The need for another study on the doctrine of analogy in the writings ofSt Thomas may not be obvious, since a complete bibliography in this area would doubtless assume depressing proportions. The present work is felt to be justified because it attempts a full-fledged alternative to the interpretation given in Cajetan's De nominum analogia, an interpretation which has provided the framework for subsequent discussions of the question. Recently, it is true, there has been growing dissatisfaction with Cajetan's approach; indeed there have been wholesale attacks on the great commentator who is alleged to have missed the clef de voute of the metaphysics of his master. Applied to our problem, this criticism leads to the view that Cajetan was not metaphysical enough, or that he was metaphysical in the wrong way, in his discussion of the analogy of names. As its title indicates, the present study is not in agreement with Cajetan's contention that the analogy of names is a metaphysical doctrine. It is precisely a logical doctrine in the sense that "logical" has for St Thomas. We have no desire to be associated with attacks on Cajetan, the meta physician, attacks we feel are quite wrongheaded. If Cajetan must be criticized for his interpretation of the analogy of names, it is imperative that he be criticized for the right reasons. Moreover, criticism ofCajetan in the present study is limited to his views on the analogy of names.

Some sentences in natural languages like English have multiple meanings. Steinhart (William Paterson U. of New Jersey) divides the meanings into literal and metaphorical, denies that they are the same, and denies that the metaphorical function is necessarily false or necessarily true. He argues that most metaphors are based on analogies, which he defines as the relative structural indiscernibility of parts of worlds, and that a metaphor is true for a particular world if and only if certain parts of that world are relatively structurally indiscernible, that is, are analogous. c. Book News Inc.

1. Metaphors and Logic Metaphors are among the most vigorous offspring of the creative mind; but their vitality springs from the fact that they are logical organisms in the ecology of l- guage. I aim to use logical techniques to analyze the meanings of metaphors. My goal here is to show how contemporary formal semantics can be extended to handle metaphorical utterances. What distinguishes this work is that it focuses intensely on the logical aspects of metaphors. I stress the role of logic in the generation and int- pretation of metaphors. While I don't presuppose any formal training in logic, some familiarity with philosophical logic (the propositional calculus and the predicate c- culus) is helpful. Since my theory makes great use of the notion of structure, I refer to it as the structural theory of m etaphor (STM). STM is a semant ic theory of m etaphor : if STM is correct, then metaphors are cognitively meaningful and are n- trivially logically linked with truth. I aim to extend possible worlds semantics to handle metaphors. I'll argue that some sentences in natural languages like English have multiple meanings: "Juliet is the sun" has (at least) two meanings: the literal meaning "(Juliet is the sunkIT" and the metaphorical meaning "(Juliet is the sun)MET". Each meaning is a function from (possible) worlds to truth-values. I deny that these functions are identical; I deny that the metaphorical function is necessarily false or necessarily true.

In the last few years, there has been an enormous amount of activity in the study of analogy and metaphor. This is partly because of an interest of artificial intelligence researchers in simulating learning processes using analogy. It also arises from critical examinations of standard theories in the philosophy of language, with their inbuilt literal/meta phoric distinction. This volume consists of recent previously unpub lished work in this area, with a particular emphasis upon the role of analogies in reasoning and, more generally, their role in thought and language. The papers are contributed by philosophers, computer scientists, cognitive scientists and literary critics. Researchers in these fields whose focus is the study of analogy and metaphor will find much of interest in this volume. These essays can also serve as an introduction to some of the major approaches taken in the investigation of analogy. As noted, this volume brings together the work of researchers in several different disciplines. The various approaches taken with respect to the understanding of analogy tend to be rather different, however, the articles suggest a common conclusion. Analogy and metaphor pervade thought and language; their close investigation thus constitutes a valuable contribution to our understanding of persons. DAVID H. HELMAN Case Western Reserve University vii PART I CONCEPTUAL AND CATEGORICAL THEORIES OF ANALOGICAL UNDERSTANDING MARK TURNER CATEGORIES AND ANALOGIES I want to pursue the following claims: The way we categorize helps explain the way we recognize a statement as an analogy.