This study is the very first on the Brazilian legislature and political system. It addresses important issues regarding the role of executive and congressional bureaucracies in Brazil.

Ambition theory suggests that scholars can understand a good deal about politics by exploring politicians' career goals. In the USA, an enormous literature explains congressional politics by assuming that politicians primarily desire to win re-election. In contrast, although Brazil's institutions appear to encourage incumbency, politicians do not seek to build a career within the legislature. Instead, political ambition focuses on the subnational level. Even while serving in the legislature, Brazilian legislators act strategically to further their future extra-legislative careers by serving as 'ambassadors' of subnational governments. Brazil's federal institutions also affect politicians' electoral prospects and career goals, heightening the importance of subnational interests in the lower chamber of the national legislature. Together, ambition and federalism help explain important dynamics of executive-legislative relations in Brazil. This book's rational-choice institutionalist perspective contributes to the literature on the importance of federalism and subnational politics to understanding national-level politics around the world.

This book develops a critical analysis of the Brazilian legislature, specifically the role of its lower chamber, the Chamber of Deputies, in policy making and how this combines with its public engagement role, namely in terms of promoting participation and transparency. The book draws from Nelson Polsby’s theoretical conceptualization about transformative and arena legislatures. The purpose is not to reach a consensus about the exact categorisation of the legislature in Polsby’s classification. On the contrary, the chapters are mainly concerned in challenging this classification through interdisciplinary perspectives drawn from within the legislative studies in Brazil. The book’s first chapters introduce the reader to an historical overview of the Brazilian legislature’s policy making and organization, identifying its role in proposing public policies and scrutinising proposals from the Executive Branch. The subsequent chapters focus on its public engagement role and address contemporary elements – such as political participation and transparency – and how these interlink, or not, with legislative practices and influence the production of law. The book provides a unique insight into the operation and power of the legislature of a key global power, Brazil, in a presidential political system context. The chapters originally published as a special issue in the Journal of Legislative Studies.

This book offers the first conceptually rigorous analysis of the political and institutional underpinnings of Brazil's recent rise. Using Brazil as a case study in multiparty presidentialism, the authors argue that Brazil's success stems from the combination of a constitutionally strong president and a robust system of checks and balances.

This volume presents in-depth insights into the polity, politics and policies of the Brazilian political system. It reassesses the processes of change since the country's return to democracy in the 1980s, in the light of autocratic societal structures and suboptimal institutional design, on the one hand, and the political and economic achievements observed, on the other. In their contributions, top Brazilian and international scholars critically examine the development of the political system with a focus on the Lula and Rousseff administrations, and place their actions and failures in the socio-political and economic context so as to uncover the underlying institutional structures, constellations and diverging interests of actors on various decision-making levels and in different political fields. It is the central aim of this book to present a differentiated portrait of the current political landscape and remaining contradictions in Latin America's largest country.

Reform success and reform delay are subject to a variety of explanations. In general, high decisiveness leads to reform propensity, while its absence, or high resoluteness, to policy-gridlock. The Brazilian reform experience is contradicting: both aspects are present - factors leading to decisiveness as well as those inducing gridlock and reform delay. Leaving the static point of view and accounting for a dynamic development, this apparent contradiction gets resolved: in fact, the executive gained growing leeway during the 1990s, providing it with the means to achieve a higher degree of decisiveness of the political system by simultaneously guaranteeing resoluteness.It is, however, greatly mistaken to consider this development as a blank cheque to universal, encompassing reforming in all areas. Despite growing executive dominance and growing policy consensus, some particular reforms were a success, while others did not surpass its initial stages. This is finally due to path-dependency and explicit policy-specificities, triggering different institutional constraints and veto-points, which even strong Presidents cannot override.