During the last decade and a half a new political party family, the extreme Right-wing populist (ERP) parties, has established itself in a variety of West European democracies. These parties represent a monist politics based on ethnic nationalism and xenophobia as well as an opposition against the 'political establishment'. Being the prototypic ERP party, the French Front National (FN) has been a model for ERP parties emerging elsewhere in Western Europe. This study presents a theoretically based explanation that combines the macro and the micro-level, as well as the political supply and the demand-side. More specifically, this study shows that it is necessary to consider both opportunity structures, created by demand and supply-side factors, as well as the ability of the FN to take advantage of the available opportunities. Of particular interest is the author's analysis of the sociology and attitudes of the FN-voters.

Populism has become a favourite catchword for mass media and politicians faced with the challenge of protest parties or movements. It has often been equated with radical right leaders or parties. This volume offers a different perspective and underlines that populism is an ambiguous but constitutive component of democratic systems torn between their ideology (government of the people, by the people, for the people) and their actual functioning, characterised by the role of the elites and the limits put on the popular will by liberal constitutionalism.

Around the world, populism has weaponized anxieties over globalization and other forms of cultural, social, and economic change. Many populist leaders have succeeded in conflating trade concerns with apprehensions over immigration, thereby creating potent campaigns to overturn existing trade agreements and the multilateral cooperation they embody. In the United States, avowed protectionist Donald Trump set out not only to raise tariffs, but to dismantle the system of global trade embodied in the World Trade Organization. In the UK, the Brexit referendum resulted in that country's withdrawal from the European Union, ending its commitment to trade integration with the continent. Populism and Trade explores the impact of populist regimes on protectionism and the damage they have inflicted on global trade and trade policy institutions. Focusing on the disruption caused by the Trump administration and the Brexit referendum, the book traces the influence of populism on trade policy today. Kent Jones shows how these methods will continue to damage global cooperation--something that is essential when faced with international crises like a deadly pandemic--until the sources of populist anger can be addressed. He argues that economic and institutional reforms, along with better education and adjustment policies, will be necessary to break the populist fever. In an age of global populism, open trade policy has become a victim of anti-globalization and economic nationalism. Populism and Trade traces the impact of these divisive political tactics to explain the fragile nature of global trade institutions and the steps needed to save them.

The recent rise of populist politics represent a major challenge for liberal democracies. This important book explores the psychological reasons for the rise of populism, featuring contributions from leading international researchers in the fields of psychology and political science. Unlike liberal democracy based on the Enlightenment values of individual freedom, autonomy and rationality, both right-wing and left-wing populism offer collectivist, autocratic formulations reminiscent of the evolutionary history and tribal instincts of our species. The book offers a comprehensive overview of the psychology of populism, covering such phenomena as identity seeking, anger and fear, collective narcissism, grievance, norms, perceptions of powerlessness and deprivation, authoritarianism, nationalism, radicalism, propaganda and persuasion, ethnocentrism, xenophobia and the effects of globalization. The book is divided into four parts. Part I deals with the motivational and emotional factors that attract voters to populist causes, and the human needs and values that populist movements satisfy. Part II analyzes the cognitive features of populist appeals, especially their emphasis on simplicity, epistemic certainty and moral absolutism. Part III turns to one of the defining features of populism: its offer of a powerful tribal identity and collectivist ideology that provide meaning and personal significance to its followers. Finally, in Part IV, the propaganda tactics used by populist movements are analysed, including the role of charismatic leadership, authoritarianism, and nationalism and the use of conspiracy narratives and persuasive strategies. This is fascinating reading on a highly topical issue. The book will be of interest to students, researchers, and applied professionals in all areas of psychology and the social sciences as a textbook or reference book, and to anyone interested in the global rise of populism.

Leading experts examine the threats posed by populism to human rights and the international systems and explore how to confront them.

Authoritarian populist parties have advanced in many countries, and entered government in states as diverse as Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Switzerland. Even small parties can still shift the policy agenda, as demonstrated by UKIP's role in catalyzing Brexit. Drawing on new evidence, this book advances a general theory why the silent revolution in values triggered a backlash fuelling support for authoritarian-populist parties and leaders in the US and Europe. The conclusion highlights the dangers of this development and what could be done to mitigate the risks to liberal democracy.

To counter the threat America faces, two political scientists offer “clear constitutional solutions that break sharply with the conventional wisdom” (Steven Levitsky, New York Times–bestselling coauthor of How Democracies Die). Has American democracy’s long, ambitious run come to an end? Possibly yes. As William G. Howell and Terry M. Moe argue in this trenchant new analysis of modern politics, the United States faces a historic crisis that threatens our system of self-government—and if democracy is to be saved, the causes of the crisis must be understood and defused. The most visible cause is Donald Trump, who has used his presidency to attack the nation’s institutions and violate its democratic norms. Yet Trump is but a symptom of causes that run much deeper: social forces like globalization, automation, and immigration that for decades have generated economic harms and cultural anxieties that our government has been wholly ineffective at addressing. Millions of Americans have grown angry and disaffected, and populist appeals have found a receptive audience. These were the drivers of Trump’s dangerous presidency, and they’re still there for other populists to weaponize. What can be done? The disruptive forces of modernity cannot be stopped. The solution lies, instead, in having a government that can deal with them—which calls for aggressive new policies, but also for institutional reforms that enhance its capacity for effective action. The path to progress is filled with political obstacles, including an increasingly populist, anti-government Republican Party. It is hard to be optimistic. But if the challenge is to be met, we need reforms of the presidency itself—reforms that harness the promise of presidential power for effective government, but firmly protect against that power being put to anti-democratic ends.