The French Constitutional Council, a quasi-judicial body created at the dawn of the Fifth Republic, functioned in relative obscurity for almost two decades until its emergence in the 1980s as a pivotal actor in the French policymaking process. Alec Stone focuses on how this once docile institution, through its practice of constitutional review, has become a meaningfully autonomous actor in the French political system. After examining the formal prohibition against judicial review in France, Stone illustrates how politicians and the Council have collaborated over the course of the last decade, often unintentionally and in the service of contradictory agendas, to significantly enhance Council's power. While the Council came to function as a third house of Parliament, the legislative work of the government and Parliament was meaningfully "juridicized." Through a discussion of broad theoretical issues, Stone then expands the scope of his analysis to the politics of constitutional review in Germany, Spain, and Austria.

James Donovan takes a comprehensive approach to the history of the jury in modern France by investigating the legal, political, sociocultural, and intellectual aspects of jury trial from the Revolution through the twentieth century. He demonstrates that these juries, through their decisions, helped shape reform of the nation's criminal justice system. From their introduction in 1791 as an expression of the sovereignty of the people through the early 1900s, argues Donovan, juries often acted against the wishes of the political and judicial authorities, despite repeated governmental attempts to manipulate their composition. High acquittal rates for both political and nonpolitical crimes were in part due to juror resistance to the harsh and rigid punishments imposed by the Napoleonic Penal Code, Donovan explains. In response, legislators gradually enacted laws to lower penalties for certain crimes and to give jurors legal means to offer nuanced verdicts and to ameliorate punishments. Faced with persistently high acquittal rates, however, governments eventually took powers away from juries by withdrawing many cases from their purview and ultimately destroying the panels' independence in 1941.

To what extent is the language of judicial opinions responsive to the political and social context in which constitutional courts operate? Courts are reason-giving institutions, with argumentation playing a central role in constitutional adjudication. However, a cursory look at just a handful of constitutional systems suggests important differences in the practices of constitutional judges, whether in matters of form, style, or language. Focusing on independently-verified leading cases globally, a combination of qualitative and quantitative analysis offers the most comprehensive and systematic account of constitutional reasoning to date. This analysis is supported by the examination of eighteen legal systems around the world including the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice. Universally common aspects of constitutional reasoning are identified in this book, and contributors also examine whether common law countries differ to civil law countries in this respect.

This text elaborates a theory of constitutional politics. It examines the pan-European movement to confer constitutional review authority on a new governmental institution. Cases show how and to what extent legislative processes have been under the influence of consititutional judges.

Focusing on the intersection of politics and law in six western European countries and in two supra-national bodies, the contributors here aim to debunk the myth that judges are merely "la bouche de la loi" and analyze similiarities in policy-making of the judiciaries from one nation to the next.

Comparative Judicial Politics synthesizes the now extensive scholarly work on judicial politics from around the world, focusing on legal traditions, lawyers, judges, constitutional review, international and transnational courts, and the impact and legitimacy of courts. It offers typologies where relevant and intentionally raises questions to challenge readers’ preconceptions of “best” practices.

Among the societies that experienced a political transition away from authoritarianism in the 1980s, South Korea is known as a paragon of 'successful democratization.' This achievement is considered to be intimately tied to a new institution introduced with the 1987 change of regime, intended to safeguard fundamental norms and rights: the Constitutional Court of Korea. While constitutional justice is largely celebrated for having achieved both purposes, this book proposes an innovative and critical account of the court's role. Relying on an interpretive analysis of jurisprudence, it uncovers the ambivalence with which the court has intervened in the major dispute opposing the state and parts of civil society after the transition: (re)defining enmity. In response to this challenge, constitutional justice has produced both liberal and illiberal outcomes, promoting the rule of law and basic rights while reinforcing the mechanisms of exclusion bounding South Korean democracy in the name of national security.