Since the end of the Cold War, the United States, NATO, the United Nations, and a range of other states and nongovernmental organizations have become increasingly involved in nation-building operations. This volume presents a comprehensive history of best practices in nation-building and serves as an indispensable reference for planning future interventions.

This guidebook presents a doctrine for conducting effective nation-building operations. It is designed to be an accessible handbook that describes effective policies for rebuilding a nation after -- and, in some cases, during -- a conflict. It is based on historical research into the conduct of such operations by the United States, Europe, the United Nations, and other states and organizations over the past 60 years. The doctrine identifies the most important components of nation-building operations; describes how these components are interrelated; establishes the best practices, size, and costs associated with each component; and draws upon national, international, and nongovernmental sources of expertise and capacity in each of these fields. The doctrine is prescriptive enough to guide specific operations, but adaptable enough to cover diverse and varied situations worldwide. The guidebook is designed to assist the aspiring nation-builder. It also is intended to assist legislators, journalists, and academics in evaluating current or prospective operations of this sort. It brings together the best practices from the 16 case studies presented in the RAND Corporation's history of nation building, which includes the 2003 "America's Role in Nation-Building: From Germany to Iraq," and the 2005 "The UN's Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq." An additional eight case studies, currently under preparation, also are included in this guidebook.

Why has the US so dramatically failed in Afghanistan since 2001? Dominant explanations have ignored the bureaucratic divisions and personality conflicts inside the US state. This book rectifies this weakness in commentary on Afghanistan by exploring the significant role of these divisions in the US’s difficulties in the country that meant the battle was virtually lost before it even began. The main objective of the book is to deepen readers understanding of the impact of bureaucratic politics on nation-building in Afghanistan, focusing primarily on the Bush Administration. It rejects the ’rational actor’ model, according to which the US functions as a coherent, monolithic agent. Instead, internal divisions within the foreign policy bureaucracy are explored, to build up a picture of the internal tensions and contradictions that bedevilled US nation-building efforts. The book also contributes to the vexed issue of whether or not the US should engage in nation-building at all, and if so under what conditions.

Bringing political philosophy out of the ivory tower and within the reach of all, this book provides us with the tools to cut through the complexity of modern politics.

Using a case study of Afghanistan, this study examines gender-specific impacts of conflict and post-conflict and the ways they may affect women differently than they affect men. It analyzes the role of women in the nation-building process and considers outcomes that might occur if current practices were modified. Recommendations are made for improving data collection in conflict zones and for enhancing the outcomes of nation-building programs.

A highly readable look at the role of the US and NATO in Libya's war of liberation, and its lessons for future military interventions.

This volume connects the study of statebuilding to broader aspects of social theory and the historical study of the state, bringing forth new questions and starting-points, both academically and practically, for the field. Building states has become a highly prioritized issue in international politics. Since the 1990s, mainly Western countries and international institutions have invested large sums of money, vast amounts of manpower, and considerable political capital in ventures of this kind all across the globe. Most of the focus in current literature is on the acute cases, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, but also to states that seem to fit the label ‘failed states’ such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia. This book brings together a diverse group of scholars who introduce new theoretical approaches from the broader social sciences. The chapters revisit historical cases of statebuilding, and provide thought-provoking, new strategic perspectives on the field. The result is a volume that broadens and deepens our understanding of statebuilding by highlighting the importance of hybridity, contingency and history in a broad range of case-studies. This book will be of much interest to students of statebuilding and intervention, peacebuilding, war and conflict studies, security studies and IR in general.