The Trident nuclear-deterrent program is one of the United Kingdom's largest-ever military acquisitions. Planned and initiated during the Cold War, it is now coming to fruition at a time when the most obvious justification for it--the Soviet threat to Western Europe--has disappeared. With the money largely spent or committed, Britain's continuance as a nuclear-weapon state until well into the twenty-first century seems certain. But with what point and purpose? This report examines the history, the underlying issues, the policy options, and the risks related to redefining a rationale for Britain's nuclear-deterrence program. The author reviews the role the United States has played in the development of Britain's nuclear policy and discusses how a new rationale might affect U.S.-U.K. relationships.

The Trident nuclear deterrent program is one of the United Kingdom's largest-ever military acquisitions. Planned and initiated in the depths of the Cold War, it is now coming to fruition, when the most obvious justification for it--the Soviet threat to Western Europe--has disappeared. The continuation of the program is not in doubt; the money is largely spent or committed, and the main political parties agree on deploying the force. But the rationale needs refurbishment. Britain has traditionally preferred to represent her nuclear capability primarily as a contribution to NATO's collective deterrence. The "second center of decisionmaking" concept defined a particular value for that contribution. This rationale seized the moral high ground (by associating Britain's deterrent with NATO's strategy to prevent war), guarded the proliferation flank, and underpinned Anglo-American relations.

This book explores aspects of the social and cultural history of nuclear Britain in the Cold War era (1945–1991) and contributes to a more multivalent exploration of the consequences of nuclear choices which are too often left unacknowledged by historians of post-war Britain. In the years after 1945, the British government mobilised money, scientific knowledge, people and military–industrial capacity to create both an independent nuclear deterrent and the generation of electricity through nuclear reactors. This expensive and vast ‘technopolitical’ project, mostly top-secret and run by small sub-committees within government, was central to broader Cold War strategy and policy. Recent attempts to map the resulting social and cultural history of these military–industrial policy decisions suggest that nuclear mobilisation had far-reaching consequences for British life. The chapters in this book were originally published as a special issue of Contemporary British History.

This text focuses on the disagreements which existed in British political and military circles over nuclear strategy directly after World War II. Based on recently released documents, it argues that British policy in this important area was much more ambiguous than is commonly supposed.

In December 2003 the British government announced that within a few years it would need to take decisions about the future of Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent. Exactly three years later, its plans were revealed in a White Paper. The existing Trident system is to be given a life-extension, which includes building new submarines to carry the missiles, costing £15–20 billion. Britain has a substantial nuclear legacy, having owned nuclear weapons for over half a century. The strategic context for the deterrent has changed completely with the end of the Cold War, but nuclear weapons retain much of their salience. This Adelphi Paper argues that it makes sense to remain a nuclear power in an uncertain and nuclear-armed world. Given that deterrence needs are now less acute, but more complex than in the past, the paper asserts that deterrence also needs to be aligned with non-proliferation policies, which seek to reduce the scale of threats that need to be deterred. Somewhat overlooked in current policy are appropriate measures of defence, which can raise the nuclear threshold and, if required, mitigate the effects of deterrence failure. It concludes that the government's decisions about the future form of the deterrent are very sensible, but cautions that they still need to be integrated into a broader policy that embraces diplomacy, deterrence and defence to counter the risks posed by nuclear proliferation.

Volume I of The Official History of the UK Strategic Nuclear Deterrent provides an authoritative and in-depth examination of the British Government’s strategy towards nuclear deterrent from 1945 to 1964. This volume, written with full access to the UK documentary record, examines the strategic nuclear policy of British governments after 1945 as they tried to build and then maintain an independent, nationally controlled strategic capability, while also attempting to forge a close nuclear relationship with the United States. This book will be of much interest to students of British politics, nuclear proliferation and international relations.

Having served opposite Warsaw Pact forces in the 1950s and on Embassy duty in the 70s in Europe, the author offers a reasoned assessment of Britain's role in the so-called "nuclear club". He asks whether Britain really needs to be a member.