First published in 1984 Britain and the Armenian Question examines the direction, changes, and ramifications of British policy towards Armenia during 1915 to 1923. The author has made extensive use of parliamentary papers and those of the Cabinet, Foreign Office, War Office and India office as well as documents produced by pro- Armenian groups during the period. This material is used to build up a detailed and incontrovertible study of British policy, which shows the extent to which it was governed by self-interest even when support for Armenia was its most altruistic. Once Britain secured predominance in the Persian Gulf, she lost all her interest in Armenian territory and the dilemma was posed when the war ended: not only did she no longer need Armenia but also had to decide who to support in Russia. Armenia lost out on all sides and was compelled eventually to adapt herself to the policies of the surrounding countries. This is an interesting read for scholars and researchers of international relations and international political history.

Reprint of the classic study on the origins of the Balfour declaration. unlike other works on the subject, Friedman emphasizes the conditions promoting the Zionist cause, both within the British government and the Anglo-Jewish community.

In this work, first published in 1986, the author shows how the Zionists of the late Thirties related to the Arabs of Palestine and of the neighbouring countries, to what extent they perceived the existence of an ‘Arab Question’, how they defined it and how they dealt with it. The Arab question is as old as the Zionist movement itself. From the moment that Zionists began to immigrate to Ottoman Palestine in the last decades of the nineteenth century, it became apparent that they were not ‘returning’ to an empty land and that they could expect opposition to their enterprise from the inhabitants of the country they considered theirs. Comprising diplomatic, political, social, economic and cultural history, this book is a close analysis of the spectrum of views and opinions pertaining to Zionist relations with the Arabs.

Self-determination, imported into the Middle East on the heels of World War I, held out the promise of democratic governance to the former territories of the Ottoman Empire. The new states that European Great Powers carved out of the multilingual, multiethnic, and multireligious empire were expected to adhere to new forms of affiliation that emphasized previously unimportant differences. In 1936, the new Republic of Turkey lay claim to Antioch and the Sanjak (province) of Alexandretta, which the French had ruled since 1920 as part of its mandate over Syria. Turkey's ambassador made a passionate argument that Alexandretta was a homeland of the Turks, a place that was essentially Turkish. With France and Turkey unable to reach agreement, the League of Nations was called in to broker a compromise consistent with the spirit of the new democratic impulse, one of many disputes that it had to adjudicate as self-determination became a rallying cry for peoples who wanted to form new nations around their collective identities. Over the next four years, Turkey struggled for recognition of its claims to the territory, while Turkish authorities competed to win hearts and minds in Alexandretta province. In this nuanced narrative, Sarah D. Shields illuminates how the people of this region-about a quarter of a million Arabs, Armenians, Circassians, Kurds, and Turks-were forced to choose between Turkish and Arab identities. In the end, Shields shows, national identities played no role in the outcome of the dispute. What happened on the ground in this contested region was determined by Great Power diplomacy amidst the crisis of European democracy in the late 1930s, a story skillfully interwoven with the violent struggles that took place on the streets of the province. In the end, a new kind of identity politics was unleashed that redefined belonging, transformed nationalism, and set in motion the process of dysfunctional democracy that continues to plague the Middle East.

Adnan Menderes' election to power in 1950 signalled a new epoch in the history of modern Turkey. For the first time a democratic government ruled the country, taking over Kemal Ataturk's political heirs, the People's Republican Party (CHP), and challenging the Kemalist elite's monopoly on the control of state institutions and society itself. However, this period was short-lived. In 1960, Turkey's army staged a coup d'etat and Menderes was hanged the following year. Here, Mogens Pelt beings by examining the era of the rule of the Democratic Party, and what led to its downfall. Among the chief accusations raised against Menderes by the army was that he had undermined the principles of the founder of modern Turkey, Ataturk, and that he had exploited religion for political purposes. Military Intervention and a Crisis Democracy in Turkey furthermore, and crucially, examines the legacy of the military intervention that brought this era of democratic rule to an end. Although the armed forces officially returned power to the civilians in 1961, this intervention - indeed, this crisis of democracy - allowed the military to become a major player in Turkey's political process, weakening the role of elected politicians. The officer corps claimed that the army was the legal guardian of Kemalism, and that it had the right and duty to intervene again, if the circumstances proscribed it and when it deemed that the values of Ataturk were threatened. Indeed, these were precisely that ground on which the armed forces justified its coup d'etats of 1971 and 1980. This unique exploration of the Menderes period sheds new light on the shaping of post-war Turkey and will be vital for those researching the Turkish Republic, and the influence of the military in its destiny.