As the Afrika Korps withdrew after a bruising defeat at El Alamein, it became apparent that Axis forces would not be able to maintain their hold over Libya. Rommel pulled his troops back to Tunisia, digging in along the Mareth Line, and turned westwards t

The Mediterranean theater in World War II has long been overlooked by historians who believe it was little more than a string of small-scale battles--sideshows that were of minor importance in a war whose outcome was decided in the clashes of mammoth tank armies in northern Europe. But in this ground-breaking new book, one of our finest military historians argues that the Mediterranean was World War II's pivotal theater. Douglas Porch examines the Mediterranean as an integrated arena, one in which events in Syria and Suez influenced the survival of Gibraltar. Without a Mediterranean alternative, the Western Allies would probably have committed to a premature cross-Channel invasion in 1943 that might well have cost them the war. Brilliantly argued, with vivid portraits of Churchill, Montgomery, FDR, Rommel, and Mussolini, this original, accessible, and compelling account of a little-known theater emphasizes the importance of the Mediterranean in the ultimate Allied victory in Europe in World War II.

New history of la France libre, Vichy collaboration, and the resistance from the campaigns in Tunisia and Italy to Liberation.

The Battle of Kasserine Pass proved to be a shock both to American military forces in the field and to the American public at home. The defeat of the Allied forces in the battle put doubt into the minds of many—all of whom assumed the righteous democracies of the western Allies could not be defeated in the field by the armies of Fascism. The defeat suffered by the Allies had nothing to do with right versus wrong, however, but was very much a product of a number of operational shortcomings on the part of the Allies. Poor logistics, failures on the part of American leadership, lack of unity of effort on the part of the Allies, the lack of combat experience, and inferior equipment all combined to contribute to the failure at Kasserine. Despite the setback at Kasserine Pass, the Americans proved quick learners, and applied the lessons of the North African experience to the remainder of their campaign in the European theater.

Fighting Rommel examines how and why some armies innovate under pressure while others do not. Focusing on the learning culture of the British Imperial Forces, it looks at the Allied campaign during the Second World War against the Afrika Korps of Rommel. The volume highlights the hitherto unexplored yet key role of the British Indian Army, the largest volunteer force in the world. It also introduces ‘learning culture’ as a heuristic device. Further, it goes on to analyze military innovation on the battlefield, in victory and defeat. A major intervention in the study of the Second World War, this book will be indispensable to scholars and researchers of military history, especially British and German, battlefield history, and defence and strategic studies.

This book focuses on the extent to which the physical terrain features across Egypt, Libya and Tunisia affected British operations throughout the campaign in North Africa during the Second World War. One main theme of the work analyses the terrain from the operational and tactical perspective and argues that the landscape features heavily influenced British operations and should now be considered alongside other standard military factors. The work differs from previous studies in that it considers these additional factors for the entire campaign until the Axis surrender in May 1943. Until now it has been widely assumed that much of the Western Desert coastal plateau was a broadly level, open region in which mobile armored operations were paramount. However this work concentrates on the British operations to show they were driven by the need to capture and hold key features across each successive battlefield. At the operational level planning was led by the need to hold key ground across Libya and especially the province of Cyrenaica during the crucial middle period of the campaign. A secondary theme of the work argues that British forces began to improvise certain tactical doctrines, which altered the early practice of combined arms assaults into one of the Infantry and Armored formations fighting largely separated battles until the autumn of 1942. Other developments in doctrine which were affected by the terrain included the practice of unit dispersal to hold key ground and the use of temporary units such as Jock columns to harass and engage the enemy. The two themes are inter-linked and contribute fresh insights to the debate on British methods of warfare. The author has consulted key primary documents, reports, war diaries and published memoirs, from major UK archives and compared these with the campaign historiography to develop the main themes of the work. These include the National Archives, the Churchill Archives Center, the Liddell-Hart Center for Military History, the National Army Museum, John Rylands Center, Imperial War Museum at London and Duxford and London and the Tank Museum Archives at Bovington. The sources include unit war diaries, after action reports, along with many of the key published and some unpublished memoirs. His text is supported by 24 pages of specially commissioned color maps.