Lt Col John J. Zentner’s The Art of Wing Leadership and Aircrew Morale in Combat addresses the role that the air force wing commander plays in affecting the level of aircrew morale during combat. More specifically, Colonel Zentner’s study seeks to identify and define those unique characteristics associated with leading airmen that sustain aircrew morale in the face of significant losses. Colonel Zentner defines aircrew morale as the enthusiasm and persistence with which an aviator flies combat missions. He then offers three historical case studies to establish a framework within which aircrew morale can be assessed. The first case study is of Maj Adolf Galland and Jagdgeschwader 26 during the Battle of Britain. The second case study considers Lt Col Joseph Laughlin and the 362d Fighter Group during the invasion of France in the summer of 1944. The third case study examines Col James R. McCarthy and the 43d Strategic Wing during Operation Linebacker II. Drawing heavily on the results of questionnaires and personal interviews, each case study is focused on the importance that aircrews ascribed to three general areas: individual needs, group cohesion, and unit esprit de corps. Colonel Zentner concludes that aircrew control over development of combat tactics was the single most important element affecting morale. This finding supports one of the fundamental truths about the employment of airpower, centralized control and decentralized execution that has become embedded in the airman’s culture. In each of the three cases studied by the author, morale generally improved when the wing commander either displayed a personal flair for tactical innovation or allowed his subordinates to become innovative. Conversely, morale declined when higher headquarters placed burdensome and unsound restrictions on aircrew tactics.

The post-cold-war leveling-off of American defense spending combined with sharp cuts in aircraft major weapon systems procurement could place the United States at a quantitative disadvantage against a future adversary. Advanced technology traditionally has provided qualitative advantages in combat capability, but aircrew morale has demonstrated in the past that it too has been a combat multiplier. For centuries military commanders have realized that raising troop morale magnifies their combat potential. It stands to reason that competent air force leaders will use every means at their disposal to capitalize on any advantage in war. This study addresses an issue that, in today's USAF at least, often is either ignored or misunderstood.

This study addresses the role that the air force wing commander plays in affecting the level of aircrew morale during air combat. This study answers the question: Is it possible to identify those characteristics of leadership that are able to sustain aircrew morale in the face of significant losses? First, the author defines aircrew morale as the enthusiasm and persistence of airmen to fly combat missions. Next, the author establishes a framework within which aircrew morale can be assessed in three historical case studies of air combat. The first case study is Adolf Galland and Jagdgeschwader 26 during the Battle of Britain. The second case study is Joseph Laughlin and the 362d Fighter Group during the invasion of France in the summer of 1944. The final case study is James McCarthy and the 43rd Strategic Wing during Operation LINEBACKER II. The author concludes that aircrew control over development of combat tactics was the most important element affecting morale. Morale was generally raised in each case study when the wing commander either displayed tactical innovation himself, or allowed his pilots or crews to become innovative. The author recommends that the USAF take steps to modify doctrine and professional military education curriculum to relate these findings to the combat air forces.