In 1862, with the outcome of the Civil War far from sure, leaders on both sides began to pinpoint places vital for their army's success. For both Union and Confederate forces, Tennessee was a prize. Drawing on contemporary sources such as memoirs and official correspondence, this book details the struggle for control of Tennessee during 1862 and 1863. It follows troop movements through some of1the worst battles, including Shiloh, Stone's River and Chickamauga. The Union victory at the battle of Chattanooga--which brought Tennessee definitively under Union control--and its consequences for both sides are discussed in detail.

"Fort Donelson's Legacy portrays the tapestry of war and society in the upper southern heartland of Tennessee and Kentucky after the key Union victories at Forts Henry and Donelson in February 1862. Those victories, notes Benjamin Franklin Cooling, could have delivered the decisive blow to the Confederacy in the West and ended the war in that theater. Instead, what followed was terrible devastation and bloodshed that embroiled soldier and civilian alike. Cooling compellingly describes a struggle that was marked not only by the movement of armies and the strategies of generals but also by the rise of guerrilla bands and civil resistance. It was, in part, a war fought for geography - for rivers and railroads and for strategic cities such as Nashville, Louisville, and Chattanooga. But it was also a war for the hearts and minds of the populace ... In exploring the complex terrain of 'total war' that steadily engulfed Tennessee and Kentucky, Cooling draws on a huge array of sources, including official military records and countless diaries and memoirs. He makes considerable use of the words of participants to capture the attitudes and concerns of those on both sides."--Dust jacket.

Three days of savage and bloody fighting between Confederate and Union troops at Stones River in Middle Tennessee ended with nearly 25,000 casualties but no clear victor. The staggering number of killed or wounded equaled the losses suffered in the well-known Battle of Shiloh. Using previously neglected sources, Larry J. Daniel rescues this important campaign from obscurity. The Battle of Stones River, fought between December 31, 1862, and January 2, 1863, was a tactical draw but proved to be a strategic northern victory. According to Daniel, Union defeats in late 1862 -- both at Chickasaw Bayou in Mississippi and at Fredericksburg, Virginia -- transformed the clash in Tennessee into a much-needed morale booster for the North. Daniel's study of the battle's two antagonists, William S. Rosecrans for the Union Army of the Cumberland and Braxton Bragg for the Confederate Army of Tennessee, presents contrasts in leadership and a series of missteps. Union soldiers liked Rosecrans's personable nature, whereas Bragg acquired a reputation as antisocial and suspicious. Rosecrans had won his previous battle at Corinth, and Bragg had failed at the recent Kentucky Campaign. But despite Rosecrans's apparent advantage, both commanders made serious mistakes. With only a few hundred yards separating the lines, Rosecrans allowed Confederates to surprise and route his right ring. Eventually, Union pressure forced Bragg to launch a division-size attack, a disastrous move. Neither side could claim victory on the battlefield. In the aftermath of the bloody conflict, Union commanders and northern newspapers portrayed the stalemate as a victory, bolstering confidence in the Lincoln administration and dimming the prospects for the "peace wing" of the northern Democratic Party. In the South, the deadlock led to continued bickering in the Confederate western high command and scorn for Braxton Bragg.

Seven perspectives of a bloody Civil War encounter The Battle of Stone's River (or Murfreesboro to give it its Confederate appellation) took place over the turn of the year between 1862 and 1863 in Tennessee within the Western theatre of the American Civil War. The outcome of the conflict was inconclusive though the Union forces under Rosecrans regained a measure of prestige after the debacle of Fredericksburg and strategic advantage as Confederate strategic objectives in Tennessee were confounded. The campaign was principally distinguished by the appallingly high casualty toll on both sides which bears the dubious distinction of being the highest in the war. Both Bragg and Rosecrans lost almost one third of their engaged forces. This unique book has brought together no less than seven individual accounts-both personal experiences and works of history-concerning this fascinating campaign and battle. Each one might possibly be too small to achieve individual publication in modern times, but together they make an essential volume for every student of the period and theatre.

Winner of the Fletcher Pratt Award and the Jefferson Davis Award A companion volume to Army of the Heartland Near the end of 1862 the Army of Tennessee began a long and frustrating struggle against overwhelming obstacles and ultimate defeat. Federal strength was growing, and after the Confederate surrender at Vicksburg, the total Union effort became concentrated against the Army of Tennessee. In the face of these external military problems, the army was also plagued with internal conflict, continuing command discord, and political intrigue. In Autumn of Glory, the final volume of Thomas Lawrence Connelly’s definitive history of one of the Confederacy’s two major military forces, Connelly analyzes the factors underlying the army’s failure during the last two years of the Civil War. The army’s military operations—including such major battles and campaigns as Murfreesboro, Chickamauga, Lookout Mountain, Missionary Ridge, Kennesaw Mountain, Peachtree Creek, Atlanta, Ezra Church, Jonesboro, and Bentonville—are viewed in perspective with its growing internal problems and the personality peculiarities of its commanders. In late 1863 a well-organized movement within the army against General Bragg failed. After his departure, a semblance of the anti-Bragg organization still remained, and subsequently the army’s leadership became embroiled in national Confederate politics. Connelly traces these growing problems of command discord and political intrigue and examines their disastrous effects upon the army’s political fortunes. Connelly’s first volume, Army of the Heartland, explores the military significance of the “heartland” of the Confederacy and covers the army’s operations from 1861 to late 1862. With the completion of these two volumes, the author has narrowed the historiographical gap between Lee’s Army of Virginia and the Confederacy’s “other army.”