There's a simple, straightforward way to cut carbon emissions and prevent the most disastrous effects of climate change-and we're rejecting it because of irrational political fears. That's the central argument of The Case for a Carbon Tax, a clear-eyed, sophisticated analysis of climate change policy. Shi-Ling Hsu examines the four major approaches to curbing CO2: cap-and-trade; command and control regulation; government subsidies of alternative energy; and carbon taxes. Weighing the economic, social, administrative, and political merits of each, he demonstrates why a tax is currently the most effective policy. Hsu does not claim that a tax is the perfect or only solution-but that unlike the alternatives, it can be implemented immediately and paired effectively with other approaches. In fact, the only real barrier is psychological. While politicians can present subsidies and cap-and-trade as "win-win" solutions, the costs of a tax are immediately apparent. Hsu deftly explores the social and political factors that prevent us from embracing this commonsense approach. And he shows why we must get past our hang-ups if we are to avert a global crisis.

Although the future extent and effects of global climate change remain uncertain, the expected damages are not zero, and risks of serious environmental and macroeconomic consequences rise with increasing atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations. Despite the uncertainties, reducing emissions now makes sense, and a carbon tax is the simplest, most effective, and least costly way to do this. At the same time, a carbon tax would provide substantial new revenues which may be badly needed, given historically high debt-to-GDP levels, pressures on social security and medical budgets, and calls to reform taxes on personal and corporate income. This book is about the practicalities of introducing a carbon tax, set against the broader fiscal context. It consists of thirteen chapters, written by leading experts, covering the full range of issues policymakers would need to understand, such as the revenue potential of a carbon tax, how the tax can be administered, the advantages of carbon taxes over other mitigation instruments and the environmental and macroeconomic impacts of the tax. A carbon tax can work in the United States. This volume shows how, by laying out sound design principles, opportunities for broader policy reforms, and feasible solutions to specific implementation challenges.

The supreme challenge of our time is tackling climate change. We urgently need to curtail our use of fossil fuels – but how can we do so in a just and feasible way? In this compelling book, leading economist James Boyce shows that the key to solving this conundrum is to put a limit on carbon emissions, thereby raising the price of fossil fuels and generating strong incentives for clean energy. But there is a formidable hurdle: how do we secure broad public support for a policy that increases fuel costs for consumers? Boyce powerfully argues that carbon pricing can be made just and politically durable only if linked to returning the revenue to the public as carbon dividends. Founded on the principle that the gifts of nature belong to us all, not to corporations or governments, this bold reform could spark a twenty-first-century clean energy revolution. Essential reading for all concerned citizens, policy-makers, and students of public policy and environmental economics, this book will be a transformative contribution to one of the most important policy debates of our era.

Shows readers how we can all help solve the climate crisis by focusing on a few key, achievable actions.

A political science analysis of the feasibility and sustainability of carbon pricing, drawing from North American, European, and Asian case studies. Climate change, economists generally agree, is best addressed by putting a price on the carbon content of fossil fuels—by taxing carbon, by cap-and-trade systems, or other methods. But what about the politics of carbon pricing? Do political realities render carbon pricing impracticable? In this book, Barry Rabe offers the first major political science analysis of the feasibility and sustainability of carbon pricing, drawing upon a series of real-world attempts to price carbon over the last two decades in North America, Europe, and Asia. Rabe asks whether these policies have proven politically viable and, if adopted, whether they survive political shifts and managerial challenges over time. The entire policy life cycle is examined, from adoption through advanced implementation, on a range of pricing policies including not only carbon taxes and cap-and-trade but also such alternative methods as taxing fossil fuel extraction. These case studies, Rabe argues, show that despite the considerable political difficulties, carbon pricing can be both feasible and durable.

Climate change : what's the big deal? -- Business as usual : what are the costs? -- Why do economists like a carbon tax? -- Isn't there a better way? (No, there isn't) -- Cap and trade : the other way to price pollution -- What to do with $200 billion : give it back -- So you want a carbon tax : how do you design it? -- Objections to a carbon tax -- Enacting a carbon tax: how do we get there? -- Afterword : what next? -- References -- Notes

Some proponents of federal policies to combat climate change are arguing for a federal carbon tax (or similar type of “carbon price”). Within conservative and libertarian circles, some proponents claim that a revenue-neutral carbon tax “swap” could deliver a double dividend, reducing climate change while shifting some of the nation's tax burden onto carbon emissions, which supposedly would spur the economy.This analysis describes several serious problems with those claims. The actual economics of climate change -- as summarized in the peer-reviewed literature as well as United Nations (UN) and Obama administration reports -- reveal that the case for a U.S. carbon tax is weaker than the carbon tax proponents claim.Future economic damages from carbon dioxide emissions can only be estimated in conjunction with forecasts of climate change. But recent history shows those forecasts are in flux, with an increasing number of forecasts of less warming appearing in the scientific literature in the last four years. Additionally, we show some rather stark evidence that the family of models used by the UN's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is experiencing a profound failure that greatly reduces their forecast utility.If the case for emission cutbacks is weaker than the public has been led to believe, the claim of a double dividend is on even shakier ground. There really is a consensus in this literature, and it is that carbon taxes cause more economic damage than generic taxes do on labor or capital, so that in general even a revenue-neutral carbon tax swap would probably reduce economic growth.