On April 6th, the German 2nd and 12th Armies, Italian 2nd and 9th Armies, and the Hungarian 4th, 5th and Mobile Corps invaded Yugoslavia from Italy, Germany, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania. Few of the Royal Yugoslav Army's 30 divisions actively resisted, and after 11 days the Yugoslav High Command surrendered. In Croatia, a puppet state was installed. Axis forces quickly occupied the principal towns and patrolled the main road and rail links, but in the villages, countryside and mountains, a vicious and complex guerrilla war was brewing. This title takes a close look at the German, Italian, Croatian, Serbian, Montenegrin, Bulgarian, Macedonian, and Slovenian units that fought for the Axis powers in Yugoslavia during World War II.

Describes weapons, equipment, and uniforms of World War II Allied Forces.

This comprehensive volume tells the rarely recounted stories of the numerous foreign air forces that supported the German Luftwaffe as part of the Axis' quest to dominate the European and Pacific theaters—a highly compelling and often overlooked chapter of World War II history. The Axis Air Forces: Flying in Support of the German Luftwaffe presents an untold history of that global conflict's little-known combatants, who nonetheless contributed significantly to the war's outcome. While most other books only attempt to address this subject in passing, author Frank Joseph provides not only an extremely comprehensive account of the "unsung heroes" of the Axis fliers, but also describes the efforts of Axis air forces such as those of the Iraqi, Manchurian, Thai or Chinese—specific groups of wartime aviators that have never been discussed before at length. This book examines the distinct but allied Axis air forces of Western Europe, Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. An extensive introduction provides coverage of Luftwaffe volunteers from Greece, Lithuania, Holland, Denmark, Norway and even the United States. Detailed descriptions of the personnel themselves and the aircraft they operated are portrayed against the broader scope of combat missions, field operations, and military campaigns, supplying invaluable historical perspective on the importance of their sorties.

It seemed that whenever Mussolini acted on his own, it was bad news for Hitler. Indeed, the Fuhrer's relations with his Axis partners were fraught with an almost total lack of coordination. Compared to the Allies, the coalition was hardly an alliance at all. Focusing on Germany's military relations with Italy, Romania, Hungary, and Finland, Richard DiNardo unearths a wealth of information that reveals how the Axis coalition largely undermined Hitler's objectives from the Eastern Front to the Balkans, Mediterranean, and North Africa. DiNardo argues that the Axis military alliance was doomed from the beginning by a lack of common war aims, the absence of a unified command structure, and each nation's fundamental mistrust of the others. Germany was disinclined to make the kinds of compromises that successful wartime partnerships demanded and, because Hitler insisted on separate pacts with each nation, Italy and Finland often found themselves conducting counterproductive parallel wars on their own. DiNardo's detailed assessments of ground, naval, and air operations reveal precisely why the Axis allies were so dysfunctional as a collective force, sometimes for seemingly mundane but vital reasons-a shortage of interpreters, for example. His analysis covers coalition warfare at every level, demonstrating that some military services were better at working with their allies than others, while also pointing to rare successes, such as Rommel's effective coordination with Italian forces in North Africa. In the end, while some individual Axis units fought with distinction—if not on a par with the vaunted Wehrmacht—and helped Germany achieve some of its military aims, the coalition's overall military performance was riddled with disappointments. Breaking new ground, DiNardo's work enlarges our understanding of Germany's defeat while at the same time offering a timely reminder of the challenges presented by coalition warfare.

"The author examines the Axis defeat in World War II and concludes that the two main causes were resource inferiority (after 1941) and strategic incompetence -- i.e., pursuit of imperial ambitions beyond the reach of its actual power. Until 1941 Axis military fortunes thrived, but the addition in that year of the Soviet Union and the United States to the list of Axis enemies condemned the Axis to ultimate strategic defeat. Germany, Italy, and Japan all attempted to bite off more than they could chew and subsequently choked to death"--Publisher's web site.