The vaccine used to protect humans against the anthrax disease, called Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed (AVA), was licensed in 1970. It was initially used to protect people who might be exposed to anthrax where they worked, such as veterinarians and textile plant workers who process animal hair. When the U. S. military began to administer the vaccine, then extended a plan for the mandatory vaccination of all U. S. service members, some raised concerns about the safety and efficacy of AVA and the manufacture of the vaccine. In response to these and other concerns, Congress directed the Department of Defense to support an independent examination of AVA. The Anthrax Vaccine: Is It Safe? Does It Work? reports the study's conclusion that the vaccine is acceptably safe and effective in protecting humans against anthrax. The book also includes a description of advances needed in main areas: improving the way the vaccine is now used, expanding surveillance efforts to detect side effects from its use, and developing a better vaccine.

The vaccine used to protect humans against the anthrax disease, called Anthrax Vaccine Adsorbed (AVA), was licensed in 1970. It was initially used to protect people who might be exposed to anthrax where they worked, such as veterinarians and textile plant workers who process animal hair. When the U. S. military began to administer the vaccine, then extended a plan for the mandatory vaccination of all U. S. service members, some raised concerns about the safety and efficacy of AVA and the manufacture of the vaccine. In response to these and other concerns, Congress directed the Department of Defense to support an independent examination of AVA. The Anthrax Vaccine: Is It Safe? Does It Work? reports the study's conclusion that the vaccine is acceptably safe and effective in protecting humans against anthrax. The book also includes a description of advances needed in main areas: improving the way the vaccine is now used, expanding surveillance efforts to detect side effects from its use, and developing a better vaccine.

This fourth edition of the anthrax guidelines encompasses a systematic review of the extensive new scientific literature and relevant publications up to end 2007 including all the new information that emerged in the 3-4 years after the anthrax letter events. This updated edition provides information on the disease and its importance, its etiology and ecology, and offers guidance on the detection, diagnostic, epidemiology, disinfection and decontamination, treatment and prophylaxis procedures, as well as control and surveillance processes for anthrax in humans and animals. With two rounds of a rigorous peer-review process, it is a relevant source of information for the management of anthrax in humans and animals.

In this provocative look at the US military from the Persian Gulf War through the 2003 invasion of Iraq, investigative journalist Gary Matsumoto contends that an anthrax vaccine dispensed by the Department of Defense was the cause of Gulf War Syndrome and the origins of a massive cover-up. Matsumoto calls it the worst friendly-fire incident in military history. A skillfully-woven narrative that serves as a warning about this man-made epidemic, Vaccine A is a much needed account of just what went wrong, and why.

Bacillus anthracis causes anthrax in all mammals, including humans. Depending upon the route of entry of B. anthracis spores, infection can result in cutaneous lesions, which are readily treatable with antibiotics, or systemic lethal disease, which is nearly always fatal. The continuing worldwide incidence of anthrax in animal populations, the risk of human infection associated with animal outbreaks, and the threat of use of B. anthracis as a biological weapon warrant continued investigation of this organisms and its virulence mechanims. Furthermore, B. anthracis is an excellent model system for inverstigation of virulence gene expression by bacteria.

If you have a child in school, you may have heard stories of long-dormant diseases suddenly reappearing—cases of measles, mumps, rubella, and whooping cough cropping up everywhere from elementary schools to Ivy League universities because a select group of parents refuse to vaccinate their children. Between Hope and Fear tells the remarkable story of vaccine-preventable infectious diseases and their social and political implications. While detailing the history of vaccine invention, Kinch reveals the ominous reality that our victories against vaccine-preventable diseases are not permanent—and could easily be undone. In the tradition of John Barry’s The Great Influenza and Siddhartha Mukherjee’s The Emperor of All Maladies, Between Hope and Fear relates the remarkable intersection of science, technology, and disease that has helped eradicate many of the deadliest plagues known to man.

At the turn of the twenty-first century, the United States contended with a state-run biological warfare program, bioterrorism, and a pandemic. Together, these threats spurred large-scale government demand for new vaccines, but few have materialized. A new anthrax vaccine has been a priority since the first Gulf War, but twenty years and a billion dollars later, the United States still does not have one. This failure is startling. Historically, the United States has excelled at responding to national health emergencies. World War II era programs developed ten new or improved vaccines, often in time to meet the objectives of particular military missions. Probing the history of vaccine development for factors that foster timely innovation, Kendall Hoyt discovered that vaccine innovation has been falling, not rising, since World War II. This finding is at odds with prevailing theories of market-based innovation and suggests that a collection of nonmarket factors drove mid-century innovation. Ironically, many late-twentieth-century developments that have been celebrated as a boon for innovation—the birth of a biotechnology industry and the rise of specialization and outsourcing—undercut the collaborative networks and research practices that drove successful vaccine projects in the past. Hoyt’s timely investigation teaches important lessons for our efforts to rebuild twenty-first-century biodefense capabilities, especially when the financial payback for a particular vaccine is low, but the social returns are high.