The quality of financial sector supervision has emerged as a key issue from the financial crisis. While most countries operated broadly under the same regulatory standards, differences emerged in supervisory approaches. The international response to this crisis has focused on the need for more and better regulations (e.g., in areas such as bank capital, liquidity and provisioning) and on developing a framework to address systemic risks, but there has been less discussion of how supervision itself could be strengthened. The IMF's work in assessing compliance with financial sector standards over the past decade in member countries suggests that while progress is being made in putting regulation in place, work remains to be done in many countries to strengthen supervision. How can this enhanced supervision be achieved? Based on an examination of lessons from the crisis and the findings of these assessments of countries' compliance with financial standards, the paper identifies the following key elements of good supervision-that it is intrusive, skeptical, proactive, comprehensive, adaptive, and conclusive. To achieve these elements, the "ability" to supervise, which requires appropriate resources, authority, organization and constructive working relationships with other agencies must be complemented by the "will" to act. Supervisors must be willing and empowered to take timely and effective action, to intrude on decision-making, to question common wisdom, and to take unpopular decisions. Developing this "will to act" is a more difficult task and requires that supervisors have a clear and unambiguous mandate, operational independence coupled with accountability, skilled staff, and a relationship with industry that avoids "regulatory capture." These essential elements of good supervision need to be given as much attention as the regulatory reforms that are being contemplated at both national and international levels. Indeed, only if supervision is strengthened can we hope to effectively deliver on the challenging-but crucial-regulatory reform agenda. For this to happen, society must stand with supervisors as they play their role as naysayers in times of exuberance.

Written by an experienced academic and practitioner, Operational Risk Management fills a gap in the information available on the Basel 2 Accord and offers valuable insights into the nature of operational risk.

The financial market events in 2007-2009 have spurred renewed interest and controversy in debates regarding financial regulation and supervision. This book takes stock of the developments in EU legislation, case law and institutional structures with regards to banking regulation and supervision, which preceded and followed the recent financial crisis. It does not merely provide an update, but anchors these developments into the broader EU law context, challenging past paradigms and anticipating possible developments. The author provides a systematic analysis of the interactions between the content of prudential rules and the mechanisms behind their production and application European Prudential Banking Regulation and Supervision includes discussions of the European banking market structure and of regulatory theory that both aim to circumscribe prudential concerns. It scrutinises the content of prudential norms, proposes a qualification of these norms and an assessment of their interaction with other types of norms (corporate, auditing and accounting, consumer protection, competition rules). It also features an analysis of the underpinning institutional set-up and its envisaged reforms, focusing on the typical EU concerns related to checks and balances. Finally, the book attempts to revive the debate on supervisory liability, in light of the developments discussed. This book will be of great value to all those interested in financial stability matters (practitioners, policy-makers, students, academics), as well as to EU law scholars.

This Detailed Assessment of Compliance on the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision on Switzerland discusses that significant portions of guidance and legislation related to qualitative risk management and control standards are not as detailed or comprehensive as in many other major countries and need to be updated and selectively strengthened. Supervisory risk assessments and guidance to auditors, as the extended supervisory arm of the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA), need to be further materially improved, beyond what is now envisioned. Additional skilled resources within FINMA are necessary to meet these goals and to conduct more on-site supervisory work. The responsibilities and objectives of FINMA that emphasize protecting creditors, investors and insured persons, as well as ensuring proper functioning of the financial market, should be clearly stated in legislation as pre-eminent. It is recommended to increase FINMA resources, especially for on-site inspection and risk expertise. Clarify and limit the cases in which the Board can become involved in supervisory decisions and improve conflict code.

Until about twenty years ago, the consensus view on the cause of financial-system distress was fairly simple: a run on one bank could easily turn to a panic involving runs on all banks, destroying some and disrupting the financial system. Since then, however, a series of events—such as emerging-market debt crises, bond-market meltdowns, and the Long-Term Capital Management episode—has forced a rethinking of the risks facing financial institutions and the tools available to measure and manage these risks. The Risks of Financial Institutions examines the various risks affecting financial institutions and explores a variety of methods to help institutions and regulators more accurately measure and forecast risk. The contributors--from academic institutions, regulatory organizations, and banking--bring a wide range of perspectives and experience to the issue. The result is a volume that points a way forward to greater financial stability and better risk management of financial institutions.