As Army Chief of Staff during the Korean war, General Collins directly monitored operations in the Far East for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He describes the actions of President Truman, Dean Acheson, George C. Marshall, Robert Lovett, Omar Bradley and the field commanders: Walton Walker’s desperate defense of the Pusan perimeter, MacArthur’s brilliant success at Inchon and disaster at the Yalu river and Ridgway taking over from MacArthur to rebuild the morale of a dispirited army. “General Collins... has produced an absorbing book which will be of great interest to the general reader... The book is clearly written... and covers its subject well.” — Denis Stairs, International Journal “[A] superior memoir of policy making on Korea.” — Richard K. Betts, The American Historical Review “[T]he story is told in compact and clear fashion, from the broadest standpoint and in gripping detail, and is supported by excellent cartography... Collins weaves an extremely useful account of his own role within the Joint Chiefs of Staff system. He is particularly informative on the unified department of defense... If he was a cold-war warrior, Collins was of the most responsible breed: a general of intelligence and balance who recoiled from the insanity of playing with global fire.” — Alvin D. Coox, The American Historical Review “This volume should not be missed by those of our citizens who want a view of the Korean war from the vantage point of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army at that time.” — Virgil Ney, Ordnance “As a primary source for decision-making studies and American historians, the book has self-evident value.” — Kirkus

A revelatory, explosive new analysis of the British military today. Over the first two decades of the twenty-first century, Britain has changed enormously. During this time, the British Army fought two campaigns, in Iraq and Afghanistan, at considerable financial and human cost. Yet neither war achieved its objectives. This book questions why, and provides challenging but necessary answers. Composed of assiduous documentary research, field reportage, and hundreds of interviews with many soldiers and officers who served, as well as the politicians who directed them, the allies who accompanied them, and the family members who loved and -- on occasion -- lost them, it is a strikingly rich, nuanced portrait of one of our pivotal national institutions in a time of great stress. Award-winning journalist Simon Akam, who spent a year in the army when he was 18, returned a decade later to see how the institution had changed. His book examines the relevance of the armed forces today -- their social, economic, political, and cultural role. This is as much a book about Britain, and about the politics of failure, as it is about the military.

“A must-read book that explores a vital pre-war effort [with] deep research and gripping writing.” —Washington Times In The rise of the G.I. Army, 1940–1941, Paul Dickson tells the dramatic story of how the American Army was mobilized from scattered outposts two years before Pearl Harbor into the disciplined and mobile fighting force that helped win World War II. In September 1939, when Nazi Germany invaded Poland and initiated World War II, America had strong isolationist leanings. The US Army stood at fewer than 200,000 men—unprepared to defend the country, much less carry the fight to Europe and the Far East. And yet, less than a year after Pearl Harbor, the American army led the Allied invasion of North Africa, beginning the campaign that would defeat Germany, and the Navy and Marines were fully engaged with Japan in the Pacific. Dickson chronicles this transformation from Franklin Roosevelt’s selection of George C. Marshall to be Army Chief of Staff to the remarkable peace-time draft of 1940 and the massive and unprecedented mock battles in Tennessee, Louisiana, and the Carolinas by which the skill and spirit of the Army were forged and out of which iconic leaders like Eisenhower, Bradley, and Clark emerged. The narrative unfolds against a backdrop of political and cultural isolationist resistance and racial tension at home, and the increasingly perceived threat of attack from both Germany and Japan.

"Recent discussions about granting direct commissions as field-grade officers (major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel) to people with highly-desirable civilian experience are often couched in terms of "that was done during World War II." Responses that such wartime commissions were temporary commissions in the Army of the United States (AUS), rather than in the Regular Army (RA), are usually met with blank looks. During World War II, almost all Army commissions--the authorization from the government that gives a military officer the right to command--were temporary AUS commissions. The AUS commission saw continued use in limited numbers after the war, but has been in hiatus since the early 1980s. The AUS commission was the last of several types of temporary commissions the United States government used to expand the Army officer corps during wartime. The use of temporary commissions to provide enough officers to lead the quickly growing ranks was the standard practice during most of the major wars fought by the United States until after the end of the Vietnam War, varying only in the type of commission and method for raising additional wartime forces. Only since 1980 has the US Army sought to wage war without issuing some sort of temporary commission to expand the officer corps"--

This occasional paper is a concise overview of the history of the US Army's involvement along the Mexican border and offers a fundamental understanding of problems associated with such a mission. Furthermore, it demonstrates how the historic themes addressed disapproving public reaction, Mexican governmental instability, and insufficient US military personnel to effectively secure the expansive boundary are still prevalent today.