On the morning of 3 January 1941, Australians of the 6th Division led an assault against the Italian colonial fortress village of Bardia in Libya, not far from the Egyptian-Libyan frontier. The ensuing battle was the second of the First Libyan Campaign, but the first battle of the Second World War planned and fought predominantly by Australians. The fortress fell to the attackers a little over two days after the attack began, in what could only be described as a remarkable victory. At a cost of 130 killed and 326 wounded, the 6th Division captured around 40,000 Italian prisoners and very large quantities of military stores and equipment. The victory was heralded at the time in Australia as one of the greatest military achievements of that nation's military history. Quite soon afterwards, however, overshadowed perhaps by Rommel's subsequent desert advances, the tragedy in Greece, and the war in the Pacific, Bardia slipped from the public mind. Very few Australians today have heard of the battle. This book attempts to bring Bardia back into the light.

The Passchendaele Campaign of 1917 is associated with images of slimy, oozing mud: mud deep enough and glutinous enough to drown men, horses and equipment, mud so pervasive that it, rather than the enemy, defeated the British Army’s only major campaign in Belgium. While these images are certainly true for the opening and final months of the campaign, mud was not he defining experience for the infantry of the Australian First and Second Divisions when, for the first time in history, two Australian Divisions fought a battle side by side in the Battle of Menin Road. For them, the defining experience was a well planned, well-conducted attack that saw all the objectives achieved in very short time. Menin Road was the third of the series of battles that together made up the Passchendaele (Third Ypres) Campaign. Intended to capture the high ground of the Gheluvelt Plateau east of Ypres to protect the right flank of the British Army advancing to its north, it was a difficult assignment. Earlier British attempts to clear the Plateau had been repulsed with heavy losses. With overwhelming artillery and air support, sound preparation and with limited objectives, the attack on 20 September surpassed all expectations. It was a classic example of how well-prepared and well-supported infantry could take and hold ground. However, as is explained in the book, it was also a classic example of why this operational method was too slow and would never win the war on the Western Front.

Between the end of the Kokoda campaign in January 1943 and the start of the New Guinea offensives at Lae in early September 1943, the Australian Army was engaged in some of the most intense and challenging fighting of the war for the ridges around Salamaua. Following the defeat of the Japanese offensive against Wau, it was decided to carry the fight to the Japanese force at Salamaua but what started as platoon level actions in April and May 1943 soon developed into company, battalion and brigade level operations for control of the dominating ridge systems around Salamaua. Following an amphibious landing, an American infantry regiment and supporting artillery units were also drawn into the fighting in July 1943. Salamaua 1943 also includes detailed insights into the tenacious Japanese defence of Salamaua, a defence to a threat that in the end was only a feint to draw Japanese forces away from Lae. Incorporating over 120 photographs from the battlefield including drone footage plus 26 maps and the added detail of 15 sidebars, Salamaua 1943 takes the reader behind what was one of the most complex campaigns of the Pacific War.

By 1942 the formidable Japanese military had conquered swathes of territory across south-east Asia and the Pacific Ocean. Despite its defeat at the Battle of Midway, Japan remained a potent enemy committed to the creation of a defensive arc to shield its captured possessions in the Pacific. The capture of Port Moresby would cement the southern border of this defensive arc and sever the vital lines of communication between Australia and the United States. It was the Japanese plan to seize Moresby that would set the course for the Battle of Milne Bay. Situated on the eastern tip of New Guinea, Milne Bay was a wretched hell-hole: swamp-riddled, a haven for malaria and cursed with torrential rain. It was here that General Douglas MacArthur ordered the secret construction of an Allied base with airfields to protect the maritime approach to Port Moresby. But the Japanese soon discovered the base at Milne Bay and despatched a task force to destroy its garrison and occupy the base. All that stood between the Japanese and their prize was a brigade of regular Australian soldiers untrained in tropical warfare and a brigade of Australian militia with no combat experience whatsoever. While the Kokoda campaign is etched in public memory, its sister battle at Milne Bay has long been neglected. However the bitter fighting over this isolated harbour played an equally important role in protecting Port Moresby and made a valuable contribution to shifting Allied fortunes in the Pacific War.

Challenging in its perspective and controversial in its conclusions, Bardia is a riveting account of the first large-scale battle planned and fought by an Australian formation in World War II. --Book Jacket.

A highly illustrated, absorbing account of the first battle of the desert war: the British against the Italians. Operation Compass was originally envisaged as a spoiling attack, combined with a reconnaissance in force to disrupt the Italian forces that had advanced into Egypt in September 1940. Lt Gen. Richard O'Connor launched what amounted to a British 'Blitzkrieg'. In less than two months the British forces swept 500 miles along the coast of North Africa. 7th Armoured Division raced across the desert to cut off the retreating Italians, and O'Connor's men destroyed 9 Italian divisions, and took 130,000 prisoners. In March 1941 General Rommel and the Afrikakorps landed at Tripoli.