Following the bombings of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, the twentieth century was haunted by the specter of nuclear annihilation. Locked in a hostile embrace, the U.S. and the USSR engaged in a ruinous arms race preparing for the kind of war no one wanted and no one could win. Though the Cold War ended, the dangers of nuclear proliferation remain, with poorly secured nuclear weapons and materials vulnerable to theft, sale, accident, or misuse. The many debates over the years surrounding the arms race, proliferation, deterrence, and security are collected here to provide readers with a fine-grained sense of the international tensions, political urgency, diplomatic strategies, and global fears that have long underlined the effort to build and maintain nuclear arsenals.

The volume contains papers presented to the Eleventh Course of the International School on Disarmament and Research on Conflicts (ISODARCO) held in August 1986 at San Miniato, Italy. Attention was focused on the international aspects of arms control and disarmament.

This new edition of a very current interdisciplinary book covers both technical material and social issues, to give readers of all backgrounds a sense of the overall implications of the arms race. Weapons are the primary focus of the book, with the history of their development and nuclear politics included in the introductory chapters. There is a thorough discussion of global nuclear exchange, which considers the consequences of an all-out nuclear war, the psychological impact of the threat and actual nuclear war; the atomic bombings of Japan; and the biological effects of radiation from nuclear weapons.

The Cold War introduced new military arsenal, weapons of mass destruction. The United States and the Soviet Union invested billions of dollars into the development of sophisticated and destructive weapons. Creating a dangerous military arsenal became another objective. After the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic bomb, the United States tested the first hydrogen bomb. This book examines how nuclear proliferation and the arms race influenced the trajectory of the Cold War.

The definitive guide to the history of nuclear arms control by a wise eavesdropper and masterful storyteller, Michael Krepon. The greatest unacknowledged diplomatic achievement of the Cold War was the absence of mushroom clouds. Deterrence alone was too dangerous to succeed; it needed arms control to prevent nuclear warfare. So, U.S. and Soviet leaders ventured into the unknown to devise guardrails for nuclear arms control and to treat the Bomb differently than other weapons. Against the odds, they succeeded. Nuclear weapons have not been used in warfare for three quarters of a century. This book is the first in-depth history of how the nuclear peace was won by complementing deterrence with reassurance, and then jeopardized by discarding arms control after the Cold War ended. Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace tells a remarkable story of high-wire acts of diplomacy, close calls, dogged persistence, and extraordinary success. Michael Krepon brings to life the pitched battles between arms controllers and advocates of nuclear deterrence, the ironic twists and unexpected outcomes from Truman to Trump. What began with a ban on atmospheric testing and a nonproliferation treaty reached its apogee with treaties that mandated deep cuts and corralled "loose nukes" after the Soviet Union imploded. After the Cold War ended, much of this diplomatic accomplishment was cast aside in favor of freedom of action. The nuclear peace is now imperiled by no less than four nuclear-armed rivalries. Arms control needs to be revived and reimagined for Russia and China to prevent nuclear warfare. New guardrails have to be erected. Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace is an engaging account of how the practice of arms control was built from scratch, how it was torn down, and how it can be rebuilt.

Innovation and the Arms Race investigates the causes and mechanisms of the "technological arms race" between the United States and the Soviet Union. Challenging the commonly held notion that Soviet weapons innovation processes simply mirror those of the United States, Matthew Evangelista shows that the United States usually leads in introducing new military technology, while the Soviets typically react to American initiatives. Evangelista bases his study of pivotal nuclear weapons development decisions on a variety of US and USSR primary sources, including the memoirs of weapons designers and scientists, declassified intelligence analyses, Soviet Academy of Science documents, and Nikita Khruschev's taped reminiscences. He finds that in the United States, impetus for innovation comes "from the bottom" at the initiative of corporate or government researchers and military officials, whereas the centralized Soviet system produces innovations "from the top" in response to foreign developments. A revelatory analysis of US military policy, Soviet-American relations, and weaponry development, Innovation and the Arms Race bears lessons for the study of great power competition and military innovation today.

The nuclear arms race had dominated international politics for the two decades prior to publication. Originally published in 1975, this symposium examines the dynamics of change within the arms race and the attempts at controlling and limiting it. At the time the nuclear arms race was strongly technologically determined, as Herbert York demonstrates in discussing the impact of MIRV. Such progress as has been made in nuclear disarmament has been far outdistanced by the technological developments so that, as Jack Ruina argues, SALT is only important when seen as part of a process of negotiating arms limitations. The most significant result of this technological advance has been the emergence of a qualitatively new system of international politics which Hans Morgenthau analyses. This system is essentially bipolar in nuclear terms and the history of the disarmament negotiations, as reviewed by William Epstein, is an exercise in freezing this structure. The negotiations themselves, particularly SALT, and the prospects for further progress are discussed extensively by Thomas Schelling, Kosta Tsipis, George Rathjens and others. The book also surveys developments in chemical and biological warfare and includes an important paper on chemical warfare agents by the Soviet chemist, O.A. Ruetov. The final section looks at recent developments in the theory of conflict and its applications in the Middle East, South Africa and a number of developing countries.