Since 1949, China has tried a large number of successful and not-so-successful corporatist experiments. What these phases have in common is a 'state corporatist' (top-down) approach, albeit with shifting degrees of state involvement; and in the present era, a snail's pace effort towards building a 'societal corporatism' (bottom-up). Over the same time period, we have also witnessed a shift from a centrally controlled corporatist state to one in which the local state has greater space to implement corporatist techniques - allowing the formation of business and professional associations at the local level, and providing them a space for local state-directed bargaining. As China embarks on its next decade, a consideration of Chinese corporatism is useful in two respects. First, foreign corporations and governments who engage in China, particularly if they come from pluralist-competitive societies, tend to misunderstand the nexus of businesses, organizations, and the state. They wrongful presume that state direction and corruption are synonymous. A more nuanced understanding of Chinese corporatism, however, leads to an important second point - that some lessons learned by Chinese experiments in corporatism, during the very period of its ascent to becoming an economic superpower, may be beneficial for foreign policymakers considering paths to a more stable public life.

This book looks at how NGOs, social organizations, business associations, trade unions, and religious associations interact with the state, and explore how social actors have negotiated the influence of the state at both national and local levels, and examines how a corporatist understanding of state-society relations can be reformulated, as old and new social stakeholders play a greater role in managing contemporary social issues. In turn, the book goes on to chart the differences in how the state behaves locally and centrally, and finally discusses the future direction of the corporatist state.

China's bold program of reforms launched in the late 1970s--the move to a market economy and the opening to the outside world--ended the political chaos and economic stagnation of the Cultural Revolution and sparked China's unprecedented economic boom. Yet, while the reforms made possible a rising standard of living for the majority of China's population, they came at the cost of a weakening central government, increasing inequalities, and fragmenting society. The essays of Barry Naughton, Joseph Fewsmith, Paul H. B. Godwin, Murray Scot Tanner, Lianjiang Li and Kevin J. O'Brien, Tianjian Shi, Martin King Whyte, Thomas P. Bernstein, Dorothy J. Solinger, David S. G. Goodman, Kristen Parris, Merle Goldman, Elizabeth J. Perry, and Richard Baum and Alexei Shevchenko analyze the contradictory impact of China's economic reforms on its political system and social structure. They explore the changing patterns of the relationship between state and society that may have more profound significance for China than all the revolutionary movements that have convulsed it through most of the twentieth century.

Why has China grown so fast for so long despite vast corruption? In China's Gilded Age, Yuen Yuen Ang maintains that all corruption is harmful, but not all types of corruption hurt growth. Ang unbundles corruption into four varieties: petty theft, grand theft, speed money, and access money. While the first three types impede growth, access money - elite exchanges of power and profit - cuts both ways: it stimulates investment and growth but produces serious risks for the economy and political system. Since market opening, corruption in China has evolved toward access money. Using a range of data sources, the author explains the evolution of Chinese corruption, how it differs from the West and other developing countries, and how Xi's anti-corruption campaign could affect growth and governance. In this formidable yet accessible book, Ang challenges one-dimensional measures of corruption. By unbundling the problem and adopting a comparative-historical lens, she reveals that the rise of capitalism was not accompanied by the eradication of corruption, but rather by its evolution from thuggery and theft to access money. In doing so, she changes the way we think about corruption and capitalism, not only in China but around the world.

The transition from a planned to a market economy that began in China in the late 1970s unleashed an extraordinary series of changes, including increases in private enterprise, foreign investment, the standard of living, and corruption. Another result of economic reform has been the creation of a new class—China's new business elite. Margaret M. Pearson considers the impact that this new class is having on China's politics. She concludes that, contrary to the assumptions of Westerners, these groups are not at the forefront of the emergence of a civil society; rather, they are part of a system shaped deliberately by the Chinese state to ensure that economic development will not lead to democratization. This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press's mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1997. The transition from a planned to a market economy that began in China in the late 1970s unleashed an extraordinary series of changes, including increases in private enterprise, foreign investment, the standard of living, and corruption. Another result of

Managing Transitions examines the history and roles of China's minor parties and groups (MPG's) in the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) united front between the 1930's and 1990's using Antonio Gramsci's principles for the winning and maintaining of hegemony. Gramsci advocated a "war of position," the building of political alliances to isolate existing state powers and win consent for revolutionary rule and transform society. Economic reform is now creating new socio-economic groups and the CCP is adjusting the united front and the MPGs to co-opt their representatives and deliberately forestall the evolution of an autonomous civil society and middle class which could challenge CCP rule. This has resulted in a new and expanding role for the united front, the MPGs and organisations representing the new interest groups.