The terms of reference for this inquiry were to investigate and report on the circumstances surrounding the death of Baha Mousa and the treatment of those detained with him. It takes account of previous investigations that have already taken place, in particular where responsibility lay for approving the practice of conditioning detainees by any members of the 1st Battalion, The Queen's Lancashire Regiment in Iraq in 2003.The report is divided into four modules: the history of the use of conditioning techniques (from the time of internment in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s up to and including March 2003; Baha Mousa and other detainees; training and the chain of command; the future - what has happened since 2003 is considered in relation to conditioning techniques.Baha Mousa died with 93 injuries in custody in Basra in 2003. His relatives claim he was beaten to death by troops. The inquiry concluded that his death was caused by a combination of his weakened physical state and a final struggle with his guards.The Inquiry has criticised the conduct of individual soldiers, senior army officers and their legal advisers and also failures in the chain of command. The lack of training and preparation British troops received for the invasion of Iraq is also highlighted. The report found that systematic abuse of civilians by British troops did not happen.There are 64 recommendations to the Ministry of Defence including that the MoD should keep its current absolute prohibition on the use of hoods on captured personnel. Arguments for the ban are overwhelming and a return to their use is difficult to justify

This book reviews the nature of the alleged abuse committed by the UK military forces, exploring the legal paradigm in which the abuse allegedly occurred; the morality of those accused; and the robustness of the accusation of a 'policy of abuse'.

On 14 September 2003 Baha Mousa, a hotel receptionist, was arrested in Basra by British troops and taken to a military base for questioning. Less than forty-eight hours later he was dead. This book tells the inside story of this crime and its aftermath.

Considers the legitimacy and authority of international law, showing how it can be more than simply an exercise of power.

Torture, Intelligence and Sousveillance in the War on Terror examines the communication battles of the Bush and Blair political administrations (and those of their successors in America and Britain) over their use of torture, first-hand or second-hand, to gain intelligence for the War on Terror. Exploring key agenda-building drivers that exposed the torture-intelligence nexus and presenting detailed case studies of key media events from the UK and USA, this insightful volume exposes dominant political discourses on the torture-for-intelligence policy. Whether in the form of unauthorized leaks, official investigations, investigative journalism, real-time reporting, or Non-Governmental Organisation activity, this timely study evaluates various modes of resistance to governments’ attempts at strategic political communication, with particular attention to ’sousveillance’: community-based recording from first-person perspectives. A rigorous exposition of the power-knowledge relationships constituting the torture-intelligence nexus, which re-evaluates agenda-building models in the digital age and assesses the strength of the public sphere across the Third, Fourth and Fifth Estates, Torture, Intelligence and Sousveillance in the War on Terror will appeal to scholars across the social sciences with interests in media and communication, sociology and social theory, politics and political communication, international relations, and journalism.

"The International Committee of the Red Cross' release of its 2020 Commentary on the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, which updated the existing 1960 "Pictet Commentary," drew global attention to the international humanitarian law governing prisoners of war POWs. This book contributes to the dialogue with a collection of capita selecta identified by the contributors as meriting examination. Part I examines qualification for POW status from two angles. Four contributions deal with types and domains of warfare - proxy, fluid, maritime, and space. The remaining three take on issues regarding the status of detainees set forth in Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention, specifically combatants, civilians accompanying the force, and members of a levée en masse. Part II discusses the treatment to which POWs are entitled. Topics range from a broad survey of key issues regarding POW treatment in contemporary conflicts to narrow topics that have created confusion or proven challenging in practice. The book concludes with Part III's consideration of the historical relevance of, and perspectives on, the international law governing POWs"--

All the key findings of the public inquiry into the handling of the 2003 Iraq war by the British government led by Tony Blair. Chaired by Sir John Chilcot, the Iraq Inquiry (known as the 'Chilcot Report') tackled: Saddam Hussein's threat to Britainthe legal advice for the invasionintelligence about weapons of mass destruction andplanning for a post-conflict Iraq. This 60,000-word executive summary was published in July 2016. Philippe Sands QC wrote in the London Review of Books: 'It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate.' Published under an Open Government Licence, this book aims to make better known the findings of the Iraq Inquiry, which took seven years to complete at a cost of £10 million. The text, headings, footnotes and any emphasis are exactly those of the original document. Contents Introduction Pre-conflict strategy and planning The UK decision to support US military action Why Iraq? Why now? The UK's relationship with the US Decision-making Advice on the legal basis for military action Weapons of mass destruction Planning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq The post-conflict period Occupation Transition Planning for withdrawal Did the UK achieve its objectives in Iraq? Key findings Lessons Timeline of events REVIEWS The Iraq Inquiry, chaired by Sir John Chilcot and composed of five privy councillors, finally published its report on the morning of 6 July, seven years and 21 days after it was established by Gordon Brown with a remit to look at the run-up to the conflict, the conflict itself and the reconstruction, so that we can learn lessons. It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate. — Philippe Sands, London Review of Books A more productive way to think of the Chilcot report is as a tool to help us set agendas for renewed best efforts in creating more effective and accountable statecraft. Chilcot has confirmed that... we still do not have intelligent long-range planning by the armed forces in close and active cooperation with other government agencies, nor an adequate and integrated system for the collection and evaluation of intelligence information, nor do we have the highest possible quality and stature of personnel to lead us through these challenging times. — Derek B. Miller, The Guardian Although sceptics wondered how much more the very-long-awaited Report of the Iraq Inquiry by a committee chaired by Sir John Chilcot could tell us when it appeared at last in July, it proves to contain a wealth of evidence and acute criticism, the more weighty for its sober tone and for having the imprimatur of the official government publisher. In all, it is a further and devastating indictment not only of Tony Blair personally but of a whole apparatus of state and government, Cabinet, Parliament, armed forces, and, far from least, intelligence agencies. Among its conclusions the report says that there was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein; that the British chose to join the invasion of Iraq before the peaceful options for disarmament had been exhausted; that military action was not a last resort... — Geoffrey Wheatcroft, The New York Review of Books Ideal for any student of politics, diplomacy, or conflict.