The Crimean War was the most destructive armed conflict of the Victorian era. It is remembered for the unreasoning courage of the Charge of the Light Brigade, for the precise volleys of the Thin Red Line and the impossible assaults upon Sevastopol's Redan. It also demonstrated the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the British military system based on privilege and purchase.??Poor organisation at staff level and weak leadership from the Commander-in-Chief with a lack of appreciation of the conditions the troops would experience in the Crimea resulted in the needless death of thousands of soldiers. The Royal Navy, by comparison, was highly effective and successfully undertook its operations in the Baltic, the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov.??The relative performance of the two branches of Britain's armed forces is reflected in the despatches sent back to the UK by the?respective commanders. The comparative wealth of detail provided by Admirals Napier, Dundas and Lyons contrast sharply with the limited, though frequent, communications from Generals Raglan, Codrington and Simpson.??The despatches of all these commanding officers are presented in this compilation just as they were when first published in the 1850s. They tell of the great battles of the Alma, Balaklava and Inkerman, of the continuing struggle against Sevastopol and the naval operations which cut the Russian communications and ensured an eventual, if costly, victory. They can be read, just as they were when revealed to the general public more than 150 years ago.

Why France, the major European continental victor in 1918, suffered total defeat in six weeks at the hands of the vanquished power of 1918 only two decades later remains moot. Why the stunning reversal of fortunes? In this volume thirteen prominent scholars reexamine the French debacle of 1940 in interwar perspectives, utilizing fresh analysis, original approaches, and new sources. Although the tenor of the volume is critical, the contributors also suggest that French preparations for war knew successes as well as failures, that French defeat was not inevitable, and that the Battle of France might have turned out differently if different choices had been made and other paths been followed.

Ernest R. May's Strange Victory presents a dramatic narrative-and reinterpretation-of Germany's six-week campaign that swept the Wehrmacht to Paris in spring 1940. Before the Nazis killed him for his work in the French Resistance, the great historian Marc Bloch wrote a famous short book, Strange Defeat, about the treatment of his nation at the hands of an enemy the French had believed they could easily dispose of. In Strange Victory, the distinguished American historian Ernest R. May asks the opposite question: How was it that Hitler and his generals managed this swift conquest, considering that France and its allies were superior in every measurable dimension and considering the Germans' own skepticism about their chances? Strange Victory is a riveting narrative of those six crucial weeks in the spring of 1940, weaving together the decisions made by the high commands with the welter of confused responses from exhausted and ill-informed, or ill-advised, officers in the field. Why did Hitler want to turn against France at just this moment, and why were his poor judgment and inadequate intelligence about the Allies nonetheless correct? Why didn't France take the offensive when it might have led to victory? What explains France's failure to detect and respond to Germany's attack plan? It is May's contention that in the future, nations might suffer strange defeats of their own if they do not learn from their predecessors' mistakes in judgment.

Between September 1939 and June 1940, the British Expeditionary Force confronted the German threat to France and Flanders with a confused mind-set, an uncertain skills-set and an uncompetitive capability. This book explores the formation's origins, the scale of defeat in France and the campaign's considerable legacy.

In 1940, the German army fought and won an extraordinary battle with France in six weeks of lightning warfare. With the subtlety and compulsion of a novel, Horne’s narrative shifts from minor battlefield incidents to high military and political decisions, stepping far beyond the confines of military history to form a major contribution to our understanding of the crises of the Franco-German rivalry. To Lose a Battle is the third part of the trilogy beginning with The Fall of Paris and continuing with The Price of Glory (already available in Penguin).

The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was the British force in Europe from 1939_1940 during the Second World War. Commanded by General Lord Gort, the BEF constituted one-tenth of the defending Allied force.??The British Expeditionary Force was started in 1938 in readiness for a perceived threat of war after Germany annexed Austria in March 1938 and the claims on the Sudetenland, which led to the invasion of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. After the French and British had promised to defend Poland, the German invasion of that country began and war was declared on 3 September 1939.??The BEF was sent to France in September 1939 and deployed mainly along the Belgian„French border during the so-called Phoney War leading up to May 1940. The BEF did not commence hostilities until the invasion of France on 10 May 1940. After the commencement of battle, they were driven back through Belgium and north-western France, forcing their eventual evacuation from several ports along the French northern coastline in Operations Dynamo, Ariel and Cycle. The most notable evacuation was from the Dunkirk region and from this the phrase Dunkirk Spirit was coined.

The main theme of this book is the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) and the defenses it constructed in France during September 1939-May 1940. Although there have been many books written about the BEF, virtually all deal with the campaign in France and Flanders that cumulated in the evacuation from Dunkirk. No detailed account has ever been published on the defenses the BEF built in the Secteur Défensive de Lille - the front allocated to it by the French - along the Franco-Belgium border. This account of the Gort Line aims to fill this gap in our knowledge of Second War defences. The book's objective is to broadly answer four questions: What events led to the Gort Line being built? What defenses were built and what were the ideas behind them - did they reflect a flawed 'Maginot' mentality? What exactly did the BEF do in France during the Sitzkrieg? How relevant was the Gort Line to what was done in Britain in respect of the anti-invasion defenses immediately after Dunkirk? The book starts by looking at the historical context, with a review of how the inter-war years shaped the grand strategy of Britain, France and Germany. In doing so, it can be understood why the BEF dug in along the Franco-Belgian border alongside their French allies. Having set the historical context, the book will describe how the Gort Line was set out with reference to British principles governing the employment of all arms in positional warfare. Chapters will deal with the construction of the Gort Line and its defenses: the pillboxes, field works, obstacles and demolitions. A chapter will describe the activities of the BEF - including training - and a glimpse at what life was like for the ordinary soldier while 'holding' the Gort Line. Allied higher strategy, determined by the French as the senior partner, is outlined in a chapter and this gives the context as to why the BEF did not fight on the Gort Line. Instead, French strategy committed it to rush into Belgium alongside the French Army and the Gort Line was in effect relegated to a reserve position. The Sitzkrieg ended violently with the German Blitzkrieg and the events of those three weeks are described, when the Gort Line was actually occupied - albeit briefly - by the BEF and French. Finally, the book will look at Britain's anti-invasion defenses immediately after Dunkirk and the influence the Gort Line had on these.