As the influence of labor unions declines in many industrialized nations, particularly the United States, the influence of workers has decreased. Because of the need for greater involvement of workers in changing production systems, as well as frustration with existing structures of workplace regulation, the search has begun for new ways of providing a voice for workers outside the traditional collective bargaining relationship. Works councils—institutionalized bodies for representative communication between an employer and employees in a single workplace—are rare in the Anglo-American world, but are well-established in other industrialized countries. The contributors to this volume survey the history, structure, and functions of works councils in the Netherlands, Germany, France, Spain, Sweden, Italy, Poland, Canada, and the United States. Special attention is paid to the relations between works councils and unions and collective bargaining, works councils and management, and the role and interest of governments in works councils. On the basis of extensive comparative data from other Western countries, the book demonstrates powerfully that well-designed works councils may be more effective than labor unions at solving management-labor problems.

Mixing economic theory and empirical analysis, this book tackles the economics and econometrics of codetermination, rooted in the German Mitbestimmung. The core themes are an examination of the theory and practice of co-determination at plant (work councils) and enterprise (worker directors) levels.

Corporate governance encompasses the free enterprise system, which is treated comprehensively in this book from a German perspective. This distinguishes the book from other books written in English in this subject area, not only because of the comprehensive way it covers German corporate law and corporate governance, but also because of the fact that it provides international and European perspectives on these important topics. This second edition is an extensively revised and updated version of the first edition, in particular with a view to the worldwide debt crisis. The authors provide readers with an overview of the unique features of German business and enterprise law and an in-depth analysis of the organs of governance of German public limited companies (general meeting, management board, supervisory board). In addition, approaches for reforms required at the international level are also suggested and discussed, including, among others, the unique interplay and dynamics of the German two-tier board model with the system of codetermination, referring to the arrangement of employees sitting on the supervisory boards of German public limited companies and private companies employing more than 500 employees; also covered are significant recent legal developments in Europe. The book highlights the core function of valuation and financial reporting at the international, European and German levels, with accounting as the documentary proof of good corporate governance. It also expands the scope of the first edition by a treatment of the German financial sector, global corporate finance and governance, and by including a new chapter on compliance of corporate governance laws, rules and standards in Germany. As far as comparative law is concerned, new developments in the area of corporate governance in the EU, the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance and corporate governance in the US, the UK and Australia are covered. The book is addressed to researchers, practitioners and basically anyone with an interest in the complex, but intriguing areas of corporate law and corporate governance.

Thoroughly updated and revised by a team of international experts, this fifth edition continues to be the most authoritative and accessible overview of industrial relations practices around the world.

Most scholarship on corporate governance in the last two decades has focused on the relationships between shareholders and managers or directors. Neglected in this vast literature is the role of employees in corporate governance. Yet "human capital," embodied in the employees, is rapidly becoming the most important source of value for corporations, and outside the United States, employees often have a significant formal role in corporate governance. This volume turns the spotlight on the neglected role of employees by analyzing many of the formal and informal ways that employees are actually involved in the governance of corporations, in U.S. firms and in large corporations in Germany and Japan. Examining laws and contexts, the essays focus on the framework for understanding employees' role in the firm and the implications for corporate governance. They explore how and why the special legal institutions in German and Japanese firms by which employees are formally involved in corporate governance came into being, and the impact these institutions have on firms and on their ability to compete. They also consider theoretical and empirical questions about employee share ownership. The result of a conference at Columbia University, the volume includes essays by Theodor Baums, Margaret M. Blair, David Charny, Greg Dow, Bernd Frick, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Nobuhiro Hiwatari, Katharina Pistor, Louis Putterman, Edward B. Rock, Mark J. Roe, and Michael L. Wachter. Margaret M. Blair is a senior fellow in Economic Studies at the Brookings Institution and author of Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate Governance for the Twenty-first Century (Brookings, 1995). Mark J. Roe, professor of business regulation and director of the Sloan Project on Corporate Governance at Columbia Law School, is the author of Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance (Princeton, 1996).