Russia's North Caucasus mujahedin of the self-declared Caucasus Emirate and the history thereof is part and parcel of the global jihadi revolutionary movement which includes but is no longer led by Al Qaeda. This book corrects the inadequate previous treatments of the violence in the Caucasus, almost all of which explain what ought to be called the rise of jihadism in the Caucasus solely in terms of Russian actions. The author brings the international jihadist and local North Caucasian causes back into the picture, detailing the global Jihadist/Islamist revolutionary movement's propagation of the "jihadi method" and material support to nationalist and Islamic extremists in Chechnya and the Caucasus since the mid-1990s. Like jihadi groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, and Africa, the Caucasus Emirate is an Al Qaeda ally and de facto affiliate. It represents a threat to Russian, U.S., and international security as evidenced by terrorist plots perpetrated or inspired by it in Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Spain, Azerbaijan, and Boston.

Russia's North Caucasus mujahedin of the self-declared Caucasus Emirate and the history thereof is part and parcel of the global jihadi revolutionary movement which includes but is no longer led by Al Qaeda. This book corrects the inadequate previous treatments of the violence in the Caucasus, almost all of which explain what ought to be called the rise of jihadism in the Caucasus solely in terms of Russian actions. The author brings the international jihadist and local North Caucasian causes back into the picture, detailing the global Jihadist/Islamist revolutionary movement's propagation of the "jihadi method" and material support to nationalist and Islamic extremists in Chechnya and the Caucasus since the mid-1990s. Like jihadi groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, and Africa, the Caucasus Emirate is an Al Qaeda ally and de facto affiliate. It represents a threat to Russian, U.S., and international security as evidenced by terrorist plots perpetrated or inspired by it in Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Spain, Azerbaijan, and Boston.

The Ukrainian crisis that dominated headlines in fall 2013 was decades in the making. Two great schisms shaped events: one within Ukraine, its western and southeastern parts divided along cultural and political lines; the other was driven by geopolitical factors. Competition between Russia and the West exacerbated Ukraine's divisions. This study focuses on the historical background and complex causality of the crisis, from the rise of mass demonstrations on Kiev's Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) to the making of the post-revolt regime. In the context of a "new cold war," the author sheds light on the role of radical Ukrainian nationalists and neofascists in the February 2014 snipers' massacre, the ouster of President Viktor Yanukovych, and Russia's seizure of Crimea and involvement in the civil war in the eastern region of Donbass.

Over 2,400 total pages ... Russian outrage following the September 2004 hostage disaster at North Ossetia’s Beslan Middle School No.1 was reflected in many ways throughout the country. The 52-hour debacle resulted in the death of some 344 civilians, including more than 170 children, in addition to unprecedented losses of elite Russian security forces and the dispatch of most Chechen/allied hostage-takers themselves. It quickly became clear, as well, that Russian authorities had been less than candid about the number of hostages held and the extent to which they were prepared to deal with the situation. Amid grief, calls for retaliation, and demands for reform, one of the more telling reactions in terms of hardening public perspectives appeared in a national poll taken several days after the event. Some 54% of citizens polled specifically judged the Russian security forces and the police to be corrupt and thus complicit in the failure to deal adequately with terrorism, while 44% thought that no lessons for the future would be learned from the tragedy. This pessimism was the consequence not just of the Beslan terrorism, but the accumulation of years of often spectacular failures by Russian special operations forces (SOF, in the apt US military acronym). A series of Russian SOF counterterrorism mishaps, misjudgments, and failures in the 1990s and continuing to the present have made the Kremlin’s special operations establishment in 2005 appear much like Russia’s old Mir space station—wired together, unpredictable, and subject to sudden, startling failures. But Russia continued to maintain and expand a large, variegated special operations establishment which had borne the brunt of combat actions in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and other trouble spots, and was expected to serve as the nation’s principal shield against terrorism in all its forms. Known since Soviet days for tough personnel, personal bravery, demanding training, and a certain rough or brutal competence that not infrequently violated international human rights norms, it was supposed that Russian special operations forces—steeped in their world of “threats to the state” and associated with once-dreaded military and national intelligence services—could make valuable contributions to countering terrorism. The now widely perceived link between “corrupt” special forces on the one hand, and counterterrorism failures on the other, reflected the further erosion of Russia’s national security infrastructure in the eyes of both Russian citizens and international observers. There have been other, more ambiguous, but equally unsettling dimensions of Russian SOF activity as well, that have strong internal and external political aspects. These constitute the continuing assertions from Russian media, the judicial system, and other Federal agencies and officials that past and current members of the SOF establishment have organized to pursue interests other than those publicly declared by the state or allowed under law. This includes especially the alleged intent to punish by assassination those individuals and groups that they believe have betrayed Russia. The murky nature of these alleged activities has formed a backdrop to other problems in the special units.

This book describes and analyzes the convergence of transnational organized crime and jihadist terrorism that has taken place within Russian-speaking social networks in Western Europe. Studies have shown that while under certain circumstances links between criminal organizations and terrorist groups appear, these are usually opportunistic and temporary in nature. Only rarely do they develop into something deeper and transformative, a convergence between crime and terrorism. This book reveals that Russian-speaking transnational organized crime and jihadist terrorism pose a serious threat to security and constitute a major challenge for law enforcement. Through their links with transnational organized crime, Russian-speaking jihadist networks from the Caucasus and Central Asia have easier access to weaponry, commercial explosives, and forged IDs than many other jihadist networks. Being in effect an integral component of transnational organized crime, the Russian-speaking jihadists can be assessed as potentially more capable than many other jihadists. The book assesses the effects of terrorism and organized crime on Russian-speaking diasporas in Western Europe and examines the implications for counterterrorism as well as policing on how to counteract the illegal activities of these networks. Drawing on Swedish court cases the work shows that an additional, and sometimes more effective way, to fight terrorism is by focusing on the non-terrorist types of crime perpetrated by terrorists. This book will be of much interest to students of terrorism and counter-terrorism, political violence, criminology, security studies and IR in general.

Religious violence is surely as old as both faith and fighting themselves. In the Russian Federation, as elsewhere in the world, religious teachings and philosophies are used both to justify and combat violence. While many, including Russian authorities, increasingly view religious conflict through the prism of violent radical Islamic jihadism, the full picture is much more complicated. It includes religious propaganda employed by violent right-wing groups, violent repression of religious communities and organizations by local and federal authorities, and conflict within religious confessions. Violence may be couched in the language of self-defense as modernity clashes with a multitude of perceived and real traditions. A better understanding of the dynamics at the heart of religious violence in Russia, in its many manifestations, is critical to the country’s future development and its security. The analyses collected in this volume aim to contribute to the body of knowledge on these topics and inform policy solutions to make Russia and Russians of all religions (and no religion) safer and more secure.