destruction of the Berlin Wall--the Iron Curtain incarnate--and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, both sides had spent huge sums of money and devoted vast human resources to preparing for a war that thankfully never came. In 1951, however, war in Europe seemed imminent and perhaps even inevitable.Chapter 1 - Setting the Stage * Germany in 1950 * The Emerging Threat and the Move Toward Collective Security * The European Command in 1950 * Perceptions of a Rising Threat * Chapter 2 - The New Mission * Building the Seventh Army * Growing Pains * Reorganization and Realignment * Identifying the Threat * Firepower and Mobility: The Seventh Army's Conventional Doctrine * Early Thoughts on an Atomic Option * Development of the Communications Zone * Logistical Support for the New Mission * Berlin, 1951-1952: Standing Fast and Showing the Flag * The End of the Beginning * Chapter 3 - Growing Into the Role * 1953: The Cold War Takes a New Turn * Keeping a Watchful Eye to the East * Changes in Command and Combat Readiness * The Seventh Army Goes Nuclear * Manning the Force: USAREUR's Personnel Pipeline * Additions and Subtractions: Organizational Changes in USAREUR and the Seventh Army * Hardening the Support Structure * Settling in for the Long Haul * Noncombatant Evacuation Exercises * A Steadying Influence * Chapter 4 - Strengthening the Alliance * Building NATO's Military Capabilities * Integrating USAREUR into the NATO Command Structure * Army Support for Military Assistance Programs in Europe * The Military Liaison Missions and the USAREUR Soviet Relations Advisory Committee * Moving the Alliance Forward * Chapter 5 - Rearming the Germans

Established during World War II to advise the President regarding the strate- gic direction of the armed forces of the United States, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) continued in existence after the war and, as military advisers and planners, have played a significant role in the development of national policy. Knowledge of JCS relations with the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense in the years since World War II is essential to an understanding of their current work. An account of their activity in peacetime and during times of crisis provides, moreover, an important series of chapters in the military history of the United States. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed that an official history be written for the record. Its value for instructional purposes, for the orientation of officers newly assigned to the JCS organization, and as a source of information for staff studies will be readily recognized.

A historical analysis of the policies and military strategies applied during the Korean War stalemate period Korean Showdown: National Policy and Military Strategy in a Limited War, 1951–1952 takes a holistic and integrative approach to strategy, operations, and tactics during the Korean War’s stalemate period and demonstrates how these matters shaped each other and influenced, or were influenced by, political and strategic policy decision-making. Bryan R. Gibby offers an analysis of the major political and military decisions affecting how the war was conducted operationally and diplomatically by examining American, Chinese, North Korean, and South Korean operations in the context of fighting a limited war with limited means, but for objectives that were not always limited in scope or ambition. The foundational political decision was Harry Truman’s voluntary repatriation policy, which extended the war by up to eighteen months. Its military counterpart was the American-led Operation Showdown, the last deliberate military offensive to coerce concessions at the negotiation table. Showdown’s failure (and the Communists’ own equally disappointing military efforts) opened up new avenues for solving the war short of a militarily imposed solution. Gibby’s research draws on primary sources from American, Korean, and Chinese archives and publications. Many of these sources have not yet been mined in diplomatic and military histories of the Korean War. This innovative book also addresses a significant gap in the study of Korean military operations—the linkage between ground and air pressure campaigns, as well as the many Chinese and American operations conducted to establish negotiation positions. Gibby also explores many political and propagandist developments that assumed great importance in the summer of 1952, such as prisoner of war riots, the bombing of hydroelectric dams, and the South Korean constitutional crisis, which significantly influenced American and Chinese military decision-making. Ultimately, this volume serves as a cautionary analysis of the limits of force, the necessity to understand an adversary, and the importance of strategic consensus. It also offers an effective case study on an underappreciated period of civil-military tension during the Cold War and on how civilian politicians and military leaders must collaborate to determine a realistic and effective strategy.

Despite American success in preventing the conquest of South Korea by communist North Korea, the Korean War of 1950-1953 did not satisfy Americans who expected the kind of total victory they had experienced in WW II. In Korea, the U.S. limited itself to conventional weapons. Even after communist China entered the war, Americans put China off-limits to conventional bombing as well as nuclear bombing. Operating within these limits, the U.S. Air Force helped to repel 2 invasions of South Korea while securing control of the skies so decisively that other U.N. forces could fight without fear of air attack.