The first biography of the philosopher who became a mastermind of Allied intelligence in World War Two. Austere, witty, and formidable, J. L. Austin (1911-1960) was the leader of Oxford Ordinary Language Philosophy and the founder of speech-act theory. This book—the first full-length biography of Austin—enhances our understanding of his dominance in 1950s Oxford, examining the significance of his famous Saturday morning seminars, and his sometimes tense relationships with Gilbert Ryle, Isaiah Berlin, A. J. Ayer, and Elizabeth Anscombe. Throwing new light on Austin's own intellectual development, it probes the strengths and weaknesses of his mature philosophy, and reconstructs his late unpublished work on sound symbolism. Austin's philosophical work remains highly influential, but much less well known is his outstanding contribution to British Intelligence in World War Two. The twelve central chapters thus investigate Austin's part in the North African campaign, the search for the V-weapons, the preparations for D-Day, the Battle of Arnhem, and the Ardennes Offensive, and show that, in the case of D-Day, he played a major role in the ultimate Allied victory. While exploring Austin's dramatic and romantic personal history, Rowe pays close attention to his harsh schooling and pre-war affair with a married Frenchwoman; his wartime marriage, bomb injury, and response to a colleague's murder; and his post-war family life, the growing influence of America, and his tragically premature death. Adding considerably to our knowledge of World War Two, and Austin's diverse and enduring influence, this biography reveals the true complexity of his character, and the full range and significance of his achievements.

This study provides a brief overview of the US military?s involvement in stability operations and draws out the salient patterns and recurring themes that can be derived from those experiences. It is hoped that a presentation and critical analysis of the historical record will assist today?s Army in its attempts, now well under way, to reassess its long-standing attitudes toward stability operations and the role it should play in them. The US military?s experience in the conduct of stability operations prior to the Global War on Terrorism can be divided chronologically into four periods: the country?s first century (1789-1898); the?Small Wars? experience (1898-1940)7; the Cold War (1945-1990); and the post-Cold War decade (1991-2001). Reference will be made to a group of 28 representative case studies. The list of these case studies can be found at appendix A; synopses of the cases, written by members of the Combat Studies Institute, are located in appendix B.

Throughout history, training noncommissioned officers of the United States Army had been accomplished using on-the-job training (OJT) in the unit, and many believed that is where it should stay. Training noncommissioned officers was conducted by officers in the regiment and was the commanding officer's responsibility. It was accepted that unit training was the best means of developing noncommissioned officers and potential noncommissioned officers. It was not until the post-World War II era that NCO training was conducted outside the unit at specially designed schools and academies. The first Sergeant Major of the Army, William O. Wooldridge, noted that in those days a soldier had to provide for his own education and training. "I went to night school. There were no requirements to attend school if you didn't want to. Now you must get training, or you don't get promoted."