In 1964 the Viet Cong was firmly entrenched in the Mekong Delta region. Using fear and terror tactics, the insurgency gained control of the population creating a safe haven for the movement to thrive and expand. The United States and the Government of South Vietnam recognized the infiltration problem in the Mekong Delta but their military organizations were either unable or incapable to deal with the problem. The geography of the region made it impossible for a U.S. Army or Marine Corps division to operate effectively and the South Vietnamese Army and Navy lacked the training and equipment to operate successfully. In response to these obstacles, Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, commissioned the U.S. Navy to develop a fighting force capable of operating in the delta and ridding the region of the Viet Cong influence. The Navy used for main Operations: MARKET TIME, GAME WARDEN,-The Mobile Riverine Force, and SEALORDS to achieve these goals. In four short years the Brown Water Sailors experienced marked success with Viet Cong influence minimized and resupply efforts rerouted to the tortuous Ho Chi Minh Trail. However, by the end of 1968 American resolve to fight a war in South Vietnam had deteriorated and the Government needed a way out. President Nixon’s Vietnamization program provided the exit for American forces and in turn mitigated the Brown Water Navy’s successes of the previous four years. The Brown Water Navy overcame tremendous obstacles in less than one year to create and deploy a formidable fighting force to the Mekong Delta. In four years aggressive strides against the Viet Cong insurgency were achieved only to be mitigated by the effects of Vietnamization.

The Brown Water Navy, created in less than one year, conducted successful counterinsurgency operations against the Viet Cong only to be marginalized by its own government's policy of Vietnamization. In 1964 the Viet Cong were firmly entrenched in the Mekong Delta region. Using fear and terror tactics, the insurgency gained control of the population, creating a safe haven for the movement to thrive and expand. The United States and the Government of South Vietnam recognized the infiltration problem in the Mekong Delta but their military organizations were either unable or incapable to deal with the problem. The geography of the region made it impossible for a U.S. Army or Marine Corps division to operate effectively and the South Vietnamese Army and Navy lacked the training and equipment to operate successfully. In response to these obstacles, Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, commissioned the U.S. Navy to develop a fighting force capable of operating in the delta and ridding the region of the Viet Cong influence. The Navy used for main Operations MARKET TIME, GAME WARDEN, The Mobile Riverine Force, and SEALORDS to achieve these goals. In four short years the Brown Water Sailors experienced marked success with Viet Cong influence minimized and resupply efforts rerouted to the tortuous Ho Chi Minh Trail. However, by the end of 1968, American resolve to fight a war in South Vietnam had deteriorated and the Government needed a way out. President Nixon's Vietnamization program provided the exit for American forces and in turn mitigated the Brown Water Navy's successes of the previous four years. The Brown Water Navy overcame tremendous obstacles in less than one year to create and deploy a formidable fighting force to the Mekong Delta. In four years aggressive strides against the Viet Cong insurgency were achieved only to be mitigated by the effects of Vietnamization.

The Brown Water War at 50 presents the work of renowned historians and Vietnam War veterans who describe and interpret the U.S. Navy’s major combat operations in South Vietnam and on its coast. The scope of the book includes the river war in South Vietnam’s Mekong Delta, the coastal patrol, and the intelligence campaign. To complement text, the authors have added images and maps from the U.S. Navy archives, U.S. Naval Institute collection and from private collections. They also provide a s list of the most authoritative works on the subject. In this retrospective, Cutler and Marolda describe not only the actions of the warships, aircraft, and river vessels involved in one of America’s longest wars but also the professional skill, dedication, and courage of the Navy men and women who went in “harm’s way” in Vietnam. The authors detail the development and combat experience of the Navy’s River Patrol Force and the Army-Navy Mobile Riverine Force as they fought the Viet Cong. They relate in full the heroism of Medal of Honor recipients Boatswain’s Mate 1st Class James E. Williams and Lieutenant Thomas G. Kelley, and the leadership of Vice Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr. Intelligence which, until recently, was classified tells the story of the Navy’s intelligence effort in South Vietnam, and describes the operations of SEAL and Naval Intelligence Officers at the tactical level. In short, this book takes an in depth look at the Navy’s major and essential role in a conflict that marked a milestone in modern American history.

[Includes 10 maps, 5 illustrations] “This monograph focuses on the battles of Quang Tri City and Hue that took place during the 1968 Tet offensive. The offensive itself, an all-out effort by Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces to overrun the major cities of South Vietnam, marked the turning point of the Vietnam War. Although the attacks were costly failures in military terms, they set the United States on a path of disengagement from the war that ultimately led to the fall of Saigon some seven years later. The battles for the two northernmost provincial capitals in South Vietnam, Quang Tri City and Hue, are particularly worth examining because the enemy regarded them as key objectives, second only to Saigon, the national capital. To a large extent, the success or failure of the offensive depended on what happened there. The battles tell us much about how the enemy prepared for the offensive, why he achieved a high degree of surprise and initial success, and why his attacks ultimately failed. The battle for Quang Tri City, a textbook example of a vertical envelopment, resulted in a quick allied victory. The fight for Hue turned into a slow, grinding campaign of attrition that lasted nearly a month before the enemy was finally defeated. Together, they offer instruction on the strengths and limitations of airmobile warfare and a primer on urban fighting in a counterinsurgency environment, subjects that continue to be a major Army interest throughout the world.”

A landmark comparative history of Europe and China that examines why the Industrial Revolution emerged in the West The Great Divergence sheds light on one of the great questions of history: Why did sustained industrial growth begin in Northwest Europe? Historian Kenneth Pomeranz shows that as recently as 1750, life expectancy, consumption, and product and factor markets were comparable in Europe and East Asia. Moreover, key regions in China and Japan were no worse off ecologically than those in Western Europe, with each region facing corresponding shortages of land-intensive products. Pomeranz’s comparative lens reveals the two critical factors resulting in Europe's nineteenth-century divergence—the fortunate location of coal and access to trade with the New World. As East Asia’s economy stagnated, Europe narrowly escaped the same fate largely due to favorable resource stocks from underground and overseas. This Princeton Classics edition includes a preface from the author and makes a powerful historical work available to new readers.

Freshly presents world history through its oceans and seas in uniquely wide-ranging, original chapters by leading experts in their fields.